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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)
OSD letter, April 12, 1974
By NLT- He , NARS Date 6.2475
-2 -
Communist Party and any non-Communist government. Cer-
tainly during the period of Soviet occupation of Manchuria
there was a close relationship between the Chinese Communist
forces and the Soviets. There is obviously e continuing
community of interest and identity of aims between the
Chinese Communists and Soviet-inspired international Com-
munism. For that reason I am doubtful if an arrangement
which unifies China, and still does not give the Chinese
Communists the power to control or destroy the government
can ever be evolved between the Chinese Communists and a
non-Communist government.
Point number two bears directly on the previous one.
I agree with the necessity for a sympathetic attitude in
determining the extent to which China fulfills the conditions
which are prerequisite to giving economic aid. Even though
we may not wish to inform the Chinese as to the exact standard
of performance which we shall require, I believe that we must
determine this standard for our own use in judging their
attitude and accomplishments. It may be that improvement of
the political situation in China is so contingent on economic
improvement that any decision to withhold U.S. economic ad-
vice and assistance until positive political advancement is
achieved, is tantamount to a decision that we will do nothing
about the problem in the foreseeable future.
With regard to point number three, I find it very diffi-
cult to distinguish clearly between military aid which might
contribute to or encourage civil war, and military or any
other type of economic or material aid which would not have
such an effect. Any stipulation similar to this point must
be considered with the greatest care to avoid the impossible
si tuation in which General Wedemeyer was placed by his post-
hostilities directive, which ordered him to assist National
Government armies in the re-occupa tion of North China, but
not to allow such assistance to influence the internal strife
involved in that re-occupation. I do not believe that the
U.S. should be prepared to accept with equanimity the mili-
tary collapse of the National Government. In the event of
such a collapse the Chinese Communist Party, as the only
strong and disciplined group in China, would be in a strong
position to seize control of the entire country, wi th or
without Russian support. I believe that this is an aspect
of the problem which should be considered by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the light of the strategic situation in
the Far East, and particularly in Manchuria.
von
ARCHIVES A "RATIONAL SERVICE E
E
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"ocrText": "DECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nOSD letter, April 12, 1974\nBy NLT- He , NARS Date 6.2475\n-2 -\nCommunist Party and any non-Communist government. Cer-\ntainly during the period of Soviet occupation of Manchuria\nthere was a close relationship between the Chinese Communist\nforces and the Soviets. There is obviously e continuing\ncommunity of interest and identity of aims between the\nChinese Communists and Soviet-inspired international Com-\nmunism. For that reason I am doubtful if an arrangement\nwhich unifies China, and still does not give the Chinese\nCommunists the power to control or destroy the government\ncan ever be evolved between the Chinese Communists and a\nnon-Communist government.\nPoint number two bears directly on the previous one.\nI agree with the necessity for a sympathetic attitude in\ndetermining the extent to which China fulfills the conditions\nwhich are prerequisite to giving economic aid. Even though\nwe may not wish to inform the Chinese as to the exact standard\nof performance which we shall require, I believe that we must\ndetermine this standard for our own use in judging their\nattitude and accomplishments. It may be that improvement of\nthe political situation in China is so contingent on economic\nimprovement that any decision to withhold U.S. economic ad-\nvice and assistance until positive political advancement is\nachieved, is tantamount to a decision that we will do nothing\nabout the problem in the foreseeable future.\nWith regard to point number three, I find it very diffi-\ncult to distinguish clearly between military aid which might\ncontribute to or encourage civil war, and military or any\nother type of economic or material aid which would not have\nsuch an effect. Any stipulation similar to this point must\nbe considered with the greatest care to avoid the impossible\nsi tuation in which General Wedemeyer was placed by his post-\nhostilities directive, which ordered him to assist National\nGovernment armies in the re-occupa tion of North China, but\nnot to allow such assistance to influence the internal strife\ninvolved in that re-occupation. I do not believe that the\nU.S. should be prepared to accept with equanimity the mili-\ntary collapse of the National Government. In the event of\nsuch a collapse the Chinese Communist Party, as the only\nstrong and disciplined group in China, would be in a strong\nposition to seize control of the entire country, wi th or\nwithout Russian support. I believe that this is an aspect\nof the problem which should be considered by the Joint\nChiefs of Staff in the light of the strategic situation in\nthe Far East, and particularly in Manchuria.\nvon\nARCHIVES A \"RATIONAL SERVICE E\nE"
}