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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 31)1 of (E)
TOP SECRET
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By
NLT- HC NARS Date 6.15.25
against oppressive police measures, corrupt practices and mal-administration of National
Government officials. Some have lost all hope for China under existing leadership and
turn to the Communists in despair. Some accept a new leadership by mere inertia.
Indirectly, the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agree-
ing at the Yalta Conference to Russian re-entry into Manchuria, and later by withholding
aid from the National Government. There were justifiable reasons for these policies. In
the one case we were concentrating maximum Allied strength against Japanese in order
to accelerate crushing defeat and thus save Allied lives. In the other, we were withholding
unqualified support from a government within which corruption and incompetence were
so prevalent that it was losing the support of its own people. Further, the United States
had not yet realized that the Soviet Union would fail to cooperate in the accomplishment of
world-wide plans for post-war rehabilitation. Our own participation in those plans has al-
ready afforded assistance to other nations and peoples, friends and former foes alike, to a
degree unparalleled in humanitarian history.
Gradually it has become apparent that the World War II objectives for which we and
others made tremendous sacrifices are not being fully attained, and that there remains in
the world a force presenting even greater dangers to world peace than did the Nazi mili-
tarists and the Japanese jingoists. Consequently the United States made the decision in
the Spring of 1947 to assist Greece and Turkey with a view to protecting their sovereign-
ties, which were threatened by the direct or inspired activities of the Soviet Union.
Charges of unilateral action and circumvention of the United Nations were made by mem-
bers of that organization. In the light of its purposes and principles such criticisms seemed
plausible. The United States promptly declared its intention of referring the matter to
the United Nations when that organization would be ready to assume responsibility.
It follows that the United Nations should be informed of contemplated action with re-
gard to China. If the recommendations of this report are approved, the United States
should suggest to China that she inform the United Nations officially of her request to the
United States for material assistance and advisory aid in order to facilitate China's post-
war rehabilitation and economic recovery. This will demonstrate that the United Nations
is not being circumvented, and that the United States is not infringing upon China's SOV-
ereignty, but contrary-wise is cooperating constructively in the interest of peace and sta-
bility in the Far East, concomitantly in the world.
The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is
necessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite. The Chinese Communists
may soon gain military control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a gov-
ernment. Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize Manchuria and
conclude a "mutual support agreement" with a de facto Manchurian government of the
Chinese Communists. In that event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual support
agreement with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar agree-
ment with Outer Mongolia. This would create a difficult situation for China, the United
States and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.
5
TOP SECRET
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"ocrText": "DECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 31)1 of (E)\nTOP SECRET\nDept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973\nBy\nNLT- HC NARS Date 6.15.25\nagainst oppressive police measures, corrupt practices and mal-administration of National\nGovernment officials. Some have lost all hope for China under existing leadership and\nturn to the Communists in despair. Some accept a new leadership by mere inertia.\nIndirectly, the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agree-\ning at the Yalta Conference to Russian re-entry into Manchuria, and later by withholding\naid from the National Government. There were justifiable reasons for these policies. In\nthe one case we were concentrating maximum Allied strength against Japanese in order\nto accelerate crushing defeat and thus save Allied lives. In the other, we were withholding\nunqualified support from a government within which corruption and incompetence were\nso prevalent that it was losing the support of its own people. Further, the United States\nhad not yet realized that the Soviet Union would fail to cooperate in the accomplishment of\nworld-wide plans for post-war rehabilitation. Our own participation in those plans has al-\nready afforded assistance to other nations and peoples, friends and former foes alike, to a\ndegree unparalleled in humanitarian history.\nGradually it has become apparent that the World War II objectives for which we and\nothers made tremendous sacrifices are not being fully attained, and that there remains in\nthe world a force presenting even greater dangers to world peace than did the Nazi mili-\ntarists and the Japanese jingoists. Consequently the United States made the decision in\nthe Spring of 1947 to assist Greece and Turkey with a view to protecting their sovereign-\nties, which were threatened by the direct or inspired activities of the Soviet Union.\nCharges of unilateral action and circumvention of the United Nations were made by mem-\nbers of that organization. In the light of its purposes and principles such criticisms seemed\nplausible. The United States promptly declared its intention of referring the matter to\nthe United Nations when that organization would be ready to assume responsibility.\nIt follows that the United Nations should be informed of contemplated action with re-\ngard to China. If the recommendations of this report are approved, the United States\nshould suggest to China that she inform the United Nations officially of her request to the\nUnited States for material assistance and advisory aid in order to facilitate China's post-\nwar rehabilitation and economic recovery. This will demonstrate that the United Nations\nis not being circumvented, and that the United States is not infringing upon China's SOV-\nereignty, but contrary-wise is cooperating constructively in the interest of peace and sta-\nbility in the Far East, concomitantly in the world.\nThe situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is\nnecessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite. The Chinese Communists\nmay soon gain military control of Manchuria and announce the establishment of a gov-\nernment. Outer Mongolia, already a Soviet satellite, may then recognize Manchuria and\nconclude a \"mutual support agreement\" with a de facto Manchurian government of the\nChinese Communists. In that event, the Soviet Union might accomplish a mutual support\nagreement with Communist-dominated Manchuria, because of her current similar agree-\nment with Outer Mongolia. This would create a difficult situation for China, the United\nStates and the United Nations. Ultimately it could lead to a Communist-dominated China.\n5\nTOP SECRET"
}