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    "label": "Report, Strategic Intelligence Estimate of China, Intelligence Review, Supplement Number 3",
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    "title": "Report, Strategic Intelligence Estimate of China, Intelligence Review, Supplement Number 3",
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    "ocrText": "Strategic Intelligence Estimate\nof\ncapt has I\nCHINA\nINTELLIGENCE REVIEW\nSUPPLEMENT No. 3\nAUGUST 1948\nTHE YES ARCHIVES SERVICE NATIONAL HECORDS TREDIN AND NEW\nREVENTEMENT\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nOSD letter, April 12, 1974\nBy NLT ; NARS Date 25.75\nINTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GSUSA\nDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY\nCopy No. 140\nWASHINGTON 25, D.C.\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nOSD letter, April 12, 1974\nBy NLT- HL. NARS Date 6.25.75\nStrategic Intelligence Estimate\nof\nCHINA\nINTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GSUSA\nDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY\nWASHINGTON 25, D.C.\nSECRET\nCONTENTS\nTopography\n1\nPolitical\n4\nEconomic\n8\nTransportation and Tele-\ncommunications\n16\nMilitary\n21\nINTRODUCTION\nPURPOSE\nThis study provides a survey of the main factors in the War Potential of China and attempts to define\nthe conditions under which her potential capabilities would be exercised. Consideration is given to the nature\nof the land mass, the population, governmental organization and stability, the economy, transportation and\ncommunications, the scientific potential, and military capabilities.\nTOPOGRAPHY\nChinese Communist Party, with the possible interim\nexistence of several regional governing bodies in out-\nChina is divided into three large topographic\nlying areas. The foreign policy of the present\nregions. The southwest is a rugged mountain barrier\nChinese Government is reflected in its attitudes of\narea. The northwest is an open, unproductive,\nreliance upon the United States and fear of the\nsemiarid basin and plateau region. The northeast\nU. S. S. R.\nand east consist of lowlands extending from the\ncoast inland, backed and almost completely ringed\nECONOMIC\nby hills and mountains. These lowlands are the\nareas of densest population, main food production,\nThe economy is primarily agricultural. Although\neasiest transportation routes, and potential indus-\nthe country has important mineral deposits, they\ntrial development. They are vulnerable to sea\nhave been exploited only to a minor extent, and there\nattack and can be reached by penetrating the high-\nis very little industry available for the support of\nland rim on the east, north, and northwest.\narmed forces. Ten years of international and civil\nstrife have dislocated all major economic activities.\nSOCIOLOGICAL\nFrom a military point of view, China's chief economic\nvalue to the United States is as a potential supplier\nThe population, estimated at 460,000,000 is the\nof minerals, especially tungsten and antimony, and\nlargest in the world. The current civil war and\ntung oil.\nperiodic local famines will probably keep the popula-\ntion relatively stable for a number of years. A low-\nTRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMU-\nindustrial development, together with a high-illit-\nNICATION\neracy rate and generally poor health standards,\nseverely limits the total number of men that can be\nThe transportation system is badly disrupted and\neffectively mobilized.\nwould be incapable of supporting a modern army in\nmajor operations. Roads and railways are inade-\nPOLITICAL\nquate to cope with the military and economic re-\nquirements of the country. The vast network of\nThe Government has been dominated by the\ninland waterways continues to be a mainstay of the\nKuomintang (Nationalist Party) for the past 20 years.\ntransportation system. Civil air lines have been\nThis extremely conservative party has been unable\nfostered, as a result of the depleted ground commu-\nto solve the postwar economic problem or to resolve\nnications, and to day play an important part in the\nthe civil war in its favor. The stability of the Gov-\ncountry's transportation and economy. China's\nernment is SO shaken that its authority is progres-\nmerchant fleet, although bolstered by war repara-\nsively weakening. In the event of a collapse of the\ntions, is still incapable of handling the nation's\npresent Government, control would pass to the\nrequirements.\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\n2. O. 11652 Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\niii\nOSD lerrer, April 12. 1974\nBy , NARS Date 6.25.75\nSCIENTIFIC\nScientific research and development are of negli-\ngible significance. and the political and economic situ-\nation in China is not favorable for the establishment\nand maintenance of such facilities. Minor research\nhas been done in the field of applied science to aid\nChinese manufacture, but there has been almost none\nin the field of pure science.\nMILITARY\nNational Government forces are mobilized at their\nvirtual maximum strengths; the size of these forces is\nbeyond the country's present industrial capacity to\nsupply in combat operations. Communist forces,\nnumerically inferior and loosely organized, have\nwrested the initiative from the Government. The\ndestructive effects of the civil war are exacting an in-\ncreasing toll from the military potential of China.\niv\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nCONCLUSIONS\nE. O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nOSD letter. April 12, 1974\nBy NLT- , NARS Date 6.25.75\nI. TOTAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES\nThe total military capabilities of China are now divided and committed in a\nstruggle for survival between the National Government and the Chinese Communist\nParty. Neither faction could effectively resist large-scale attack by a foreign power.\nII. FACTORS IN CHINA'S WAR POTENTIAL OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO\nA FUTURE WAR EFFORT OF THE UNITED STATES\nChina's importance to any future war effort of the United States lies in her size,\nmaterial resources, central location in East Asia, and geographic proximity to the\nU. S. S. R. She possesses one-fifth of the world's population, a land area slightly\ngreater than that of the United States, and substantial reserves of a number of stra-\ntegic ores. China has the longest common border with the U. S. S. R. and is within\nair range of Soviet industrial areas and advanced United States bases in the Pacific.\nHer central location in East Asia gives the nation in control of her potential the capa-\nbility of influencing the trends of development in the neighboring areas of Southeast\nAsia and Japan.\nIII. CURRENT AND FUTURE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES AS THEY\nRELATE TO CHINA'S WAR POTENTIAL\nStrongly anti-Communist, the present National Government in China would\nprobably be allied with the United States in a possible war with the U.S. S. R. Should\nthe National Government succumb to threatened disintegration and replacement by\nthe Chinese Communist Party, China would probably be allied with the U.S. S. R.\nV\nSECRET\nTOPOGRAPHY\n60°\nNORTH\nLondon\nAMERICA\nE\nSan Francisco\nSEA\nU\n120\nR\nPCTIC\nNEGAN\nFairbanks\nMoscow\n20°\nE\nA\nS\nI\nA\nALEUTIAN is\n140°\nNovosibirsk\nO\n20%\nAbadan\nIrkutsk\nKhabarovsk\nKURIES\n0\n/40°\nHAWAIIAN ISLANDS\nPACIFIC\n160°\nTokyo\nLOCATION MAP\nNonking\nof\nCHINA\n1000ML\nDistances correct from\nNanking only\nMI\nGUAM\nPHILIPPINES\n2000\nOCEAN\nINDIAN\nOCEAN\n3000 MI\n60\"\n80\"\nAREAL COMPARISON OF CHINA\nAMOO MI\nWITH UNITED STATES\n20°\nSOOO MI\nDarwin\nAREA CHINA 3.858.900 SQ. MI.\nAREA USA 3,022,387 SQ. MI.\nAUSTRALIA\nO\nSidney\n40°\n100°\n120'\n140°\n/160°\n180°\n160°\nCHINA, FOCAL COUNTRY OF THE FAR EAST\nCentrally located in the Far East, China is the strategic cores of the two countries. China is within\npivotal country for Communist expansionist efforts\nlong range bomber distance of large areas of the\nin Asia. She has a long common border with the\nU.S. S. R. and advanced United States strategic\nU. S. S. R., although great distances separate the\nbases in the Pacific.\nSECRET\n1\nTOPOGRAPHY\nSECRET\n701\n1301\nRELIEF\nSOCIALIST\nREPUBLICS\n50°\nWith Major Approach Routes.\n250\n0\n250\n500\nSTATUTE MILES\nSOVIET\nOF\nPOPULATION DISTRIBUTION\n0\nHarbin\nUNION\n100\n110\nOUTER\nMONGOLIA\n40*\nMukden\nHami\nSufu\n-\nKalgan\nQuiren\nPeiping\nKOREA\nYELLOW\nTsinano\nsingled\nSEA\nO\nLanchou\nHsuchou\nSian\nNanking\nO\nShangha\nEAST\nIchang\nHankow\nCHIN\nTHE\nSEAL\nLhasa\nChungking\nWenchow\nSEA\nINDIA\nBHUTAN\nLEGEND\nFoocher\nFlattish Relief Areas Plains, Plateaus.\nWHITE\n/\n-\nAmoy\nand Basins.\nKunming\nTAIWAN\nModerate Relief Areas Hills, High\nSwatom\nCanton\n80\"\nPlateaus or Low Open Mountains.\nO\n20*\nRugged Relief Areas Rugged Hills and\n20\nMountains.\nModerate to Rugged Relief Areas forming\nFRENCH\nSignificant Barriers, Breaks indicate\nBURMA\npossible routes.\nINDO\nHigh Rugged Mountain Areas Major\nBarriers.\nGHINA\nHAINAN\nMajor Routes to Strategic Areas Most\nare densely populated Width of arrow\nindicates importance\n8\nI\nA\nM\nSOUTH\nCHINA\nSEA\n100°\nWE\n120°\nEASTERN LOWLANDS ARE CHINA'S MOST STRATEGIC AREAS\nChina's vital areas are its large eastern lowlands.\nsouth. Movement inland would be easiest at or\nThey are vulnerable to sea and land attack. Landing\nnorth of Shanghai. The highland rim around the\nbeaches are best on the two northern peninsulas (see\nvital lowlands can be penetrated at many points on\narrows) and in the coastal sector from Shanghai\nthe northeast, north, and northwest.\n2\nSECRET\nSECRET\nTOPOGRAPHY\n100\n1101\nCE\n1130°\nBEST PERIODS FOR GROUND OPERATIONS\nMONTHLY TEMPERATURE FOUR STATIONS\n250\n0\n250\n500\n*F\nHumid lowland and basin areas. Operations best\nSTATUTE MILES\n90°\nin winter, or fall and winter.\nHill and mountain areas, with operations best\nUSSR\n50°\nin fall, winter and early spring.\nJAJO TATO A 0 JAIO\nMountain areas with operations best in summer\nMONTHLY RAINFALL FOUR STATIONS\nand fall\nINCHES\nINCHES\n10\n10\nSub humid to desert areas with operations best\nNOV OR DEC\nin spring, or spring, summer, and fall\nSHIPPING\nOR JAN MAR\nJAJO\n,\nA\nI\n0\nI\nan\na\nD\nI\nA\nD\nHarbin\nUSSR\nCANTON\nNANKING\nPEINING\nHARBIN\nO\nOCT OR NOV DEC\nAbsolute maximum temperature\nMean maximum temperature\nMean minutum temperature\nAbsolute-ounument temperature\nJUL, TO JULY TO\nOF APPIL\nOUTER MONGOLIA\nMukden\nOHami\nTO 3NDC OF Tan K\nSufu\nKalgan\nAPRIL\nTO\nJUNE\n$\nPeiping\nDairen\nYELLOW\nAPRIL TO DEC\nTsinan\nSEA\nLanchou\nO: OCT OR NOV To\nTringido\nHsuchou\nSian\nNanking\nJULY\nTO\nNOV\nOR\nDEC\nSEPT\nOR\nOCT\nShanghoi\nEAST\nTO MAR OR APR\nIchang\nHankow\nOHINA\nOCT TO MAR\nOCT TO MAR\nLhasa\nChungking\nSEA\nWenchow\nA\n1.\nFoochow\nSEPT OR OCT TO MAR OR APRIL\nI\nN\nD\nI\nA\nAmoy\nTAIWAN\nKunming\nO\nCanton\n*Swalow\nDEC TOO\nMAR\nBURMA\nFRENCH\nINDO\nHAINAN\nCHINA\nSOUTH\nCHINA\nBAY\nOF\nBENGAL\nSEA\n6\nA\nM\n99°\n100°\nAUTUMN AND WINTER BEST FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS\nWithin the eastern lowlands, trafficability problems\nmountain valleys south of 34° North latitude\ncreated by the combination of heavy rainfall, swollen\n(Hsuchou) and mitigate against heavily mechanized\nrivers, flooded rice fields, and marshes make summer\ncross country operations. NOTE.-The worst season\nthe worst season for military operations. The rice\nfor military operations in some areas may be better\nfields cover extensive areas in the lowlands and\nthan the most favorable season in other areas.\nSECRET\n3\nPOLITICAL\nCHINA'S GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATIC IN FORM ONLY\nTechnically, the Chinese Government became a\nthe Constitution, and very few changes have in fact\nconstitutional democracy on 25 December 1947\nbeen made in the Government. The Kuomintang\nwhen the newly adopted Constitution was put into\n(Nationalist Party) is expected to maintain practical\neffect. Unstable internal conditions, however, have\ncontrol over the Government indefinitely unless\nprecluded actual operation under the provisions of\noverthrown by successful Communist operations.\nNATIONAL GOVERNMENT BUILT AROUND FIVE BRANCHES\nNATIONAL ASSEMBLY\n(3045 MEMBERS)\nPEOPLE\nELECTS PRESIDENT\nAMENDS CONSTITUTION\nPROVINCIAL\nPRESIDENT\nAND\nOF\nMUNICIPAL COUNCILS\nREPUBLIC\nELECT\nAPPOINTS\nCONTROL\nLEGISLATIVE\nEXECUTIVE\nJUDICIAL\nEXAMINATION\nBRANCH\nBRANCH\nBRANCH\nBRANCH\nBRANCH\n(PREMIER\nAND\nHAS POWER\nMEETS\nCABINET)\nHAS POWER\nPERFORMS\nOF\nTWICE A YEAR IN\nISSUES DECREES\nTO\nCIVIL SERVICE\nINVESTIGATION\n3 TO 4 - MONTH\nWITH\nINTERPRET\nAND\nIMPEACHMENT,\nSESSIONS\nCONCURRENCE\nCONSTITUTION\nEXAMINATION\nAUDIT\nOF\nFUNCTIONS\nLEGISLATIVE\n4\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPOLITICAL\nCOMMUNIST DOMINATED\nPOPULATION-I15,000,000\nANTI-GOVERNMENT PARTIES\nCOMMUNIST - 2,000,000\nDEMOCRATIC LEAGUE - 50,000\nGOVERNMENT DOMINATED\nPOPULATION 345,000,000\nPRO GOVERNMENT PARTIES\nKUOMINTANG 4,500,000\nSOCIAL DEMOCRATS 32,000\nYOUNG CHINA PARTY-2,000\nPOLITICAL PARTIES REPRESENT ONLY SMALL SEGMENT OF POPULATION\nThe Government has declared illegal the Chinese\nState within a State. The membership of the two\nCommunist Party and the Democratic League, the\ndominant parties comprises in each instance a very\ntwo major opposition parties. Since the Communist\nsmall percentage of the population governed by\nParty maintains a large armed force and exercises\nthem, but party policies are nevertheless imposed\ngovernmental control over roughly one-fourth of\nwith only slight regard for the will of the majority\nthe country's population, however, it is in effect a\nof the people.\nSECRET\n5\nPOLITICAL\nSECRET\nORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY\nNATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS\nTHEORETICALLY, THE SUPREME\nCCP ORGAN. SCHEDUALED TO MEET\nANNUALLY BUT POWER is LIMITED BY\nINFREQUENCY OF MEETINGS\nELECTS CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE\nCENTRAL\nPARTY COMMITTEE\nCHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG\nSUPREME ORGAN WHEN CON-\nGRESS NOT IN SESSION DIRECTS\nCCP ACTIVITY ON NATIONAL LEVEL\nAPPROXIMATELY 44 MEMBERS\nPOLITICAL BUREAU\nPARTY DEPARTMENTS\nCHAIRMAN: MAO TSE-TUNG\nORGANIZATION, PUBLICITY\nPARTY SECRE TARIAT\nSUPREME NATIONAL CCP\nFOREIGN AFFAIRS, FINANCE\nCHAIRMAN:MAC TSE-TUNG\nORGAN WHEN CENTRAL\nMILITARY AFFAIRS,\nPARTY COMMITTEE is NOT\nMINORIY GROUPS,\n5 MEMBERS\nIN SESSION.13 MEMBERS\nAND OTHERS\nREVOLUTIONARY\nMILITARY COUNCIL\nCHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG\nREGIONAL\nBORDER\nPROVINCIAL\nPOLITICAL\nPOLITICAL BUREAU\nREGION COUNCIL\nCOUNCIL OF PARTY\nDEPARTMENT\nAPPEARS TO BE LINK\nPROVINCIAL\nMILITARY\nBETWEEN PARTY\nCHOSEN BY DIRECT\nDELEGATES\nREGIONS\nPOLITICAL\nORGANIZATION,\nPOPULAR ELECTION\nPARTY COMMITTEE\nELECTS DELEGATES TO\nCOMMISSAR\nARMY, AND LOCAL\nONE THIRD\nNATIONAL PARTY\nGOVERNMENT\nCCP MEMBERS\nCONGRESS\nCOMMUNIST SPONSORED LOCAL GOVERNMENTS\nRELATIONSHIP UNCERTAIN\nCCP-CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY\nCOMMUNIST PARTY WELL ORGANIZED AND STRONGLY DISCIPLINED\nThe Chinese Communist Party is firmly organized,\non a national level, and exercise of the popular\nwith party cells extending down to the village level.\nwill, even on a theoretical basis, stops at the local\nPolitical power on a national level is vested in the\nlevel of the border region council. At the level of\nCentral Committee and Political Bureau. Policy\nthe operating field echelons military, political, and\ndirectives are issued to the regional military and\nlocal government organizations function on a parallel\npolitical organs. There is no governmental organ\nbasis.\n6\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPOLITICAL\nCENTERS OF SOVIET INTRIGUE\nU\nS\nS\nR\nHarbin\nIli Region\n(Semi -Autonomous)\nOUTER\nMONGOLIA\n80\nChangchun\nTIHUA\nChihfeng\nMukden\n&\nSINKIANG\nKalgan\nPootou\nPeiping\na\nDairen\nRiver)\nTientsin\nChefoo\nYELLOW\n7\nTsinan\nSEA\nTsingtao\nYenan\nAnyong\nLinfen\nLanchou\nKaifeng\nPaochi\nSion\nEAST\nTIBET\nShanghai\n(Autonomous)\nNanking\nCHINA\nYangtze\nN\nHankow-\nSEA\n&\nChungking\n4\nL\nBHUTAN\nKweiyang\nI\nN\nD\nI\nA\nTAIWAN\nKunming\nHongkong\n250\n0\n250\n500\nBURMA\nFRENCH\nSTATUTE MILES\nINDO CHINA\nHAINAN\nLEGEND\nSOVIET\nSOVIET\nSOVIET\nU.S.S.R.\nSOVIET\nSOVIET\nCHINESE\nPOTENTIAL\nPOTENTIAL\nCOMMUNITIES\nCONSULATE-\nSATELLITE\nOCCUPIED\nCOMMUNISTS\nSOVIET\nSOVIET\nEMBASSY\nGENERALS\nSATELLITE\nINFLUENCE\nCHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY UNDERGOING SEVERE TESTS\nSuccessful Communist military operations threaten\nProvince threaten China's ability to hold that area,\nthe survival of the Chinese Government as an effec-\nand recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent\ntive, national, political entity. Continued economic\nstate has strengthened the autonomy movement of\ndeterioration characterized by an unbalanced budget,\nthe Inner Mongolians. The Soviet position on the\nspiraling inflation, lack of production, stagnation of\nstatus of Dairen and Port Arthur has weakened\ncommerce, and commodity shortages may culminate\nChinese authority in Manchuria by denying those\nin financial collapse. Tribal rebellions in Sinkiang\nports to the government.\nSECRET\n7\nECONOMIC\nCHINA'S ECONOMY, NOW CHAOTIC, HAS IMPORTANT POTENTIALITIES\nAGRICULTURE-THE ECONOMIC\n75\nBACKBONE\n100\n50\n45.3%\n75\n70%\n25\n50\n66%\n0\nCHINA\nU.S.\nACRES OF FARM LAND PER\n25\nPERSON ON FARM\n9%\nChina is primarily an agricultural nation, with\nsome 85 percent of the population living on farms and\n0\nCHINA\nU.S.\napproximately 70 percent of the national income\nPERCENT OF NATIONAL INCOME\nderived from agriculture. Although China ranks\nDERIVED FROM FARMING\nfirst as a world producer of rice and, in recent years,\nhas been the second largest producer of wheat, the\n100\nmajority of her people have long lived at the margin\nof subsistence. The diet, derived in large measure\n85%\nfrom cereals, is low in calories and deficient in impor-\ntant health-building elements. Droughts, floods, and\n75\nother causes result in widespread periodic famines.\nThe extremely poor transportation system often pre-\nvents the movement of food to famine areas, and the\nlarge coastal cities find it necessary to import a sub-\n50\nstantial portion of their food from abroad, rather than\nrelying entirely on shipments from the hinterland.\nFor a number of years, Manchuria has had a surplus\nof agricultural products for export, but it is possible\n25\n18.1%\nthat under relatively stable conditions a rapidly\nexpanding Manchurian population may well absorb\nthis surplus, unless there is a corresponding improve-\n0\nment in production methods.\nCHINA\nU.S.\nChina is by far the world's leading producer and\nPERCENT OF POPULATION\nexporter of tung oil and has been the major source\nON FARMS\nof this oil for the United States.\n8\nSECRET\nSECRET\nECONOMIC\nCALORIES AVAILABLE FROM PREWAR FOOD SUPPLIES\n(PER HEAD PER DAY AT THE RETAIL LEVEL)\nMILK\n3000\nFROM MEAT\nFROM\nFRUITS AND\nVEGETABLES\n2000\nFROM PULSES\nFROM FATS\nFROM SUGAR\n1000\nFROM ROOTS\nAND TUBERS\nFROM\nCEREALS\nCHINA\nUNITED STATES\nSECRET\n9\nECONOMIC\nSECRET\n90°\n100\n110\"\n250\n0\n250\n500\nSTATUTE MILES\nSOCIALIST\nREPUBLICS\n50\"\nMAJOR FARMING AREAS\nSOVIET\nOVER 40% OF AREAS IN CULTIVATION\n20% TO 40% OF AREAS IN CULTIVATION\nTANNU TUVA\n?0\"\nHSINGAN\nOF\nHOKIANG\nNUNKIANG\nUNION\nOUTER\nMONGOLIA\nLIADREN\nKIRIN\nDEPARTMENT\nCHAHAR\nNGT\nJEHOL\nLAONINGS\nSUIYUAN\nSINKIANG\nK\nNINGHSIA\nII\nA\nHOPEH\nN\nSHANSI\nTSINGHAI\nSHANTUNG\nYELLOW SEA\nHONAN\nSHENSI\nTIBET\nANHWEI\nH\nP\nE-H\nEAST\nSZ\nH\nW\nSIKANG\n@\nCHEKIANG\nCHINA\nSEA\n4\n4\nKIANGSI\n0\nBHUTAM\n.KWEICHOW\nHUNAN\nFUKIEN\n14\nI\nN\nD\nI\nA\nN\nG\nTAIWAN\nYUNNAN\nKWANGSI\nFRENCH\nBURMA\nINDO\nCHINA\nSOUTH CHINA SEA\nBAY\nOF\nBENGAL\nSTAM\n\"\n1000\nAGRICULTURE CENTERED IN EASTERN PLAIN REGIONS\nThe chief farming areas of China are found on the\nwhich are of little value for cultivation, the Chinese\nbroad alluvial plains in the east and north and on the\nhave terraced the slopes wherever the soil is deep\nflood plains bordering the rivers in the highlands of\nenough. Nevertheless, the total area under cultiva-\ncentral, south, and west China. While the greater\ntion constitutes only about 12.5 percent of China\npart of China consists of hill and mountain areas,\nproper.\n10\nSECRET\nSECRET\nECONOMIC\n190°\n100°\n110°\n120°\n250\n0\n250\n500\nSTATUTE MILES\nCROP DISTRIBUTION\nSOCIALIST\nREPUBLICS\n50\nSOVIET\n70\"\nOF\nTANNU TUVA\nAREA\nUNION\nSOYBEAN\nHarbin\nOUTER MONGOLIA\nKAOLIANG\n& R RE\nWHEAT\nlientsin\nWINTER\n7\nYELLOW\nWHEAT\nSPRING\nWINTER WHEAT\nAREA\nSEA\nMILLET AREA\nSian\nShanghai EAST\nSZECHWAN RICE\nYANGTZE RICE\nAREA\nAREA\nHankow\nCHINA\nNNPAL\nChungking\nSEA\n:BHUTAN\nRICE\nTEA\nAREA\nKweiyang\nC\nSOUTH WESTERN RICE AREA\n1\nN\nD\n1\nA\nKunming\nDOUBLE CROPPING Canton RICE ARE\nTAIWAN\n80°\nFRENCH\nBURMA\nBAY\nINDO\nSOUTH\nCHINA\nHAINAN\nOF\nCHINA\nBENGAL\nSEA\nSIAM\n100°\nFARM PRODUCTS FOR DIRECT HUMAN UTILIZATION\nCultivated land is almost universally devoted to\nWheat, kaoliang, and millet are raised in the dry\ncrops for direct human utilization. There are few\nnorth, while rice predominates in the humid south.\nlivestock herds and only limited grazing areas con-\nAll byproducts, such as stalks or straw, are utilized\nfined to the northwest. Orchards and wood lots are\nfor fuel, as fodder for labor animals, or for building\nconspicuous for their absence, except on some hillsides.\nmaterials.\nSECRET\n11\nECONOMIC\nSECRET\nCHINA HAS LARGE IMPORTANT MINERAL DEPOSITS\n100,000%\n0\nCOAL\no\nIRON ORE\nA\nTUNGSTEN\nHarbin\nANTIMONY\no\nMukden\no\no\n0\n4000%\nPeiping\nTatung\no\no\nYellow\n0\no\nOF A D T C T $ N E S U E T R E P\nTaiyuan\nT\nR\niver\nHsuchou\nN\n2000%\nNanking\nA\nN\nHankow\nT\nYangtze\niver\nM\no\nChungking\nO\nN\n630%\nU\nY\nHengyang\nA\n600\nN\nG\n500\nAmoy\nS\no\n460%\nB\nT\n400\nE\nI\nR\nM\nMH-XCDW\nU\nN\nCanton\n300\nA\nX\nNanning\nQ\nC\n0\no\nN\nN\n200\nP\nC\nG\nP\no\n0\nE\nE\nR\no\n100\nA\nE\nR\nL\nR\nUNITED STATES\n42%\nE\nRESERVES\n11%\n12%\nCHINESE MINERAL RESERVES EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE\nSOME MAJOR CENTERS OF MINERAL PRODUCTION\nOF CORRESPONDING U. S. MINERAL RESERVES\nChina has the world's fourth largest reserve of coal\ndeveloping industry for many years. Known re-\nand substantial iron ore deposits. These two miner-\nserves of petroleum are comparatively small (about\nals are SO situated as to permit the development of\none-tenth of 1 percent of United States reserves) and\nan important iron and steel industry. Deposits of\nhave been exploited to only a limited degree. De-\nmagnesite, tungsten, and antimony are probably the\nposits of oil shale are, however, large.\nlargest in the world.\nAn effective exploitation of these mineral resources\nReserves of bauxite, tin, and manganese are ade-\nis dependent upon (a) an end of the civil war and the\nquate to meet the needs of a sizeable industry. While\nrestoration of political stability, and (b) substantial\nknown deposits of lead, zinc, and copper are not\nforeign aid in the form of capital equipment and\nlarge, they probably would be sufficient to supply a\ntechnical assistance.\n12\nSECRET\nSECRET\nECONOMIC\nMINERAL PRODUCTION HAS STEADILY DECLINED*\nANTIMONY\nBITUMINOUS COAL\n16\n40\nI2\n8\n02 TONES T\n33\n26\n4\n19\nTONN\no\n12\n1937\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n1937\n38\n39\n40\n4I\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\nZINC METAL\nLEAD METAL\n1.2\n3\n.9\n2\n.6\nTONES SETRICE\nTONES E T\nI\n.3\no\no\n1937\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n1937\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n48\nTIN METAL (EXPORTS)\nTUNGSTEN ORE (M.C.)\n16\n16\nTONES 04\nI2\n4\nTONE T\n12\n8\n8\n4\no\no\n1937\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n1937\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n* STATISTICS IN CHARTS EXCLUDES MANCHURIA\nThe combined effects of the war with Japan, civil\nIn the past, China has been an important source of\nstrife, the disruption of transportation, the tremen-\ntungsten for the United States and has also supplied\ndous inflation, and other difficulties have brough a\nsmall amounts of antimony and tin. When normal\nlarge portion of the mining and smelting industry to a\nmining activities are again possible, China probably\nvirtual standstill. Under the conditions now pre-\nwill be an important exporter to the United States of\nvailing in China, no real recovery of production can\nboth tungsten and antimony.\nbe expected.\nSECRET\n13\nECONOMIC\nSECRET\nCHINA HAS LITTLE INDUSTRY\nIRON AND STEEL\nMOTOR VEHICLE\nIND. MACHINERY\nAIRCRAFT\nINDUSTRY\nINDUSTRY\nINDUSTRY\nINDUSTRY\nINDUSTRY\n(Very small)\n(None)\n(Very small)\n(None)\n(Large)\nThe small industrial establishment is capable of\ndispersal of skilled labor and technicians, and other\nmeeting only a fraction of the nation's needs for\nfactors. Aside from a comparatively large textile\nmanufactured products. Although a substantial\nindustry there are few manufacturing industires of\nindustrial capacity was built up in Manchuria by the\nmilitary significance, although small quantities of\nJapanese, most of this capacity must be regarded as\niron and steel and industrial machinery are produced,\nlost indefinitely because of Soviet removals, deteriora-\nand there is a substantial output of simple consumer\ntion of equipment, lack of critical replacement parts,\ngoods.\nTANKS\nMED. AND\nLIGHT\nSMALL\nMORTARS\nSMALL ARMS\nSHELLS\nHEAVY ART.\nARTILLERY\nARMS\nAMMUNITION\n(None)\n(None)\n(None)\n(Sm1ll)\n(Small)\n(Small)\n(Small)\nA substantial part of the limited industrial capacity\narms and infantry weapons capacity cannot begin\nis devoted to the manufacture of arms, ammunition,\nto meet requirements, since much of the capacity is\nand military equipment for use of the Nationalist\nconstantly involved in repair and rehabilitation of\narmies. Munitions manufacture is confined chiefly to\nold equipment. Ammunition production is sufficient\nsmall arms, other infantry weapons, and ammunition.\nfor perhaps 30 percent of the Army's over-all re-\nAside from a few 75-mm. pieces, the Chinese have\nquirements, but in certain categories (United States\nnot attempted the manufacture of artillery. Small\nweapons) is virtually nonexistent.\n14\nSECRET\nSECRET\nECONOMIC\nINFLATION STILL SERIOUSLY THREATENS CHINA'S ECONOMY DESPITE\nNEW CURRENCY\nAMERICAN DOLLAR\nCHINESE DOLLAR\n37,000,000\nAPRIL 1948\nS\n(1937)\n(3½)\n(MAY 1945)\n(950)\nN\n14,074,000\nJANUARY 1948\n$\n0\nW\n(MARCH 1948)\n(450,000)\n0\n8,330,000\nDECEMBER 1947\n0\nS\n4,325,000\nSEPTEMBER 1947\nT\n2,431,333\nMAY 1947\n1937\nITEMS COSTING 100 CHINESE DOLLARS IN 1937\n(MAY 1948)\n(1,000,000)\nINDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES\nCHINESE DOLLARS FOR\nFOR BASIC COMMODITIES\nONE AMERICAN DOLLAR\nChina has already experienced an inflation so long\nsupply of money. In addition, public confidence in\nand severe that it would probably have paralyzed a\nthe future value of the currency steadily declined\nhighly industrialized nation. The essentially agrarian\nas political, economic, and military conditions con-\neconomy, in which the peasant farmers are relatively\ntinued to deteriorate. Prices have therefore been\nself-sufficient, has tended to minimize the disruptive\npushed ever higher.\neffects of the rapid price rise.\nOn August 20 the National Government placed\nThe inflation resulted from the issuance of huge\nthe currency on a Gold basis. Government owned\nquantities of paper money by the Government,\nproperties and bullion were earmarked as backing\nlargely to support its military forces. At the same\nfor the new Gold Yuan which has been fixed at the\ntime, declining production and a disrupted trans-\nvalue of $3,000,000 to one. Despite this measure,\nportation system have resulted in an acute scarcity\nhowever, the existing budget imbalance is likely to\nof goods available for purchase with the increased\nbe the main reason for continued inflation.\nSECRET\n15\nTRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS\nHIGHWAY CONDITIONS\n250\n0\n250\n500\nNOVEMBER 1947\nSTATUTE MILES\nin operation\nSOVIET\nSOCIALIST\nREPUBLICS\nTo be restored\nDestroyed by communists\nOF\nTANNU TUVA\nDIVION\nOUTER\nMONGOLIA\nTihua\nChihfeng\nHami\nKalgan\nChengte\nPeiping\nAnsi\nDairen\nTentar\nVehnawer\nNinghsia\nWuwei\n(Tsinanc)\nisingido\nHsining Lanchou\nKaiteng\nHsuchou\nSian\nNanking\nhanglio\nChengtu\nHankow\nEAST\nWuchang\nKangting\nChungking\nNanchang\nCHINA\nChangsha\nSEA\nBHUTAN\nFoother\nHengyang\nKweiyang\nKweilin\nDAmoy\nINDIA\nTAIWAN\nKunming\nCanton\nPaylow\nNanning\nMengkong\nBURMA\nFRENCH\nINDO\nHajon\nCHINA\nHAINAN\nBAY OF BENGAL\nSOUTH CHINA SEA\nSIAM\nROADS ARE WAR-DAMAGED AND POORLY MAINTAINED\nChina's road network was not conceived as a\nwaterways, relies heavily upon the few existing roads.\nunified whole, but built from point to point as regional\nAll major cities are linked by roads of some descrip-\ntraffic demanded. Many roads lead to dead-ends\ntion. The best construction is water-bound ma-\nbecause they are intersected by rivers navigable\ncadam or gravel; few roads are paved. Wartime\nonly by small craft. Western and northwestern\ndestruction of roads was heavy and continues in the\nChina, almost devoid of railroads and navigable\ncivil war. Reconstruction is slow and inadequate.\n16\nSECRET\nSECRET\nTRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS\n50°\n110'\n120°\n130°\n140° 50\nUSSR\nLEGEND\nouter MONGOLIA\nNenchiang\nOperable\nPeian\nDamaged-inoperable\nRAILROAD STATUS\nStatus unknown\nas of April 1948\nM\nHarbin\nFuyu\n100\n250\n0\n250\n500\nSTATUTE MILES\nChangchung\nTungliao\nJAPAN\n90\nControlled by\nMukden\n40\nNationalists\n26.4%\n40°\nPaotou\nAntung\nOF\n80\nPeiping\nTatung\n73.6\nTientsin\nDairen\nTaiyuan\nKOREA\nSEA\n70\nYELLOW\nControlled by\n60\nCommunists\nTsinan\nSEA\n26.2%\nAnyang\nTsingtao\nTienshui\nKaifeng\n50\n47.4\nChenghsien\nHsuchou\nPangfou\n40\nNanking\nSoochow\n30°\nEAST\n30°\nWuhu\nShanghai\n30\nHankow\nDestroyed\nChiuchiang\nHangchow\nCHINA\nor damaged\nIpin\nChangsha\nNanchang\nSEA\n20\nlyang\n10\nKweiyang\n140°\nKunming\nKweilin\n0\nTAIWAN\nLiuchow\nCanton\nBURMAN\nLookey\nFRENCH\nHongkong\n20°\n110°\nINDO CHINA\n130°\nRAILROAD STATISTICS\nOPERABLE MILEAGE\nTOTAL RAILROAD MILEAGE\nNATIONALISTS\nCOMMUNISTS\nTOTAL\nChina\n10,060\n4,295 92%\n345 8%\n4,640\nManchuria\n6,690\n125 4%\n4,050 96%\n4,175\nTotal\n16,750\n4,420\n4,395\n8,815\nRAILROAD SYSTEM DISRUPTED AND INADEQUATE\nThe railroads of China are not capable of coping\nof the Chinese Government as long as the civil war\nwith the economic and military needs of the country.\ncontinues.\nDisrupted by 10 years of continuous war, about half\nThe existing railroads, concentrated in eastern\nof the operable lines are controlled by the Commu-\nChina and Manchuria, are of standard gage. Double\nnists, most of these being in Manchuria. Restoration\ntracks have been cannibalized in repairing war-\nof railroad communications is beyond the capabilities\ndamaged lines.\nSECRET\n17\nTRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS\nSECRET\n90°\n100°\n110°\n120°\n130°\n140\nWATERWAYS, PORTS AND MERCHANT MARINE\nAmur\nUSSR\nLEGEND\nS\nSteamer routes\nCOMPARATIVE GROSS TONNAGE\n50\n(showing tonnage capacity)\nAmur\ns\n140\nWORLD\nJunk and launch routes\nR\nAreas of numerous canals\nand canalized streams\nUnusable\nTsitsihar\nSungart\nPrincipal ports\n69,806,483\n13\nSecondary ports\nNonni\nHarbin\nOUTER\nCHINA\nMONGOLIA\nKirin\n809,000\nLiaoyuan\n40°\nLiao\nSEA OF\n250\n0\n250\n20\n500\nYalu\nYellow\nHulutao\nYingkou\nSTATUTE MILES\nChinwangtao\nAntung\nJAPAN\nPeiping\nI Iangku\nDairen\n4\nTientsin\nToku\nPort Arthur\n50\nTehsien\nLungkow\nWelhaiwei\nChefoe\nYELLOW\n7\nLanchou\na\nTsingino\nYellow\n50\nCrand\nSEA\nWei\nLienyunkang\nNancheng\nYOU\n30\nNanking\nOG\nShanghai\nEAST\nChialing\nYangtze\nHankow\nMin\n50\n50\n2000\nChenhol\nNingpo\nCHINA\nChungking\nChiuchiang\nShihpu\nINDIA\nHalmen\nYangtze\n50\nSEA\n50\nKan\nWenchow\n50\nCanal Hengyang Hsiang\nMin\nFoochow\nNanpan\nKeelung\nKwei\nPeh\nWuchi\nSugo\nTung\nAmoy\nHuallenkang\n«\ngshui\nWuchow\nTAIWAN\n50\nHSi\nCanton\nSwotow\n50\n14\nKoohsiung\n20°\nBURMA\nNanning\nMacool\nHangkong\nFRENCH\nPaihai\n1\nofort Boyard\nINDO CHINA\nSOUTH CHINA\nSIAM\nHaik\nHaikou\nPaill\nSEA\nHAINAN\nYulie\n100°\nSanya 110*\n120\"\n130°\nMARITIME TRAFFIC FAR BELOW\nINLAND WATERWAYS A MAJOR\nPREWAR LEVEL\nTRANSPORTATION MEDIUM\nChina's ports are inadequate for her domestic and\nWaterways extend far into the interior where other\nforeign requirements. All of them have suffered\nmeans of communication are often inadequate or non-\nwar damage or deterioration in recent years, and\nexistent, although only a relatively small part are\nwill require a considerable amount of rehabilitation.\nnavigable by steamships.\n18\nSECRET\nSECRET\nTRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS\n/90\n100°\n110°\n120°\n1307\n1140\n50°\nLEGEND\n50*\nUSSR\nUSSR\nRoutes of China National Aviation Corp.\nRoutes of Central Air Transport Corp.\nPoints served by Civil Air Transport (CNRRA)\nForeign airlines\n140°\nAeroflot\n(U.S.S.R)\nChina's total civil air carriers can lift 3300\nfrom\nAlma Ata\ntroops or 330 tons of cargo per mission.\nTihua\n250\n0\n250\n500\nSTATUTE MILES\nHami\nOUTER MONGOLIA\n40°\nMukden\n10°\nKueisui\nNov. 1947\nA\nSEA OF JAPAN\nPeiping\nTientsin\nTaiyuan\nTsinan\nWeihsier\nYELLOW\nAnyang\nLanchou\nTsingtao\nSEA\nKaifeng\n90°\nSian\nChenchow\nNWA (US)\nfrom Takyo\n30°\nNanking\nChengtu\nShanghai\nIchang\nHankow\nEAST\nFAA (U.S.)\n1/4\nChungking\nTUS\nChiuchiang\nSichang\nSaigon\nCHINA\nTHE\nINDIA\nNanchang\nSOME Good\nChangsha\nfrom\nSEA\nKweiyong\nHengyong\nfrom\nCalcutta\n(Fronce)\nKunming\nKweilin\nPARTY\nFoochow\nChenghsien\nToipei\nLiuchow\nAmoy\nTAIWAN\nCanton\nTainan\nSwatow\n20°\nBURMA\nNonning\nfrom\nFRENCH\nHongkong\nManila\n20°\nU.S.\nSOUTH\nINDO Hanoi\n(U.S.)\nCHINA\nSIAM\nCHINA\nBOAC (U.K.). Haiko Bangkok Bang PAA\nMonito\nSEA\nNWA (U.S.) NWA/(U.S.)\nfrom Manila\nmost\n/100°\n110°\n120°\n11301\nINTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS RELY HEAVILY ON AIR TRANSPORT\nAir transport is a vital adjunct to communications\n(CAT) performs unscheduled services, largely for\nand supplies in China's interior, where surface facil-\nrehabilitation and relief, to outlying regions. The\nities are inadequate. Two scheduled airlines, the\ndevelopment of international air routes in China has\nChina National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and\nbeen restricted by the requirements of internal supply.\nthe Central Air Transport Corporation (CATC), link\nHowever, foreign commercial air lines are gradually\nChina's main traffic hubs. Civil Air Transport\nmeeting the demands of international air traffic.\nSECRET\n19\nTRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS\nSECRET\n110\n120\nU\nS\nS\nR\nTELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES\nU\nS\nLEGEND\nS\nTelephone or Telegraph Station\nR\nLow Power Radio Station\nHigh Power Radio Station\nOUTER\nTelephone or Telegraph Line\nUnderground Cable\nMONGOLIA\nHarbin\n250\n0\n250\n500\nNingkuta\nSTATUTE MILES\nChangchun\nExternal cable lines shown DD map are pre wat and are not in\nKirin\nChangtu\noperation at present.\n40\"\n/\nMukden\nSEA OF\nChinhsien\n10\nJAPAN\nKueisui\nKolgan\nChinwangt\nAntung O.Gishu\nPeiping\nDamien\nPooting\nDate\nTients\nKaila\nTaiyuan\nfoo\nELLOW\nMIDNIN\nKOREA\nTsinan\nlanchou\nWeihsien\nFuscing\nSEA\nJAPAN\nTsining\n/90°\nOMoopo\nloyang\nHalkhou\nSign\nKaifeng\nHsuchou\na\nMagaink\nChingchiangpu\nChungsiang\nChinkian\nNanking\nPatung\nShashih\nShanghai\nChengtu\nWanhsien\nAnking\nChungming\nEAST\nIchang\nHankow\nHangchow\nChienli\nChungking\n.\nTingho\nChiuchiang\nCHINA\nLanchi\nIpin\nLubsien\nNanchang\nSEA\nINDIA\nChangsha\nHsiangton\nPucheng\nWanch\nChian\nKweiyang\nFoochow\nKunming\nKanhsien\nKweilin\n09\nKeelung\nChinmen\nToipel\nAmoy\nTAIWAN\nTsangwu\nCanton\nMingchiang\nSwatow\nBURMA\nLangson\nNanning\nHenghsien\nTunghsing\nHongkong\nMontay\nLienchou\nFRENCH\nHonoi\nSOUTH\nGox Tow\nrefort Bayard\nKienan\nINDO\nCae Bo\nHajon\nCHINA\nSIAM\nCHINA\nChingebov\nSEA\nHAINAI\n110\"\nFEW CITIES ADEQUATELY SERVICED BY TELECOMMUNICATIONS\nTelecommunications are best around Nanking,\nThe above three cities have the only international\nShanghai, and Hong Kong, but even there they are\nradio outlets and are the principal centers of broad-\nvery poor by United States standards. Elsewhere\ncasting, which is negligible elsewhere.\ntelecommunications are very primitive. Services\nLow-powered radio sets are used in many places to\nsuffer from many years of war and no maintenance.\nsupplement the very poor land lines.\n20\nSECRET\nMILITARY\nNATIONALIST FORCES UNABLE TO\nMAINTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY\nChina's military forces could not long withstand\nattack from outside by a major power. Weaknesses\ninherent in the Chinese social, economic, and political\nfabric have retarded the development of a modern\nfighting force. The current civil war has not only\nnullified many of the improvements made with United\nStates assistance during World War II, but has\nstarted a degenerative process which has progressed\nto the extent that the National Government is inca-\npable of defeating the Communist forces with the\nmilitary means at its disposal.\nSECRET\n21\nMILITARY\nSECRET\n100\nREPUBLICS\n250\n250\n500\nSITUATION IN JANUARY 1947\nSOCIALIST\nSTATUTE MILES\nNATIONALIST FORCES REACHED\nSOVIET\nMAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS\nCommunist Controlled Areas\nTANNU TUVA\nHSINGAN\nHOKIANG\nOF\no\nU\nT\nE\nR\nNUNKIANG Harbin\nUNION\nMONGOLIA\nLIAOPEH\nKIRIN\nCHAHAR\nJEHOL\nO\nTihua\nMukden\noHami\nChihfeng\nTHE\nSUIYUAN\n(Chengte\nKalgan\nSINKIANG\nPootou\nPeipingr\nNINGHSIA\n4\nNL\nBentsin\nJairon\nWeihziwel\nNinghsia\nHOPEH\nSHANSI\nWuwei\nTSINGHAI\ns\nTsinan\nTsingito\nHsining\nis\nYELLOW SEA\nLanchou\nKaifeng\nKIANGSI\nSian\nHONAN\nSHENSI\nNanking\nTIBET\nShangha\nHUPEH\nANHWEI\nSZECHWAN\nHankow\nRAST\n4\nSIKANG\nChengtu\n(Wuchang\nCHINA\nLhasa\nKangtingᶜ\nNanchang\\CHEKIA\nSEA\nChungking\nO\nChangsha\n(BHLTAN,\nKWEICHOW HUNAN\nKIANGSI\nSochow\nHerfgyang\nKweiyang\nFUKIEN\nLiechow\nTHIWAN\nKunming\nAmoy\nENDIA\nKWANGTUNG\nYUNNAN\nKWANGSI\nCanton\nSmokew\nNanning\nHongkong\nFRENCH\nBURMA\nINDO\nHeich\nCHINA\nAMAN\nSOUTH CHINA SEA\nNATIONALIST STRATEGY FAILS TO HALT COMMUNIST EXPANSION\nThe strategy adopted by the National Government\nand maintain effective control over large sections of\nafter VJ-day envisioned the seizure of industrial\na predominantly Communist countryside. Although\ncenters and communication lines, the division and\nthree times as large as the Communist Army, the\ndestruction of the Communist military forces, and\nNationalist Army was SO organized, trained, and\nthe extension of Government hegemony over all\nequipped that, without substantial industrial support,\nChina. This plan required that its armies press\nit would have a limited effective operating life. The\nattacks on Communist-controlled areas, supply\nNationalist Army reached maximum effectiveness in\nevery point on several thousand miles of railroads,\nearly 1947 and then began to deteriorate.\n22\nSECRET\nSECRET\nMILITARY\n100\n250\n0\n250\n500\nSITUATION IN MARCH 1948\nSTATUTE MILES\nSOCIALIST\n50°\nCOMMUNIST FORCES EXERCISE\nSOVIET\nREPUBLICS\n$5\nINITIATIVE THROUGHOUT\nCommunist-Controlled Areas\nOF\nTANNU TUVA\nHSINGAN\nHEILUNGKIANG\nHOKIANG\nUNION\nNUNKIANG\nHarbin\nSUNGKIANG\nLIAOPEH-\nOUTER\nMONGOLIA\nKIRIN\nTihua\nCHAHAR\nANTUNG\nJEHOL\nChihfeng\nMukden\nHami\nChengte\nLIAONING\nS\nSUIYUAN\nI\nN\nKalgan\nK\nA\nN\nPootou\nG\no+\nPeiping\nNINGHSIA\nKANSU\nNinghsia\nHOPEH\nWuwei\nSHANTUNG\nYELLOW\nT\no\n&\nSEA\nTsinan\nIsingino\nN\nHsining\nSHANSI\n\"\nOlanchou\nHsuchou\nSHENSI\nKaifeng\nKIANGHT\nT\nSian\nHONAN\nI\nANHWEI\nB\nE\nNanking\nT\nShompher\nSZECHWAN\nSIKANG\nHUPEH\nHankow\nEAST\nOChengtu\nOthasa\nCHINA\nKangting O\nCHEKIANG\nChungking\nONanchang\nSEA\nChangsha\nKIANGSI\nBHUTAN\nHUNAN\nKWEICHOW\nFoochow\nHengyong\nKweiyang\nFUKIEN\nN\nD\nI\nA\nDamos\nYUNNAN\nLiuchow\nTAIWAN\nKunming\nKWANGTUNG\nKWANGSI\nSwatow\nConton\nNonning\nBURMA\nFRENCH\nINDO\nHAINAN\nCHINA\nSOUTH CHINA SEA\nOF\nCOMMUNIST STRATEGY SUCCESSFULLY REDUCING NATIONALIST\nEFFECTIVENESS\nCommunist military strategy has been skillfully\ndeterioration of the Nationalist economy and military\nshaped around available human and material re-\npotential. The tactics employed in the execution of\nsources and the basic economic and social relation-\nthis strategy, however, have been positive and\nships within the country, thereby overcoming the\nadverse factors of numerical inferiority and lack of\naggressive and have enabled the Communists to seize\nindustrial support. This strategy has been essen-\nand exercise the initiative throughout the country.\ntially negative, aimed at obstructing Nationalist\nThey have also capitalized skillfully on the govern-\nefforts and creating conditions which accelerate the\nment's strategic blunders.\nSECRET\n23\nMILITARY\nSECRET\nHUGE MANPOWER RESOURCES MISUSED BY NATIONALISTS, EXPLOITED BY\nCOMMUNISTS\nPEAK WARTIME STRENGTHS\nPOPULATION & MILITARY MANPOWER\n16\n12\n8\n4\n0\n500\n5% (1.9%)\nINDIA\nCHINA\nINDIA\n17% (6.2%)\nCHINA\n460\n&\nPAKISTAN\nP\n400\n7.9% (31%)\nUS\n0\n412\nP\nU\n6.5% (29%)\nUSSR\nL\n% OF TOTAL POPULATION\nA\nT\n300\n(% OF MILITARY MANPOWER)\nI\n*PEAK TOTAL OF ALL TROOPS\n0\nLIVING OFF THE COUNTRY\nN\nI\nN\n200\nU.S.S.R.\nM\n193\nI\nU.S\nL\nL\n145\nI\n100\n125\nO\nN\nS\n35\n0\nMALES OF MILITARY AGE (15-49 YEARS)\nCOMPARATIVE STRENGTHS, NATIONALISM & COMMUNISM\n3,000\nT\n2,500\nH\no\n2,000\nU\nS 1,500\nA\nN\n1,000\nD\nOf the 130,000,000 (32,000,000 in Communist-\nS\n500\ncontrolled areas) Chinese males between the ages of\n15 and 49, probably less than one-third are fit and\n0\navailable for military service. Only an estimated\n1935\n1936\n1937\n1938\n1939\n1940\n1941\n1942\n1943\n1944\n1945\n1946\n1947\n1948\n8,000,000 (the peak wartime strength of troops of all\nkinds living off the country) could be effectively\nmobilized because of the inability of the nation's\nThe Communists have succeeded in developing the\neconomy to support a greater number of nonproduc-\nnatural loyalty and hardihood of their troops by\ntive personnel.\ncapable and considerate leadership, the use of guerrilla-\nMaladministration of the conscription system,\ntype operations for which the manpower is well\ninept leadership, inadequate training, and lack of\nsuited, and propaganda effectively designed to give\nconsideration for the conscripts and men in the armed\nthe people ample incentive to fight for the Commu-\nforces have nullified the effect of Nationalist numerical\nnist cause and to maintain morale at a constantly\nsuperiority.\nhigh level.\n24\nSECRET\nSECRET\nMILITARY\nPRESIDENT\nCOMMANDER IN CHIEF\nCHINESE\nARMED FORCES\nOTHER\nYUAN\nMINISTERS\nMINISTER\nOF\nEXECUTIVE\nNATIONAL DEFENSE\nADMINISTRATIVE\nCONTROL\n02\nSUPREME\nCHIEF\nGENERAL\nOF SUPREME\nSPECIAL\nSTAFF\nGENERAL STAFF\nSTAFF\nOPERATIONAL DIRECTION\nARMY\nAIR\nFORCE\nCOMBINED\nNAVY\nSERVICE\nFORCE\nGARRISON\nADVANCED\nHQ\nPACIFICATION\nHQ\nCOMMUNIST\nCOORDINATION\nHQ\nSUPPRESSION\nPRESIDENT'S\nHQ\nHQ\nMukden\n(NE)\nPeiping\nTaiyuan\nHsuchou\nLanchous\n(NW)\nSign\nNanking\nOShanghai\nHankow (Wy Han)\nChiuchiang\nChuchou\nChungking\nSTaipei\nHEADQUARTERS-TERRITORIAL COMMANDS\nCanton\nTAIWAN\nUNDER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL\nOF PRESIDENTS HQ IN WU-HAN\nAND TACTICAL CONTROL OF CENTRAL\nCHINA COMMAND\nNATIONALIST HIGH COMMAND TOP-HEAVY AND CHAIN OF COMMAND\nCOMPLICATED\nDespite the formation, in June 1946, of the Minis-\nSupreme General Staff, often operates directly from\ntry of National Defense to supplant the previous\nthe Generalissimo to territorial headquarters and\ncomplicated military hierarchy, high command au-\neven to field commanders. The complicated system\nthority continues to be centered around Generalis-\nof territorial organization and the lack of coordination\nsimo Chiang Kai-shek and his select advisers. The\namong the various field headquarters hamper effec-\nchain of command, though nominally through the\ntive operational control. All President's Headquar-\nMinister of National Defense and the Chief of the\nters were recently dissolved.\nSECRET\n25\nMILITARY\nSECRET\nNATIONALIST CONCENTRATIONS ISOLATED AND CUT OFF FROM MUTUAL\nSUPPORT AND SUPPLY BASES\nNATIONALIST STRATEGIC RESERVES ALREADY COMMITTED\nThe Nationalist forces are virtually immobilized\nable redispositions without yielding some areas cur-\nat garrison and line of communication guard duty.\nrently held. The loss of Manchuria and any signifi-\nCommunist strength in most areas is sufficiently\ncantly large sector in North China might well lead\nstrong to prevent the Nationalists from making size-\nrapidly to complete military disintegration.\nNATIONALISTS UNABLE TO COPE WITH LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES\nLack of industrial support, continual disruption of\nsufficient. The troops live off the land, and matériel\ntransportation facilities, and inefficient supply serv-\nrequirements are largely satisfied by weapons,\nices contribute to the deteriorating military position\nequipment, and ammunition captured from the\nof the Nationalists. The Communist forces, loosely\nNationalists.\norganized and highly independent, are largely self-\nLEGEND\nNationalist-controlled areas\nCommunist-controlled areas\nNationalist concentrations\nCommunist concentrations\nLight Medium Heavy\nDensity of concentrations\nLight Medium Heavy\nArea of Nationalist-Communist operations\nNATIONALISTS\nCOMMUNISTS\nDivisions\nStrength\nStrength\n#\nAlpha\nRegular\nReorganized\nNortheast (Manchuria-Jehol)\n15\n24\n2\n350,000\n450,000\nNorth of Yellow River plus Shensi Province\n2\n41\n9\n625,000\n320,000\nBetween Yellow River and Yangtze River\n3\n12\n41\n1,025,000\n350,000\nSouth of Yangtze River (including Taiwan)\n-\n1\n4\n80,000\n30,000\nNorthwest (Ningsia, Kansu, Tsinghai, Sinkiang)\n-\n6\n6\n120,000\nTOTALS\n20\n84\n62\n2,200,000*\n1,150,000\n2,723,000*\nFormerly trained and equipped by U.S.\nStrength in tactical units\nOverall strength (as of 1 March 1948)\n26\nSECRET\nSECRET\nSECRET\n50°\n70°\n80°\n90°\n100°\n110°\n120°\n130°\n150°\nUNION\nOF\nSOVIET\nSOCIALIST\nREPUBLICS\nKARAFUTO\nCHINA\nSituation as of 1 March 1948\nHSINGAN\n150°\n0 100 200 300 400 500\nHOKIANG\nSTATUTE MILES\nNUNKIANG\nHarbin\nHOKKAIDO\n40°\nOUTER\nMONGOLIA\nLIAOPEN\nKIRIN\nINFORMATIONS\n40°\nSEA\nOF\nTihua\nCHAHAR\nJEHOL\nChihfeng\nMükden\nLIAONING\nJAPAN\nSINKIANG\nChengte\n4\nKalgan\nAFGHANISTAN\nSUIYUAN\nPaotou\no Peiping\nHONSHU\nNINGHSIA\nKANSULI\nHOPEH\nNinghsia\nSHANSI\nChefoc\nO\nTaiyuan:\nRiver)\nTsingtod\nYELLOW\nIsinan\n30°\nO\nHsining\nYellow\nHuang\nSHANTUNG\nSEA\nSHIKOKU\n70°\nTSINGHAI\nHuang Hol\nLanchou\nKoifeng\nHsuchoy\nKYUSHU\nSian\nHONAN\nTIBET\nKIANGSU\nSHENSI\nANHWEI\nNanking\nEAST\nShanghai\nHUPEN\nSZECHWAN\nHankow\n7\nO\nO\nE\nLhasa\nChengtu\nCHINA\nSIKANG\nCHUNGKING\nCHEKIANG\ne\n140°\nA\nL\nSEA\nBHUTAN\nHUNAN\nKIANGSI\nFoochow\nKWEICHOW\nFUKIEN\no\nI\nN\nD\nKweiyang\n20°\nI\nA\nAmoy\nKweilin\nKunming\nTAIWAN\n20°\nSwatow\nKWANGSI\nYUNNAN\nO\nKWANGTUNG\nNanning\nCanton\nHongkong\nBURMA\nSOUTH CHINA\nFRENCH\nBAY\nOF\nBENGAL\nINDO.CHINA\nSEA\nHAINAN\n/80°\n90°\n100°\n110°\n130°\n(Face 26)\nSECRET\nMILITARY\nTHE NATIONALISTS\nHAVE 100\nTANKS\nNEED 230\nMORE\nWITH\nAND\nTHEY\nHAVE 1,500\nGUNS\ne\n75 MM OR ABOVE\n*\nNEED 900\nMORE\n75 MM OR ABOVE\n*ACCORDING TO PRESENT T/O & E\nQUANTITY AND CONDITION OF NATIONALIST EQUIPMENT INADEQUATE\nNationalist military equipment is inadequate for\nartillery, possess few armored vehicles, and are\ncurrent needs. Moreover, available weapons and\ncritically short on ammunition, especially for weapons\nequipment, which are noteworthy for their hetero-\nprovided by the United States.\ngeneity, are, except for United States types and\nCommunist weapons reflect the same heterogeneity\nsome of Japanese manufacture, obsolescent or obso-\nwhich characterizes the armament of the Nation-\nlete. Multiplicity in types of equipment, aggravated\nalist forces, since the principal sources of supply are\nby attrition in 2½ years of civil war, creates a\nNationalist units and supply dumps. The Com-\ndifficult supply situation and innumerable mainte-\nmunists acquired considerable quantities of Japanese\nnance problems. The Nationalists are deficient in\nweapons in Manchuria after VJ-day.\nSECRET\n27\nMILITARY\nSECRET\n50\n70°\n80°\n90°\n100°\nLEGEND\nt\nNaval Base\nHB\nHeavy Bomber\nR\nSquadron\nTC\nTroop Carrier\nS\nF\nFighter\nPR Photo-Reconnaissance\nB\nMedium Bomber\nS\nFigure in ( ) indicates number of units\nU\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\nSTATUTE MILES\nNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AIR FORCE\nOUTER\nPersonnel Strength\n102,500 total-30,000 in tactical units\nMONGOLIA\nUnits\n40°\n8 Bomber Squadrons\n13 Fighter Squadrons\nTihua\n8 Troop Carrier Squadrons\n1 Photo-Reconnaissance Squadron\nNATIONAL GOVERNMENT NAVY\nSINKIANG\nPersonnel Strength\n35,000 total\nMajor Combatant Vessels\nNINGHSIA\n2 Escort Vessels\nKANSTI\nTSINGHAI\nINDIA\nTIBET\nNEPAL\nSZECHWAN\nSIKANG\nCAPABILITIES OF AIR FORCE AND\nNAVY LIMITED\nBHUTAN\nAir Force.-The maximum combat effort of the\nKWEICHOW\nChinese Air Force is estimated to be about 270\nINDIA\nKunming\naircraft for the initial effort, decreasing to 15 to\nO\nYUNNAN\n25 aircraft by the tenth day, assuming that\nlosses resulting from enemy action would be\nnegligible. An enemy capable of inflicting ordi-\nnary combat losses would probably neutralize\nBURMA\nthe CAF within 1 week.\nNavy.-The Chinese Navy is capable only of\nFRENCH\ncoastal police patrol operations relating to do-\nINDO CHINA\nmestic security.\n100\n28\nSECRET\nSECRET\nMILITARY\n110°\n120°\n130°\n\\140\n-50°\nKARAFUTO\nU\nS\nHEL LUNG KIANG S\nR\nHSINGAN\nHOKIANG\nMANCHURIA\nHOKKAIDO\nOUTER\nNUNKIANG\nMONGOLIA\nLIAOPEH\nHarbing KIRIN SUNGKIANG\nCHAHAR\nJEHOL\nChihfeng\nMukden\nANTUNG\nChengte\nING\nSEA OF JAH\nWanchuen\nSUIYUAN\nTC\nPaotou\nPeiping\nKOREA\nJAPAN HON\nB\nHOPEH\nSHANSI\nOlntai\nF(3)\nYELLOW\no\nTaiyuan\nOTsinan\n(singrao\n8\nSEA\nSHIKOKU\nSHANTUNG\nSinsiang\n0\nHsuchou\nKYUSHU\nB\nKaifeng\n>|F(2)\nHONAN\nSian\nANHWEI\nKIANGSU\nEAST\nSHENSI\nTC\nNanking\nPR\nShanghoi\nCHINA\n+\nHUPEH\nHankow\nO\nSEA\nSZECHWAN\nCHEKIANG\nChungking\nO\nHUNAN\nKIANGSI\nFoochow\nKWEICHOW\nO\nFUKIEN\nKueiyang\nAmoy\nKuilin\nO\nTAIWAN\nKWANGSI\nKWANGTUNG\nOSwatow\nKaohslung\nCanton\nNanning\nHongkong\nSOUTH CHINA SEA\nHaikouO\nHAINAN\nSECRET\n29\nSECRET\nWARNING\nThis document contains information affecting the\nNational Defense of the United States within the\nmeaning of the Espionage Act (50 U. S. C., 31 and\n32), as amended. Its transmission or the revelation\nof its contents in any manner to any foreign agency\nor other unauthorized person is prohibited by law.\nReproduction of the intelligence in this publication\nis prohibited without special authority from the\nDirector of Intelligence, GSUSA, Department of the\nArmy.\n30\nSECRET\nSECRET"
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