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-2- #SECTO 36, September 20, 11:14 p.m. from- New York.
made it clear to them that they will want to be sure how
much of their own force would be retained for the defense
of their own country and how much would be used for general
operations on the continent. They also wanted to know
to what extent the supreme commander would direct his strategy
toward defending their particular countries. Of course, no
one could answer this latter question. Therefore, they
wanted to consult their governments, which is wholly under
standable.
The result of our meetings is that during the recess all of
us will consult our governments and one another and will
meet again next week. At that time I think the idea of an
integrated force will be accepted by all and that the idea
of German participation in it will be accepted by all except
France, unless our discussions in the next few days with
Messrs. Moch and Shinwell bring about a change. As to the
chances of this change, the various European Ministers assure
me that they believe that the French will be able to alter
their position in a matter of a few weeks; whereas McCloy
hears from the French that Moch is coming over here in a very
negative attitude of mind and will be hard to deal with.
As I analyze this situation, it seems to me that we
should clearly differentiate in our minds what we can get
the French to agree to in extreme secrecy and what we can
say about the situation both in the supposed secrecy of the
Atlantic Council and in the communique. I should advise
that we press the French very hard in private and that we
should be as moderate as possible in public. McCloy shares
this view thoroughly. He believes that the immediate future
is very critical in Germany and that the High Commissioners
must have enough leeway to talk with Adenauer in a constructive
and not in a negative way. It seems to me that we cannot
accept any French position which puts us back to the position
of the twenties, when we were adamant in not making any concession
to the Germans who were on our side, and then yielded under
pressure to the Germans who were against us. If, however,
the French will tell us they will enter on a program I do
not think we should push them too far in public confessions.
2. In the meetings of the three Ministers which followed
the NAT Council on Monday afternoon and Tuesday morning
we really made great progress. Aside from the military
side of Germany mentioned above, we reached agreement 01. all
German questions and the High Commissioners are well armec.
to move
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"ocrText": "-2- #SECTO 36, September 20, 11:14 p.m. from- New York.\nmade it clear to them that they will want to be sure how\nmuch of their own force would be retained for the defense\nof their own country and how much would be used for general\noperations on the continent. They also wanted to know\nto what extent the supreme commander would direct his strategy\ntoward defending their particular countries. Of course, no\none could answer this latter question. Therefore, they\nwanted to consult their governments, which is wholly under\nstandable.\nThe result of our meetings is that during the recess all of\nus will consult our governments and one another and will\nmeet again next week. At that time I think the idea of an\nintegrated force will be accepted by all and that the idea\nof German participation in it will be accepted by all except\nFrance, unless our discussions in the next few days with\nMessrs. Moch and Shinwell bring about a change. As to the\nchances of this change, the various European Ministers assure\nme that they believe that the French will be able to alter\ntheir position in a matter of a few weeks; whereas McCloy\nhears from the French that Moch is coming over here in a very\nnegative attitude of mind and will be hard to deal with.\nAs I analyze this situation, it seems to me that we\nshould clearly differentiate in our minds what we can get\nthe French to agree to in extreme secrecy and what we can\nsay about the situation both in the supposed secrecy of the\nAtlantic Council and in the communique. I should advise\nthat we press the French very hard in private and that we\nshould be as moderate as possible in public. McCloy shares\nthis view thoroughly. He believes that the immediate future\nis very critical in Germany and that the High Commissioners\nmust have enough leeway to talk with Adenauer in a constructive\nand not in a negative way. It seems to me that we cannot\naccept any French position which puts us back to the position\nof the twenties, when we were adamant in not making any concession\nto the Germans who were on our side, and then yielded under\npressure to the Germans who were against us. If, however,\nthe French will tell us they will enter on a program I do\nnot think we should push them too far in public confessions.\n2. In the meetings of the three Ministers which followed\nthe NAT Council on Monday afternoon and Tuesday morning\nwe really made great progress. Aside from the military\nside of Germany mentioned above, we reached agreement 01. all\nGerman questions and the High Commissioners are well armec.\nto move"
}