Ask the Scholar
Page 3 of 4
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) er (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT- the NARS Dats6 24-75
-2-
Dr. Tan, while admitting the impossibility of eliminat-
ing Chinese Communists from China by force, seemed to think
that they could in some way be immunized in so far as
Russia was concerned. He ignored the fact that military
action is forcing the Chinese Communists back on the
Russians.
I expressed the view that a reduction in the influence
of the Communists might be more readily achieved if the
Government "took them in" (in more senses than one) on a
minority basis rather than try to shoot them all.
I
felt,
and I was sure General Marshall felt, that a National Gov-
ernment moving ahead with American support in the job of
rehabilitation and reconstruction would have a better
chance to cut the ground out from under the Communists,
even though they were in the Government, than it would
have of doing so by keeping them out of the Government
and endeavoring to eliminate them by force. I reminded
him that 15 years intermittent efforts to eliminate them
by force when they were receiving no support from Russia
had certainly not proved successful.
At this juncture Dr. Tan asked me whether General
Marshall's recent reports were optimistic and whether he
indicated that he thought the Kuomintang more reasonable
than the Communists or vice versa. I told him that
General Marshall's reports could not be called optimistic
but that they still showed characteristie determination
to stick with the problem. I told him that General
Marshall felt strongly that Chiang Kai-shek should declare
at this time a general truce in order to allow the politi-
cal discussions in the Stuart Committee to move forward
with a view to formation of a State Council and Cabinet,
adoption of a Constitution, in line with the Peoples Con-
sultative Conference Resolution of last January, and
integration of all armed forces into a National Army in
accordance with the agreement of last February.
There ensued some discussion of problems in connec-
tion with Communism in eastern Europe. Dr. Tan said that
the position of the National Government in China was
entirely different from the situation in eastern Europe.
He spoke of the ignorance of the Chinese masses, their
susceptibility to Communist propaganda, and the unfair
methods of the Communist Party. I told him that I could
not
Page data
- Page
- 3
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- c7c77d92edadd3cc
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 205716209
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "205716209",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205716209",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum from Acting Secretary of Will Clayton to President Harry S. Truman, with Attached Memorandum of Conversation",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205716209",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750236/750236-23-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750236/750236-23-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750236/750236-23-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 4,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "205716209",
"label": "Memorandum from Acting Secretary of Will Clayton to President Harry S. Truman, with Attached Memorandum of Conversation",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205716209"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "205716209",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205716209",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum from Acting Secretary of Will Clayton to President Harry S. Truman, with Attached Memorandum of Conversation",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205716209",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750236/750236-23-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750236/750236-23-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750236/750236-23-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 4,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/205716209",
"naId": 205716209,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"logicalDate": "1946-09-01",
"month": 9,
"year": 1946
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 3,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750236/750236-23-03.jpg",
"mediaId": "c7c77d92edadd3cc",
"ocrText": "DECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) er (E)\nDept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973\nBy NLT- the NARS Dats6 24-75\n-2-\nDr. Tan, while admitting the impossibility of eliminat-\ning Chinese Communists from China by force, seemed to think\nthat they could in some way be immunized in so far as\nRussia was concerned. He ignored the fact that military\naction is forcing the Chinese Communists back on the\nRussians.\nI expressed the view that a reduction in the influence\nof the Communists might be more readily achieved if the\nGovernment \"took them in\" (in more senses than one) on a\nminority basis rather than try to shoot them all.\nI\nfelt,\nand I was sure General Marshall felt, that a National Gov-\nernment moving ahead with American support in the job of\nrehabilitation and reconstruction would have a better\nchance to cut the ground out from under the Communists,\neven though they were in the Government, than it would\nhave of doing so by keeping them out of the Government\nand endeavoring to eliminate them by force. I reminded\nhim that 15 years intermittent efforts to eliminate them\nby force when they were receiving no support from Russia\nhad certainly not proved successful.\nAt this juncture Dr. Tan asked me whether General\nMarshall's recent reports were optimistic and whether he\nindicated that he thought the Kuomintang more reasonable\nthan the Communists or vice versa. I told him that\nGeneral Marshall's reports could not be called optimistic\nbut that they still showed characteristie determination\nto stick with the problem. I told him that General\nMarshall felt strongly that Chiang Kai-shek should declare\nat this time a general truce in order to allow the politi-\ncal discussions in the Stuart Committee to move forward\nwith a view to formation of a State Council and Cabinet,\nadoption of a Constitution, in line with the Peoples Con-\nsultative Conference Resolution of last January, and\nintegration of all armed forces into a National Army in\naccordance with the agreement of last February.\nThere ensued some discussion of problems in connec-\ntion with Communism in eastern Europe. Dr. Tan said that\nthe position of the National Government in China was\nentirely different from the situation in eastern Europe.\nHe spoke of the ignorance of the Chinese masses, their\nsusceptibility to Communist propaganda, and the unfair\nmethods of the Communist Party. I told him that I could\nnot"
}