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{
    "localId": "205716148",
    "label": "Memorandum from Secretary of State James Byrnes to Matthew Connelly, with Attached Memorandum from James Shepley to President Harry S. Truman",
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    "id": "205716148",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum from Secretary of State James Byrnes to Matthew Connelly, with Attached Memorandum from James Shepley to President Harry S. Truman",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205716148",
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{
    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "STORE\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973\nBy NLT- HL NARS Date 6.24.75\nThe only hope of maintaining a sovereign China appeared to lie\nin a political settlement which would present a unified nation to the world\nand force any other power that might be intent upon creating a puppet China\nto do so by overt aggression.\nThe Generalissimo clearly was not, and will not be for many years,\nin any position to defend himself against armed Soviet aggression. His only\nhope and sovereign China's only hope in the event the Soviets should make\nhostile moves was to place China in the position of a victim of open aggres-\nsion and hope for the same world support that was drawn to the victims of\nGerman and Japanese aggression.\nGeneral Marshall proceeded to attempt to carry out your instruc-\ntions to strive for a cessation of hostilities in China, a coalition gov-\nernment in which all factions might participate in the government, and the\nintegration of autonomous armies into the national armies of the Republic.\nEach step along the way was extremely laborious and required ex-\ntremes of tact and patience and diplomacy. The Chinese were able to agree to\nalmost anything in general and almost nothing in specific; and even when they\nwere able to agree on specific terms they had not the slightest conception of\nhow to put agreements into operation.\nBasically,General Marshall was able to convince the Generalissimo\nthat it was imperative to him to get an agreement which would put an end to\nthe independent Communist Government and Army, and that this would require\nconcession on his part. General Marshall was able also to convince the Gen-\neralissimo that without such an agreement it was politically impossible for\nthe American Government to make available the aid to China which she needs\nso critically. Essentially, this was the way in which the Government was\nbrought to make the necessary concessions which produced the agreement, but\nit was far less simple than this mere statement. The Generalissimo was con-\ntinually unable to relate his general logic to the day by day incidents that\noccurred in the negotiations with the Communists.\nThe cessation of hostilities, for example, was brought about only\nafter General Marshall went to the Generalissimo late at night and prevailed\nupon him to discontinue efforts to take over the provinces of Jehol and Chahar.\nThe Generalissimo was determined to move into these two provinces, both before\nand after the truce, to gain only a minor advantage, and continued to fail\nto perceive that he was risking everything. In this course he was urged con-\ntinually by his generals and the Kuomintang irreconcilables who were not and\nnever have been in sympathy with, nor understood the vital necessity for the\nagreement. These \"diehard\" elements of the Kuomintang present one of the\nGeneralissimo's most serious problems at this time. It is likely that the\nGeneralissimo can handle them, but before the progress in China that is now\npromised becomes certain, there will undoubtedly be many tense moments pre-\ncipitated by the \"diehards\".\nARCHIVES \"NATIGHAL RECORDS AHD\nEGGIS\nSERVICE^\nto"
}