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The original was left with the President in power. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HST WASHINGTON JAN 1 9 1953 Dear Mr. President, For some time, the Department of Defense has concerned itself with two increasingly serious aspects of the problem of safeguarding facilities essen- tial to the nation's security. In view of their continuing nature, it may be that you may wish to call them to the specific attention of your successor. In attempting to provide for the adequate protection of our productive capacity against possible sabotage, espionage, or other wilful activity intended to disrupt the national defense program, the Department of Defense has been concerned about (1) the problem of removing subversive individuals from a large number of defense facilities (such as power plants) which are not themselves classified and which do not contain classified information, but which are, nevertheless, vital to national security; (2) certain unions, the international officials of which are suspected subversives at worst, and questionable security risks at best, which enjoy collective bargaining rights at key defense facilities. We do, of course, have authority to deny subversive individuals access to classified material located at national defense facilities. However, as indi- cated above, there are a large number of important facilities which do not have classified information and which, therefore, we are unable to bring within the framework of our denial of access program. Recognizing the interest of the whole Government in this particular problem, the Department of Defense drafted a bill authorizing, under certain conditions, the summary exclusion or removal from national defense facilities of individuals who may engage in espionage, sabotage, or other wilful activity intended to disrupt the national defense program. This bill was referred to the attention of Dr. Steelman by Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward's letter of 19 October 1951. Subsequently, the proposed legislation and the problem involved in it were referred to the National Security Resources Board. A further study was conducted by the National Security Resources Board and an analysis, including the difficulties which would be encountered in administering the proposed program, was prepared. It was indicated that further discussions within the Executive Branch, including the Department of Justice and the Interdepartmental Committee on Industrial Security, appeared to be in order. In addition to the necessity for legal authority to remove suspected sub- versives from defense facilities, there is an additional and related problem which poses a serious security hazard, not only for the Department of Defense, but for the Atomic Energy Commission and other government agencies. This is the problem of the international union, whose members may be loyal American citizens, but whose officers and collective bargaining officials may not be. Such union officials may be in a position, through the disciplinary and super- visory control which they can exercise on the individual members, to cause SERVICE