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SCOULS
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT- He NARS Date 624-75
2. That both the National Government and the Communist
Party were willing to negotiate so long as they could win their own
objectives by political means, and that both sides were filled with
such a deep-seated distrust of the good faith of the other that no
concrete results were likely ever to result from such negotiations
if the Chinese factions were left to themselves.
3. That your statement had an extremely healthy effect
throughout China. It had clearly opened the way for American assist-
ance in bringing about a peaceful settlement.
4. That the Soviet objectives in China and the relationship
between the Chinese Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. were extremely ob-
scure but, insofar as they could be judged, made it all the more imper-
ative that the Chinese factions reach a political settlement.
In addition to his deepseated distrust of the Chinese Communists
the Generalissimo was extremely fearful of his and their relationships with
Russia. His first statements to General Marshall were in this vein and he
repeated them on almost every occasion. It seemed at first that his views
might be colored by the thought that he might thus be able to press the
United States into supporting the Central Government in the liquidation of
the Communists. However, with the more recent developments of Russian fail-
ure to leave Manchuria on the agreed date of February 1 and their heavy de-
mands for economic concessions, he seemed to have more justifiable grounds
for his grave concern.
General Marshall concluded that so long as there remained in exis-
tence an independent Communist Government and independent Communist Army,
China was highly vulnerable to undercover Soviet infiltration, which could
result in the Communists overthrowing the Generalissimo by force of arms.
It was his opinion that the Communist forces which lay across the throat
of the strategic areas of North China and controlled the vital north-south
railways, could not be liquidated by National forces without full-scale Am-
erican intervention both in the movement of Chinese forces with American
equipment and the use of American personnel, possibly even combat forces.
Since this was utterly out of the question the Generalissimo would
be left unable to eliminate Communist Armies, which, with their backs to Soviet
Siberia, could easily be supplied and equipped and led under cover by the
Soviets.
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"ocrText": "SCOULS\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973\nBy NLT- He NARS Date 624-75\n2. That both the National Government and the Communist\nParty were willing to negotiate so long as they could win their own\nobjectives by political means, and that both sides were filled with\nsuch a deep-seated distrust of the good faith of the other that no\nconcrete results were likely ever to result from such negotiations\nif the Chinese factions were left to themselves.\n3. That your statement had an extremely healthy effect\nthroughout China. It had clearly opened the way for American assist-\nance in bringing about a peaceful settlement.\n4. That the Soviet objectives in China and the relationship\nbetween the Chinese Communist Party and the U.S.S.R. were extremely ob-\nscure but, insofar as they could be judged, made it all the more imper-\native that the Chinese factions reach a political settlement.\nIn addition to his deepseated distrust of the Chinese Communists\nthe Generalissimo was extremely fearful of his and their relationships with\nRussia. His first statements to General Marshall were in this vein and he\nrepeated them on almost every occasion. It seemed at first that his views\nmight be colored by the thought that he might thus be able to press the\nUnited States into supporting the Central Government in the liquidation of\nthe Communists. However, with the more recent developments of Russian fail-\nure to leave Manchuria on the agreed date of February 1 and their heavy de-\nmands for economic concessions, he seemed to have more justifiable grounds\nfor his grave concern.\nGeneral Marshall concluded that so long as there remained in exis-\ntence an independent Communist Government and independent Communist Army,\nChina was highly vulnerable to undercover Soviet infiltration, which could\nresult in the Communists overthrowing the Generalissimo by force of arms.\nIt was his opinion that the Communist forces which lay across the throat\nof the strategic areas of North China and controlled the vital north-south\nrailways, could not be liquidated by National forces without full-scale Am-\nerican intervention both in the movement of Chinese forces with American\nequipment and the use of American personnel, possibly even combat forces.\nSince this was utterly out of the question the Generalissimo would\nbe left unable to eliminate Communist Armies, which, with their backs to Soviet\nSiberia, could easily be supplied and equipped and led under cover by the\nSoviets.\nARCHIVES \"NATIONAL AMD\nRECORDS\nfor\nSERVICE'\n2"
}