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    "title": "Report, Background Memoranda on the Visit to the United States of Vincent Auriol, President of the French Republic",
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    "ocrText": "NLT (PSF-SUBJ.) 266\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY 10F2\nBACKGROUND MEMORANDA\nON VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES\nOF\nVINCENT AURIOL\nPRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC\nMARCH 1951\nPrepared in the\nDepartment of State\nMarch 1951\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority N'T- P2-17\nNSC LETTER 10-15-f2\nBy NC NLT Date 1-28-83\nTOP SECRET\nfor SECRET\nTITLE PAGE\nPage\nTable of Contents\ni\nProgram for the Visit\nii, iii, iv\nList of Persons Accompanying the President\nV\nBiographical Sketches\nI, II, III, IV\nThe Political Situation in France\nV, VI, VII, VIII\nPurpose of Visit and Proposed Discussions\nIX, X, XI, XII, XIII\n1. US Aid\n(A) Financial Aid\n1, 2\n(B) MDAP\n3\n2. Korea\n4, 5\n3. CFM\n6, 7, 8, 9\n4. Indochina\n10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15\n5. Middle East Defense-Malta\n16\nfor SECRET\n1\nUNCLASSIFIED\nPROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF\nHIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND\nMADAME AURIOL\nMarch 1951\nWednesday, March 28\n4:25 p.m.\nThe President and party will arrive at Union Station from\nNew York where they will be met by the President and\nMrs. Truman. En route to Blair House, they will stop for\na short welcoming ceremony by the Board of Commissioners\n5.45\nof the District of Columbia at the District Building.\nRECEPTION BCAIR\n8:00 p.m.\nThe President and Mrs. Truman will give a dinner in honor\nof the President and Madame Auriol at the Carlton Hotel.\nThe President and Madame Auriol will spend the night at\nBlair House.\nThursday, March 29\n9:30 a.m.\nThe President and Madame Auriol will move to Prospect\nHouse.\n10:30 a.m.\nTruman-Auriol conversation, Cabinet Room, White House.\n12:00 noon\nThe President will lay a wreath at the Statue of\nLafayette. Lafayette Park.\n12:30 p.m.\nThe National Press Club will give a luncheon in honor of\nthe President.\n3:00-4:30 p.m. Acheson-Schuman conversation, Secretary's office.\n8:00 p.m.\nThe Secretary of State and Mrs. Acheson will give a dinner\nin honor of the President and Madame Auriol at Anderson\nHouse.\nFriday, March 30\n10:30 a.m.\nThe President and party will leave Washington for Annapolis\nwhere they will have lunch, visit the U.S. Naval Academy\nand review a parade of Midshipmen.\n4:00 p.m.\nThe President and party will leave Annapolis and return to\nWashington.\n8:00 p.m.\nThe President and Madame Auriol will give a dinner in honor\nof the President and Mrs. Truman at the Embassy.\n10:30 p.m.\nUNCLASSIFIED\nii\nUNCLASSIFIED\nFriday, March 30 (cont'd)\n10:30 p.m.\nReception at the Embassy.\nSaturday, March 31\n9:45 a.m.\nThe party will arrive at Mount Vernon where the President\nwill lay a wreath at the Tomb of Washington.\n11:15 a.m.\nThe party will arrive at Arlington National Cemetery where\nthe President will lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown\nSoldier.\n1:00 p.m.\nLuncheon private.\n5:00 p.m.\nThe President and Madame Auriol will give a reception for\nthe French Colony at the Embassy.\n8:30 p.m.\nThe President and Madame Auriol will attend the concert\nby the Boston Symphony at Constitution Hall.\nSunday, April 1\n(To be announced later.)\nMonday, April 2\n10:30 a.m.\nAcheson-Schuman conversation, Secretary's office.\n12:15 p.m.\nThe President will address Congress.\n2:00 p.m.\nThe party will depart from Washington for New York by\ntrain.\n6:00 p.m.\nThe party will arrive in New York and will proceed to the\nWaldorf-Astoria,\n8:00 p.m.\nThe Mayor of New York will give a dinner in honor of the\nPresident and Madame Auriol at the Waldorf-Astoria.\nTuesday, April 3\n12:00 noon\nThe President and party will be received at City Hall by\nthe Mayor of New York.\n1:30 p.m.\nThe Secretary General of the United Nations will give a\nluncheon in honor of the President at the Waldorf-Astoria.\n3:30 p.m.\nColumbia University will bestow an honorary degree on the\nPresident. Low Memorial Library.\n5:00 p.m.\nUNCLASSIFIED\niii\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTuesday, April 3 (cont'd)\n5:00 p.m.\nThe President and Madame Auriol will give a reception at\nthe Waldorf-Astoria.\n8:00 p.m.\nThe President will give a dinner at the home of Mr. Jean\nChauvel, French Delegate to the United Nations, in -henor\nof the Secretary General of the United Nations and the\nMembers of the Security Council.\nWednesday, April 4\na.m.\nThe President and party will depart for Hyde Park to have\nlunch with Mrs. Roosevelt, following which the party will\nvisit West Point.\n5:00 p.m.\nThe President and Madame Auriol will give a reception for\nthe French Colony at the Waldorf-Astoria.\n8:00 p.m.\nThe President will give a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria.\n11:30 p.m.\nThe President and party will depart by train for Montreal\nen route to Ottawa.\nUNCLASSIFIED\niv\nUNCLASSIFIED\nLIST OF PERSONS ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT\nOF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND MADAME AURIOL\nMarch 1951\nHis Excellency Vincent Auriol,\nPresident of the French Republic\nand Madame Auriol\nHis Excellency Robert Schuman,\nMinister of Foreign Affairs\nHis Excellency Henri Bonnet,\nAmbassador of the French Republic\nand Madame Bonnet\nGeneral Paul Grossin,\nMilitary Secretary General to the President\nThe Honorable Jacques Dumaine,\nChief of Protocol\nMr. Paul Auriol,\nAssistant Secretary General to the President\nMr. Jacques Koscziusko-Morizet,\nDirector of the Office of the President\nMr. Bernard Beck,\nDeputy Director of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs\nJean Daridan, Minister-Councilor, French Embassy\nJean Baube, Councilor of Embassy\nJean-Pierre Benard, First Secretary, French Embassy\nThe Honorable David K. E. Bruce,\nAmerican Ambassador to France\nThe Honorable John F. Simmons,\nChief of Protocol\nMajor General William E. Hall, U.S.A.F.,\nAide to the President\nUNCLASSIFIED\nV\nCONF IDENTIAL\nNAME:\nVincent Auriol. In conversation is addressed as\n\"Mr. President.\"\nNAME OF WIFE:\nMadame Michele Auriol (nee Aucoutourier).\nEDUCATION OF\nPRESIDENT:\nMaster's Degree in Philosophy; Doctorate in Finance and\nEconomics; Doctor of Laws, University of Toulouse.\nCAREER:\nElected Socialist Deputy from Haute-Garonne in 1914,\nhe has returned to the Chamber at every subsequent\nelection. President of the first and second\nConstituent Assemblies and subsequently of the National\nAssembly. Has been a member of several Cabinets: as\nMinister of Finance in 1936-1937: Minister of Justice\nand Minister for Coordination of the Services, 1938:\nand Minister of State without Portfolio, November 1945-\nJanuary 1946. Elected President of the Fourth Republic\nJanuary 16, 1947.\nCHARACTERISTICS: A patient and skillful arbiter. Known as \"the most\nsuccessful peacemaker in French politics.\" Gregarious,\nwarm-hearted, demonstrative. Has a highly-developed\nsense of humor and expresses himself in a ready flow\nof language punctuated by oratorical flourishes. Does\neverything with great gusto, including eating and\ndrinking, but is nevertheless very dignified. De-\nservedly proud of his success. Deeply attached to his\nnative region of Toulouse.\nHABITS:\nHas expressed the wish to enjoy simple, typically\nAmerican food. Likes to drink water with his meals.\nDrinks scotch and soda and has asked to have it available\nwherever he is staying. Would prefer to retire early in\nview of heavy schedule and to breakfast at 8 A.M. Eats\nvery lightly at night except at official dinners. A\nfishing and hunting enthusiast.\nINTERESTS IN\nUNITED STATES:\nWould like to have a few hours off in a completely\ninformal way at some typically American occasion. Wants\nto make a thorough tour by car of New York City for a\nclose-up view of various bridges. Although he has little\nknowledge of the language, he plans to make a few\nintroductory remarks in English on occasion.\nSIGNIFICANCE OF VINCENT AURIOL:\nIDENTIAL\nI\nCONFIDENTIAL\nSIGNIFICANCE OF\nVINCENT AURIOL:\nAs President, Mr. Auriol is more a figurehead than a\npolitical power in France, but he has created for\nhimself a position of real influence as the presiding\nofficer at Cabinet meetings and in connection with the\nselection of Prime Ministers and the formation of their\nCabinets. He is extremely popular in France as a\nresult of having carried out the duties of his office\nmost conscientiously.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nII\nCONF IDENTIAL\nMADAME AURIOL\nMadame Vincent Auriol, nee Michele Aucoutourier, was born at Albi\nin southern France, the daughter of the owner of a glassware factory. At\nsixteen she was married to M. Auriol whom she met through his friendship\nwith Jean Jaures, the great Socialist leader, who was also a warm personal\nfriend of her father. Her only son, Paul, was born when she was eighteen.\nThe Auriol family is very united. Paul and his wife and two young sons\noccupy a small suite at the Elysee (Palace), the President's official home.\nMadame Auriol frequently accompanies her husband on week-end fishing and\nhunting trips. She is extremely devoted to her two young grandsons,\nJean-Claude and Jean-Paul, aged ten and twelve.\nNow in her early fifties, Madame Auriol is tall, dignified and\ndistinguished. Very attractive, she has gracious manners and great charm\nand tact. Her chief pastime is the study of art and she herself paints a\nlittle in oil. While in the US she hopes to visit the National Gallery\nof Art in Washington and the Metropolitan Museum and Museum of Modern Art\nin New York. She would also like to see something of an American home.\nShe is noted for her exquisite taste in clothes. Nevertheless, in France,\nwhere she enjoys great popularity, she is known for her lack of personal\nvanity and for her interest in the more serious side of life.\nROBERT SCHUMAN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS\nRobert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, has been a member of\nalmost every French government since 1946. Regarded by all factions of\nthe Mouvement Republicain Populaire as the Party's influential elder\nstatesman, he has often been described as a saintly character and a\nmystic, yet one who is endowed with much practical common sense. A quiet,\nunassuming, and shy bachelor, he is a devout Catholic and leads an un-\nusually austere, ascetic life. He is intensely interested in history and\ntheology.\nDespite the sufferings of Schuman and his people in Lorraine at the\nhands of the Germans, he is an advocate of Franco-German cooperation;\nhence, his sponsorship of the Schuman Plan and his efforts to cooperate\nwith the US in connection with the thorny problem of German rearmament.\nAlthough he speaks only French, German and Luxembourgeois, he understands\nEnglish reasonably well. Completely pro-Western in outlook and firmly\nopposed to both Communism and the extreme right, Schuman has always been\na genuine friend of the U.S. He has been in this country on several\noccasions as chairman of the French delegation to the UN General Assembly\nand for conferences on various vital international questions. His per-\nsonal relations with US officials with whom he has dealt on these matters\nare extremely cordial, and he is held in high regard here.\nPAUL AURIOL\nCONF\nIDENTIAL\nIII\nCONF IDENTIAL\nPAUL AURIOL\nPaul Auriol, only son of the President, was born in 1918 at\nToulouse. He will accompany his father in his official capacity as\nAssistant Secretary General of the President's personal cabinet. He has\nbeen in this country on several occasions, including a three-month visit\nin 1946 and a recent one during which he made preliminary arrangements\nfor the official trip. He hopes to visit American airfields and to\nintroduce his mother, to whom he is devoted, to his American friends.\nHe reportedly is unassuming, affable and friendly, is an aviation\nenthusiast, and an expert skier.\nMAJOR GENERAL PAUL GROSSIN\nMajor General Grossin, Military Secretary General to the Presidency\nof the Republic, was personally selected by President Auriol, and is\nreported to exert a certain measure of influence over the President.\nAlways cordial in his relations with American representatives, he is\nfavorably disposed toward the U.S. He hopes to visit the Pentagon and,\nif possible, airplane, automobile and metallurgical plants. As a result\nof recent illness, the General is on a diet, limiting himself to broiled\nmeat, salads, and fresh fruit or fruit juice. He does not eat bread or\ndrink alcoholic beverages. At seven o'clock, on arising, he usually\ntakes tea.\nJACQUES KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET\nJacques Koscziusko-Morizet, Director of President Auriol's personal\ncabinet, is an intellectual endowed with considerable practical sense and\nthe ability to get things done. Very much interested in literature, art\nand music, he commands a fund of knowledge in these fields. He has been\nin the U.S. several times, the most recent trip having been in 1949, and\nwas a visiting professor at Columbia University in 1946.\nBERNARD BECK\nBernard Beck, Deputy Director of M. Schuman's personal cabinet, has\nbeen associated with the Foreign Minister since the latter was Minister of\nFinance. A pleasant, unassuming person, he has expressed his delight at\nthis first opportunity to visit the U.S. Having a slight knowledge of\nEnglish, he believes he will be able to make himself understood but is\nnot equally certain of understanding what is said to him by Americans.\nEMMANUEL JACQUES DUMAINE\nJacques Dumaine, Chief of Protocol with the rank of Minister\nPlenipotentiary, is a distinguished career diplomat of more than thirty\nyears' experience, and has served in London, Rome, Washington and Rio.\nSuave and handsome, he possesses remarkable tact, courtesy, and judgment.\nHis faultless English should prove a decided asset.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nIV\nCONF IDENTIAL\nTHE POLITICAL SITUATION IN FRANCE\nCurrent Internal Problems\nAfter the fall of Prime Minister Pleven's cabinet on February 28,\n1951, over the question of electoral reform, Henri Queuille, a Radical\nSocialist and a former Premier, was able to form another \"third force\"\ncoalition government of so-called \"limited activity\". Its principal\ntasks are to prepare for national elections, which may be held this June,\nto get the national budget passed and to take certain temporary and\nemergency measures to improve the economic position of labor. The gener-\nal pre-electoral atmosphere which has been apparent for many months has\ngradually weakened the governmental coalition of the Socialist, MRP\n(Catholic Party) and Radical Socialist (moderate right) parties. The\nnational preoccupation with the elections, which will determine the com-\nposition and political outlook of the National Assembly for the next five\nyears, is responsible for the failure of the government to take action\nnecessary to improve the position of industrial workers.\nIn spite of the remarkable recovery of the French economy, which\nhas reached levels of production well above pre-war, the purchasing\npower of industrial workers is still below the 1938 level. This accounts\nfor the dissatisfaction of the workers with the moderate governments and\nis a factor in their tendency to vote Communist as a protest against the\nsituation. Although the present wave of strikes will be exploited by the\nCommunists, they are caused by long-standing economic distress which has\nbeen aggravated by the rise in the cost of living (of almost 10 percent\nCONF IDENTIAL\nV\nCONFIDENTIAL\ncompared to about 7 percent in the U S)since the beginning of the Korean\nWar.\nUnder existing legislation national elections must be held before\nNovember 1951. The National Assembly has now passed a compromise bill\nwhich abandons the previous system of proportional representation and\nprovides for an electoral law based on a majority system, a single ballot,\nparty alliances and the \"departments\" as the voting district. However,\nin those departments in which no single list is able to win a majority\nof the votes cast the seats will be distributed among the parties on the\nbasis of proportional representation as before. If this present bill\nshould become the new electoral law (it has not yet been passed by the\n\"upper house\" - the Council of the Republic), its effect might be esti-\nmated as follows: The \"third force\" parties will probably control nearly\ntwo-thirds of the next legislature at the expense of the Communists and\nGaullists. However, the shift of strength within the \"third force\" parties\nwill probably be to the right. Such a shift may affect the economic\nprogram of the governments which will be relying on their rightist parlia-\nmentary majority.\nBackground of Internal Problems\nImmediately after the Liberation and until January 1947, France was\ngoverned under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle, by coalition\ncabinets composed of all parties including the Communists and old parties\nof the right. In the last elections to the National Assembly, held in\nNovember 1946, the Communists polled approximately 28 percent of the\npopular vote and obtained 25 percent of the seats. Until the spring of\nCONF IDENT\nVI\nCONFIDENTIAL\n1947 Communists participated in the government and held important cabinet\npositions. During this period Communists and fellow travelers gained\naccess to strategic positions in the civil service, the trade union move-\nment and the armed forces. In recent years, however, party members and\nfellow travelers have been removed from positions of influence and au-\nthority in public life and there are today no Communists in important\ngovernment positions. In spite of the development of non-Communist labor\norganizations, the Communists' control over the CGT, the largest single\nunion, continues to give them a relatively dominant position in the field\nof organized labor. Although the hard core of Communist militants has not\nbeen radically affected, the Communist offensive in France has been blocked.\nThe government's security measures have been reinforced and it is very\nunlikely that the Communists could seize control by overt action.\nIn the early post war years French politics reflected the idealistic\nand reformist atmosphere of the Resistance movement. After the exclusion\nof the Communists from the cabinet, the economic and social program of the\ngovernment was still dominated by leftist and socialist economic thought.\nParadoxically, however, in view of the make-up of the National Assembly,\nthe economic and social policies of the French Government evolved so that\nthey are essentially conservative and reflect the views of the center and\nthe right.\nSince May 1947, the balance of power among the parties in the Assembly\nhas been such that it has generally been impossible to get support for a\ncabinet which does not include the Socialist Party on the left and some\nelements of the traditionalist and conservative parties on the right. This\nCONF IDENTIAL\nVII\nCONF IDENTIAL\nfact has accounted in large part for the continuing instability of cabinets\nin France.\nFrench Foreign Policy\nFollowing the liberation of France public attention naturally focused\non the domestic problems of reconstruction and the return to normal poli-\ntical life. France's major foreign policy concern was to insure herself\nagainst future German military and economic encroachment. A theory pop-\nular in France at this time established a reconstructed France as a bridge\nbetween the East and the West. However, as the aggressive nature of Soviet\nintentions and the subservience of the French Communist Party to Soviet\ninterests were clarified in the French mind this theory was discredited.\nThe problem of Germany is now seen in a larger perspective and the French\ngenerally have come to take a broader view of their best interests, although\nthis evolution is retarded by understandable historical and geographical\nfactors. Today France is a major partner in the effort of the free world\nto eliminate the danger of Soviet aggression. The French have taken con-\nsiderable initiative in furthering the development of European and Atlantic\ninstitutions, the NATO, the OEEC, the Schuman Plan and the Council of\nEurope. The French have generally agreed with our position on major security\nissues before the United Nations. French troops in Korea have given an\nexcellent account of themselves.\nForeign policy issues have not been at stake in any of the recent\npolitical crises and we are confident that we shall continue to be able\nto depend on French cooperation with the West in all of the issues affect-\ning our mutual security.\nCONF IDENT\nVIII\nTOP SECRET\nBACKGROUND OF THE VISIT AND\nSUMMARY OF PROPOSED DISCUSSIONS\nThe major purpose of President Auriol's visit is to strengthen the\nsentiments of good will and friendly interest which have existed tradi-\ntionally between France and the United States.\nThe French Government has been anxious to arrange for M. Auriol's\nvisit to this country for some time. Difficulties arose in scheduling\nthe visit in 1950 and the visit was, therefore, postponed to March of\nthis year. The French Government believes that such a visit will enhance\nFrench prestige generally and will give evidence of the major role which\nFrance is playing in the free world.\nPresident Auriol is the first President of the French Republic to\nvisit the United States. General de Gaulle who came to this country in\nAugust 1945 was then President of the Provisional French Government.\nThe visit of M. Auriol follows the recent and highly successful\nvisit of Rene Pleven, the French Prime Minister.\nThere were no substantive questions which the Department wished to\nraise with President Auriol on the occasion of this State visit. However,\nthe French wished for discussion of the following subjects. The French\nand United States positions on these questions may be summarized as fol-\nlows:\nU.S. Aid to France\nA) U.S. FINANCIAL AID TO FRANCE\nFrench Position\nThe French government has a serious problem of raising\nfrancs to finance the 1951 budget which includes increased\nTOP SECRET\nIX\nOP SECRET\nmilitary expenditures. The French wish, therefore, to receive\nfreely-disposable dollars which they could use directly to\ncreate francs to meet the deficit.\nUnited States Position\nThe United States cannot undertake to solve problems arising\nfrom the French budget deficit which is strictly a problem of\nlocal currency. The US can finance essential dollar imports\ninto France which are related directly or indirectly to military\nproduction. The francs gained for the government by the sale\nof such imports can then be used to offset the budget deficit.\nRecommendations\nIf the French raise this subject they should be informed\nof our position.\nB) DELAYS IN THE PROVISION OF MDAP AID\nFrench Position\nThe French may state their concern about delays and procedural\ndifficulties in receiving certain equipment and raw materials from\nthe US.\nUnited States Position\nThere have been certain delays in receiving the French pro-\nduction programs and their requests for imports from dollar sources\nand in our review of their plans. The matter is being handled in\nParis and our Missions have just received additional instructions.\nRecommendations\nIf the question is raised, that the French be informed of\nour position.\nTOP SECRET\nX\nTOP SECRET\nKorea\nAlthough the French have not raised this question for discussion it\nis suggested that the President express our appreciation for the French\ncontribution to the United Nations and on the battlefield,\nThe Four Power Deputies Conference in Paris\nFrench Position (as of March 23)\nThe French have so far maintained a united front with us and\nthe British in the Four Power talks. However they are more willing\nto compromise with the Soviet proposals for the Agenda in order to\nensure that a meeting will be held.\nUnited States Position\nWe are unwilling to accept the present Soviet demand that the\nsubject of the \"demilitarization of Germany\", unrelated to other\nissues, be the first item of the agenda of a later meeting of the\nForeign Ministers of the Four Powers. We are determined to continue\nthe united front of the French, the United Kingdom and the US.\nRecommendation (as of March 23)\nThat M. Auriol and M. Schuman be informed of our view of the\nimportance of the United front; that in the face of our united front\nwe do not believe that the USSR will make a Foreig Minister's meeting\nimpossible by refusing to agree on an agenda; that we will not accept\nthe Soviet proposal of the \"demilitarization of Germany\" as a separate\nagenda item; and that if necessary we would accept the consequence\nof no meeting of the Foreign Ministers.\nTOP SECRET\nXI\nmor SECRET\nIndo-China\nFrench Position\nThe French will probably outline current developments particularly\ntheir decision to send reinforcements and will emphasize the extent\nof their burden in Indochina and their determination to carry on.\nThey may cite the recent transfer of powers to the Associated States\nas evidence of their good faith in implementing the Pau Accords,\nUnited States Position\nThere has been no important change in our position since the\nTruman-Pleven talks in January. The US will continue to furnish mili-\ntary aid as outlined to M. Pleven. American assistance is designed\nto supplement rather than supplant French aid to Indochina. We are\nstill doubtful as to the advisability of UN consideration of the\nIndochinese problem.\nRecommendations\nThat the French be informed that we believe the observations\nand conclusions reached in January are still valid; that decisions\nto send reinforcements to Indochina should continue to be a purely\nFrench responsibility; however, that no mention be made to the French\nof reference of this question to NATO; that the US has no desire or\nintention to supplant French efforts in Indochina; that the US is\npleased by the recent transfer of powers to the Associated States.\nMiddle East Defense - Malta Talks\nThe Secretary has discussed the problem with the President. In view\nof the daily developments on this subject a briefing paper will be submitted\nprior to President Auriol's arrival.\nTOP SECRET\nXII\nU.S. S. AID\nSECRET\n1\nUS FINANCIAL AID TO FRANCE\nFrench Position\nThe most important French financial problem is not one of meeting the\ndollar obligations arising from the French defense effort. Rather, the\nFrench have a very serious problem of raising francs internally to finance\ntheir overall 1951 budget, including increased military expenditures. The\nnormal difficulties of the French Government in raising revenue are com-\npounded by the fact that this is an election year in France. If possible,\nthe French would like to receive freely-disposable US dollar aid, which\nthey could partly use to create francs by discounting the dollars at the\nBank of France.\nUS Position\n1. The French budget is strictly a local currency problem which can\nbe solved only by the French themselves. The only way in which the US\nmay help is by financing essential dollar imports into France. Such 1m-\nports may in effect be sold to French importers by the French Government,\nand the francs used for budgetary expenditures.\n2. Financial assistance will be provided to France during the re-\nmainder of fiscal 1951 and in fiscal 1952 to the extent that France\ndemonstrates a requirement 1) for dollar imports to support military\nproduction in France, or 2) for dollar imports necessary to support a\nhealthy French economy, which is fundamental to any French defense effort.\nContinued financial assistance will be available provided 1) such dollar\naid does not make possible an increase in French gold and dollar reserves,\nand 2) the US continues to be satisfied with the French defense effort.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n2\nIt is US policy that economic aid should not be extended to a country\nif the result is an increase in its reserves, except where the effect of\nwithholding aid would be to hurt the defense effort. Negotiations are\npresently under way to determine the amount of financial assistance that\nFrance will receive during the remainder of fiscal 1951.\n3. As Secretary Acheson stated in the talks with the French last\nOctober and again in January, we believe that we cannot become directly\ninvolved in the local budgetary deficits of other countries. We believe\nthat only by means of an increase in essential imports into France can\nUS financial aid serve to provide increased local currency resources for\nthe French Government. Such imports, by absorbing purchasing power, will\nserve as a most effective device to combat rising prices. In the same\nway, France may shift some part of the burden of rearmament to the other\nNATO countries in real terms only by developing an import surplus in her\noverall trade with those countries, rather than the large and increasing\nexport surplus which has characterized French trade with Western Europe\nduring the past eighteen months.\nRecommendation\nIf the French raise this subject, they should be informed of the\nUS position.\nSECRET\nCECRET\n3\nDELAYS IN THE PROVISION OF US MDAP AID\nFrench position\nIt is likely that the French will state their concern about the long\ndelays and procedural obstacles involved in receiving raw materials,\nmachine-tools and deliveries of military end-items.\nUS position\nThe problem has been, in the first place, to obtain a satisfactory\npicture of planned military production in France together with a French\nprogram for imports of necessary materials and machine-tools required from\ndollar sources; and secondly, to complete our own review of the French\nmilitary program and to suggest to them what changes we believe desirable.\nWe are handling this matter through our missions in Paris, who have just\nreceived additional instructions on these subjects.\nWith respect to the delivery of military end-items, every effort will\nbe made to provide the end-items programmed for France as quickly as possi-\nble. The French know that priorities of delivery are necessarily given to\nAllied forces in Korea and to Indochina. As production mounts, substantial\nacceleration of deliveries to all areas may be possible. Shipments already\nmade to France under the MDAP include 180 aircraft, 7 vessels, 2320 tanks\nand armored vehicles, and 6627 trucks.\nRecommendation\nThat the French be informed of the US position.\n(SECRED\nKOREA\nTOP SECRET\n4\nKOREA\nFrench Position:\nFrance has consistently supported the action of the United Nations\nwith respect to Korea and has sent a battalion of French troops in sup-\nport of United Nations military operations.\nUnited States Position:\nTo bring the maximum possible collective pressure of the free world\nto bear upon the Communist aggressor in Korea so as to enhance the possi-\nbility of finding an honorable solution for the Korean problem and to\ndeter similar aggression elsewhere.\nRecommendations:\nIt is recommended that President Auriol be given an expression of\nthe appreciation of the United States for the fine service being rendered\nthe Unified Command in Korea by the French battalion and for the constant\nsupport which the French Delegation to the United Nations has provided\nwith reference to the United Nations resolutions on Korea.\nThe following points in relation to Korea might be reviewed with the\nPresident of France:\n1. The United States has not changed its position in support of the\nbasic objectives of the United Nations in Korea. Our military efforts to\nrepel the aggression and to bring international peace and security to the\narea will continue.\n2. It is the hope of the United States that continued United Nations\nmilitary action in Korea will assist France in her efforts to repel com-\nmunist aggression in Indochina and will relieve military pressures in\nTOP SECRET\nFOR SECRET\n5\nother Far Eastern areas.\n3. At the same time, the United States, together with the other\nnon-Communist members of the United Nations, is anxious to take full\nadvantage of any developments which might ultimately lead to the accept-\nance of an honorable solution in Korea. Such a solution, however, must\nbe without reference to political commitments in other areas.\nTOP SECRET\nC F M\nSECRET\n6\nTHE FOUR POWER DEPUTIES CONFERENCE IN PARIS\nFrench Position\nThe French have so far maintained a united front with the British\nand ourselves in the Four Power talks. While the French would like to\nachieve the same type of agenda we desire, it is evident from private\ntripartite talks that they, as well as the British, are more willing to\ncompromise with Soviet proposals than we in order to ensure that a meet-\ning of the Foreign Ministers will be held.\nUnited States Position\nThe US, together with the United Kingdom and France, has been striv-\ning to achieve with the Soviet representative an agreed agenda for a later\nmeeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers. The principal point\nat issue has been the insistent attempt of the Soviet Union to obtain the\nagreement of the Western Powers to include on the agenda, as the first\nitem and without relation to other issues, the subject of \"German Demili-\ntarization.\" The US has rejected this attempt and has insisted that\nGermany is not a cause but a result of existing international tensions\nwhich must be examined as a whole and in relation to each other. Funda-\nmental to the US approach to achieving an agreed agenda is the maintenance\nof a united front with the British and French.\nRecommendations\nM. Auriol and M. Schuman should be informed that we attach the utmost\nimportance to the maintenance of a common tripartite approach in face of\nthe USSR; that we are confident that if we remain undivided and firmly\ninsist upon a \"neutral\" agenda, the USSR will not make impossible a Foreign\nSECRET\nSECRET\n7\nMinisters meeting by refusing to agree on an agenda satisfactory to all\nof us; that we will not accept the principal Soviet aim to have listed\non the agenda as a separate item reference to the \"demilitarization of\nGermany;\" and that we prefer, should it prove impossible to obtain an\nagenda, to have no ministerial meeting rather than accept the serious\npolitical consequences of permitting the Soviet proposals to prevail and\nto subject the three Foreign Ministers to a time-consuming and unproduc-\ntive series of meetings which the USSR desires primarily for propaganda\nreasons.\nDiscussion\nSince March 5 the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of France, the\nUnited Kingdom, the US and the USSR have been meeting in Paris, in an\nattempt to agree on an agenda for a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers.\nThe three Western Powers have maintained a common front to date in pre-\nsenting their agreed proposals and in countering the Soviet proposals.\nThe original versions of an acceptable agenda presented by both sides\nin the opening meetings have each been changed on several occasions. The\npresent tripartite version differs slightly from the original. The pre-\nsent USSR version appears to differ considerably from the original, in\nthat in its present form two of its three points use almost identical\nlanguage with two of the three points originally proposed in the tripartite\nversion. But, in fact, the USSR has not departed from the focal point of\nits original position.\nThe USSR position is that the question of the demilitarization of Germany\nis the principal cause of the tension existing in Europe today and that this\nSECRET\nSECRET\n8\nmust be the first item on any agenda and that it must be discussed standing\nby itself. The tripartite position has been that the first item of any\nagenda must be an examination of the causes of present international ten-\nsion including the existing level of armaments in relation to its effect\non the question of the demilitarization of Germany.\nIn addition there has been one other main difference of opinion.\nTogether with the British and French we have been insisting that the\nAustrian treaty must be dealt with at any Ministers' meeting. The USSR\nhas taken the position that the Austrian treaty must be discussed along\nwith Trieste; the tripartite position has been that there is no relation\nbetween these two problems.\nRecently in private tripartite meetings, the French representative\nhas submitted two alternate agenda proposals. No tripartite agreements\nhas been reached as yet on the French suggestions.\nThe first follows closely the present agreed tripartite version with\nthe important difference that it lists separately within the context of\nthe item on \"Examination of Causes of Present Tension in Europe,\" the\nsubject \"Question of Demilitarization of Germany.\" We maintain our\nobjections to listing this item separately. It is possible this question\nmay have to be decided on the governmental level.\nThe second French proposal would list under \"Examination of Causes\nof Present International Tension in Europe,\" questions which France, the\nUnited Kingdom and the US desire to discuss, and separately the questions\nwhich the Soviet Union desires to discuss at a meeting of the Foreign\nMinisters. This second French proposal would appear to mean an unagreed\nSECRET\nSECRET\n9\nagenda. We do not favor this suggestion, though as a last resort we would\nbe willing to give it serious consideration provided the tripartite list\nfavorably presented the Western point of view, omitting reference to German\ndemilitarization and provided the tripartite list could be obtained as\nitem one on the final agenda.\nThis paper reflects the position as of Friday, March 23 and a summary\nof subsequent developments will be submitted prior to M. Auriol's arrival.\nGROD Tm\nINDOCHINA\nTOP SECRET\n10\nINDOCHINA\nFrench Position\nIt is anticipated that M. Schuman will state that France is carrying\nthe burden of the Indochina responsibility in as great a degree as her\nnational and international commitments permit. In so doing she is carry-\ning a more than equitable share of the burden of the free nations of the\nworld in their defense against communism. Her recent decision to send\nreinforcements will be cited as additional evidence of this fact. France\nhas loyally carried out its agreements to grant autonomy within the\nFrench Union to the Associated States. With the fulfillment of American\nassurances concerning aid, France is determined to fulfill her primary\nresponsibility for French Union areas. The only eventuality which might\nlead France to a reconsideration of her role in Indochina would be a\nlarge scale Chinese attack. In that event France will require aid from\nher allies, including the US, to forestall if possible, a withdrawal or\nevacuation.\nThe French may refer to the complex nature of Vietnam internal\npolitics and the practical considerations delaying the transfer of powers.\nThey will cite their recent action in transferring customs and certain\nfinancial services as evidence of their good faith.\nUnited States Position\nThere has been no important change in the US position regarding\nIndochina since the Truman-Pleven talks on January 29th and 30th, 1951.\nThe US continues to recognize the seriousness of the threat from\nChina and the extent to which the Chinese are supporting the Viet Minh.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP\nSECRET\n11\nThe US believes that every means within the power of the Associated\nStates and the French Union must be brought to bear to assure the terri-\ntorial integrity of the Indochinese peninsula. American military aid is\nbeing furnished to assist toward that end. The US is at present planning\nto continue to furnish military aid during the present and coming fiscal\nyear, as outlined to M. Pleven.\nThe US continues to regard the defense of Indochina as being the\nprimary responsibility of the French Union. The US is not prepared to\nintervene directly but would be willing to consider requests for logistic\nsupport in the event of an emergency such as a forced evacuation. The\ntripartite military conversations agreed upon during the Pleven talks\nwill take place in the near future.\nIn agreeing to proceed with its aid programs the US is confident\nthat the French Government will interpret the various Accords with the\nAssociated States as liberally as circumstances permit. The US looks\nforward to the early development of the National Armies. We are confident\nthat the French will continue to furnish financial and military aid to\nthe Associated States. American aid in all fields is designed to supple-\nment rather than supplant French aid. The US continues to doubt the\nadvisability of a general UN consideration of the Indochina problem.\nRecommendations\nIt is recommended that the President and Secretary inform the French\nthat there appears to be no need to revise the observations and conclu-\nsions reached during the discussions with Prime Minister Pleven. There\nare, however, one or two new problems and further developments in old\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n12\nones which we would wish to draw to the attention of the French in order\nto confirm at the highest level the declarations of US policy made by our\nAmbassador in Paris and Minister in Saigon, and, in turn, obtain French\nofficial confirmation of assurances already given.\n1. Reinforcements for Indochina\nThe US recognizes the fact that French Union Forces in Indochina must\nbe supplied with the men and equipment required to assure the successful\ndefense of the Associated States from foreign aggression and communist-led\nand inspired internal insurrection. Any decision regarding reinforcements\nfor French units in the French Union forces is primarily a French deci-\nsion. The President should avoid any discussion relating to the necessity\nof submitting any such decision to NATO and any question regarding the\nlatter's jurisdiction in the matter.\nDiscussion\nGeneral deLattre has received the approval of the French Government\nfor the assignment of an additional 12,000 troops to Indochina as rein-\nforcements for a maximum period of a year and a half. It is the opinion\nof General Bradley, concurred in by the Department, that the decision to\nprovide French reinforcements should be a French decision in which General\nEisenhower, as SACEUR should, if possible, not participate.\n2. United States Intentions in Vietnam, Particularly as they Concern the\nOperations of our Military and Economic Aid Programs and Information\nServices\nThe President should make it abundantly clear that the US has no in-\ntention of supplanting French efforts in Indochina either at the present\ntime or in the future. The US purpose remains one of furnishing economic\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n13\nand technical aid to supplement that being furnished by France in order\nto achieve our common objectives of national stability in the Associated\nStates. The US trusts that this objective will be attained at the earliest\npossible moment in order to permit both France and the US to be relieved\nof their present commitments. The President should request that Foreign\nMinister Schuman take the necessary steps to bring these assurances to\nthe attention of those French officials, both in France and Indochina,\nwho still labor under any illusions on this score.\nDiscussion\nThere have recently been evidences of an impression on the part of\nsome French officials in Indochina that the US was endeavoring to replace\nthe French as the western power primarily concerned with advising and\nassisting the governments of the Associated States in the conduct of\ntheir affairs. The matter has been the subject of discussion between\nour envoys and the appropriate French officials. Although assurances\nhave been given to the contrary, the suspicion concerning the true nature\nof our motives persists and should be vigorously denied.\n3. Transfer of Services to the Associated States\nThe President should indicate that he has noted with pleasure the\nrecent transfer from French to local control of certain services and the\nsteps currently in process to transfer certain others as provided in the\nPau Accords. The US Government recognizes the difficulties entailed in\neffecting the transfer of other services yet trusts that the French\nGovernment will not relax its attention to the matter. Notwithstanding\nthe difficulties it is believed that the furtherance by the Associated\nfor SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n14\nStates of their foreign relations with friendly states through the assign-\nment of representatives abroad has been delayed longer than might be\nexplained by practical considerations, It is recommended therefore, that\nthe President, urge M. Schuman to bring the influence of his government\nto bear upon the sovereigns of the three Associated States to enlarge their\npresent representation abroad as rapidly and extensively as possible.\nDiscussion\nThe French have taken steps to transfer certain services to the As-\nsociated States in accordance with the Pau Accords. The speed and scope\nof the transfers have been delayed, largely for valid reasons involving\npractical considerations. It is believed, nevertheless, that the diplo-\nmatic representation of the Associated States abroad can and should be\nincreased.\n4. Recent Vietnam Cabinet Crisis\nThe President may wish to seek French confirmation of their govern-\nment's determination to maintain a detatched attitude in the internal\nstruggle for power now taking place in Vietnam. The President may wish\nto attest to our appreciation of the complexities of the factors involved\nin Vietnamese internal politics and the dangers inherent in attempting\nany major alterations in the Bao Dai solution under the present circum-\nstances of armed internal conflict and threatened invasion from abroad.\nDiscussion\nThe new cabinet in Vietnam was established on March 3, 1951, only\nafter considerable negotiation and maneuvering between Bao Dai, Prime\nMinister Huu, and other protagonists. Although the French maintained a\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n15\npolicy of nonintervention during the unfolding of the crisis, General\ndeLattre did intervene in an advisory capacity, particularly in prodding\nBao Dai on to action in resolving the impasse. General deLattre's role,\nalthough not interventional in an unwarranted sense, was evident in con-\nnection with the Bao Dai-Huu tension which was ultimately, if temporarily,\nset aside in the formation of a cabinet under Huu. In the thought that\nthe present government will fall in the near future, French views on its\npossible successor are sought.\nTOP SECRET\nMIDDLE EAST\nDEFENSE-MALTA\nTOP SECRET\n16\nA paper on the \"Malta Talks\" and Middle East defense will be\nfurnished prior to President Auriol's arrival.\nTOP SECRET\nToΓ SECRET\n16\nMIDDLE EAST DEFENSE - MALTA TALKS\nBackground\nOn January 23-24 Admiral Carney met at Malta with General Sir Brian\nRobertson, the British Commander in Chief of Middle East Forces to dis-\ncuss the defense of the Middle East.\nDuring his conversation with President Truman on January 30 Prime\nMinister Pleven said that the French desire to participate in any stra-\ntegic conversations such as those held in Malta. President Truman said\nthat neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of State had any\nintention of cutting the French out of any conversations.\nAmbassador Bonnet requested on Saturday, March 10, that the French\nbe invited to participate in conversations that were to be held in Malta\non Monday, March 13, between Admiral Carney and General Robertson. Am-\nbassador Bonnet was informed that in view of the question of the principle\nraised by this request, the position taken by the British Government on\na similar request made of it, and the shortness of time, it was impossible\nfor us to accede to the French desire.\nOn Friday, March 16, Ambassador Bruce was handed by Ambassador Parodi\na strong note signed by Mr. Schuman reflecting the decision taken that\nmorning by the Cabinet regarding the Malta Conference. It outlines in\nconsiderable detail France's interests in the Near East, her desire to\nfulfill her responsibilities in that area, the unfortunate repercussion\nboth political and military of the Malta Conference to continued US-UK\nand French collaboration and concludes with the hope that \"in the general\ninterest of the Western powers the Government of the United States will\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n17\ntake measures with a view to preventing the recurrence of the incident\ncaused by French absence at the Malta conversations and that it will\ndefine with full clarity its position regarding the association of France\nwith the organization of the defense of the Near East.\"\nIn handing this protest to Ambassador Bruce, Parodi referred to\nPresident Truman's assurances to Mr. Pleven. He also stated that the\nFrench are inclined to attribute their exclusion more to the British\nthan to ourselves.\nAt the same time the French delivered a similar, but stronger, note\nto the British.\nThe deep interests of France in the Western Mediterranean are self\nevident. Her position in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, her sovereignity\nover Corsica, as well as her continental position on the Mediterranean,\ngive France as great an interest in Western Mediterranean affairs as\nany nation in Europe. With regard to the Eastern part of the Mediterranean,\nFrance's interest stems from the economic, cultural and political posi-\ntion it enjoyed until recent years. The French Government has made clear\nthat it now regards the petroleum resources in the Near East and the\ncommunications to Indo China and other territories of the French Union\nvia the Suez Canal as of capital importance to the vital interest of\nthe French Republic. The United Kingdom and France have a treaty rela-\ntionship with Turkey which France considers as being ample evidence of\nthe importance she attaches to the general area of the Middle East.\nFrance does not believe that it is possible to isolate Western and Eastern\nMediterranean affairs.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n18\nFrance's position in the Near East has suffered a marked decline\nsince the beginning of World War II, During the period of her mandate\nin Syria and Lebanon she exerted strong political, economic and cultural\ncontrol. However, her popularity declined over the period of years and\nwith the fall of France in 1940 it reached a low point. When these two\ncountries became independent several years later, it was clear that\nthere was a strong antipathy toward any French military, economic or\npolitical influence in the area. This antipathy continues up to the\npresent moment. There is no sign that it is likely to decrease. France\nhas one major interest in Iraq in the form of a 23 percent share of the\nIraq Petroleum Company. French cultural influence continues strong in\nEgypt and Lebanon, and France has displayed a keen interest in the Holy\nPlaces of Palestine.\nIt has been the opinion of the United States Government that the\nprestige of France in the Middle East had declined to such an extent that\nit would not be possible for France to make any useful contribution in\nthe political or military fields for the time being. NSC 47/2, \"United\nStates Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States\", approved October 17,\n1949, states: \"There should also be close United States-United Kingdom\ncollaboration wherever possible to achieve the basic objectives. In\naddition, the United States should bear in mind the desirability of\ncollaborating with France and with Turkey and with other Moslem non-Arab\nstates in the area for the same purpose whenever it is feasible and\npracticable.\"\nfor SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n19\nNSC 47/5, \"United States Policy Toward the Arab States and Israel\",\napproved by the President March 17, 1951, was prepared for the purpose\nof developing a policy for the United States to follow in the Arab states\nand Israel during the cold-war period. It has been felt during the past\nseveral years that our approach to the area on matters relating to the\ndefense of the area could only be done in collaboration with the United\nKingdom. The opposition which would be engendered in the Arab world if\nFrance were to participate in defense arrangements has been repeatedly\nmade clear by spokesmen of Near Eastern countries. Recent manifestations\nof French policy in Morocco have further decreased French prestige in the\nNear East.\nThe United States has attempted to cooperate with France in the Near\nEast wherever possible, taking into account the limitations imposed by\nthe decline of French prestige. In this connection, we have participated\nwith France and Turkey on the Palestine Conciliation Commission since\n1948. Similarly we have collaborated on the settlement of the Arab refugees.\nIn May 1950, the United States, United Kingdom and France participated\njointly in the issuance of the Tripartite Declaration which was addressed\nto the question of the shipment of arms to the Near Eastern area. However,\nthis is the extent to which the United States has felt that it would be\npolitically possible for us to go in collaborating with France.\nRecommendations:\nIn discussing the question of the Malta Conference with Foreign Minister\nSchuman it is recommended that you take the following line:\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n20\nWe sincerely regret the amount of publicity received by the recent\nmeeting between British and American commanders of forces in the Middle\nEastern area. The purpose of this meeting was merely to discuss together\nour appraisals of the military situation in the Middle East.\nAlthough the United States Government is firmly convinced of the\nnecessity of the multilateral approach to European problems and to\ncertain other questions of mutual interest, it nevertheless believes\nthat there are many questions that can be best handled on a bilateral\nbasis, as recently shown by the Carney-Lambert talks, the Franco-Italian\nnaval discussion, General Hamilton's meetings with the French Air Force\nofficials, and General Juin's meetings here in January.\nThe relationship of the Mediterranean area to other defense plans\nhas not been clarified. The United States desires to discuss this matter\nfurther with the French military authorities and accordingly proposes\nthat there be held in Washington in the near future a meeting between\nFrench, British and American officials on the standing group (not the\nstanding group per se), plus such additional personnel as any of the\nthree powers might want to attend. At this meeting the general conclu-\nsions arrived at at the Malta talks would be outlined and the United States\nGovernment would be prepared to discuss the relationship of the Mediter-\nranean area to General Eisenhower's command and to the British Command\nin the Middle East. As the Malta talks were concerned with technical\nmilitary questions relating to American and British forces, you might\nwish to say to Mr. Schuman that these questions can be more appropriately\ndiscussed by military representatives.\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n21\nThe United States representatives at this forthcoming meeting would\nbe prepared to consider the possibility of holding technical discussions\nof Mediterranean matters, if desired, on French soil between French,\nUnited States and United Kingdom naval commanders. Such a meeting,\nhowever, would undoubtedly create additional problems in that other\nMediterranean countries, such as Italy, Greece, Turkey and possibly certain\nArab States, might desire to participate therein. This matter would there-\nfore have to be further discussed at the Washington meeting.\nMr. Schuman will undoubtedly inquire as to the United States Govern-\nment's position regarding the association of France in organizing the\ndefense of the Middle East (interpreted by us to include Turkey, Iran,\nthe Arab States and Israel). It is suggested that you reply that this\nis a problem that will have to be worked out and that you continue as\nfollows:\n1. The establishment of an organization for the defense of the Middle\nEast should, in our opinion, conform to the desires of the governments in\nthe area as well as the governments which are prepared to contribute\nforces to the defense of the area.\n2. Similarly, while the United States believes that all possible\nsteps should be taken to strengthen the Middle Eastern area, with due\nregard to the requirements of the NAT area, nevertheless this must be in\nresponse to the expressed will of the governments concerned.\n3. The United States desires to carry out in close cooperation with\nFrance and the United Kingdom, the purpose of the Tripartite Declaration\n(Tab A). (Mr. Schuman will recall that this declaration was addressed to\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n22\nthe question of the shipment of arms to the area and contained an expres- -\nsion of interest on the part of three governments in the maintenance of\npeace between the states in the area. It was not designed to deal with\ngeneral defense of the area against external aggression.)\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n23\nDECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE\nUNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, REGARDING SECURITY IN THE\nNEAR EAST\nThe Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States,\nhaving had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers Meeting in London\nto review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab\nStates and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war\nmaterial to these states, have resolved to make the following statements:\n1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel\nall need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of\nassuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to\npermit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All\napplications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered\nin the light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments\nwish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their re-\npresentatives on the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they\ndeclared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the\nArab states and Israel.\n2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received\nfrom all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied\nfrom their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to under-\ntake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances\nwill be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit\narms to be supplied in the future.\nMay 25, 1950\nTOP SECRET\nFOP SECRET\n24\n3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their\ndeep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and main-\ntenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposi-\ntion to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in\nthat area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these\nstates was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would,\nconsistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations,\nimmediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to\nprevent such violation.\nTOP SECRET"
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