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2.
After she was admitted to the League in 1934, Russia was the
best Great Power member that the League ever had. On every vital occasion
she stood for action against the fascist aggressors, perhaps not for any
idealistic reason, but to help save herself. Yet in every decisive case
her cooperation was rejected by the British and French.
(1) They refused really to discipline Italy in the Ethiopian affair.
(2) Far from defending the Spanish Republic at Geneva, they fled to
London and organized a "Non-Intervention Committee" which held
a blanket over the Spanish tragedy until the Republic was
strangled to death under it by Mussolini, Hitler and France.
When Russia tried belatedly to help the Spanish Republic, the
cry of "Communism" was accepted, for a time at least, even in
RCHIVESIAND
the United States.
(3) The rape of Austria followed, throwing all Eastern Europe open
to Hitler.
(4) Then when Czechoslovakia's turn quickly came, the British and
French Governments begged Hitler to take what he wanted peaceably,
making Poland's doom sure. But the deepest significance of the
Munich "conference"was the exclusion of Russia. She was sent
back to Asia, to await her turn in Hitler's sweep to world power.
(5) When Hitler tore up the Munich Pact in March 1939, Britain and
France at once threw out guarantees of the independence of Poland
and Rumania -- guarantees which they were totally powerless to
make good. Only Russia could defend Poland and she would have
to do it virtually alone, because of the German West Wall. Even
then, third rank negotiators were sent to get the alliance with
Russia.
(6) The Russians chose instead to make a deal with Hitler which would
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"ocrText": "2.\nAfter she was admitted to the League in 1934, Russia was the\nbest Great Power member that the League ever had. On every vital occasion\nshe stood for action against the fascist aggressors, perhaps not for any\nidealistic reason, but to help save herself. Yet in every decisive case\nher cooperation was rejected by the British and French.\n(1) They refused really to discipline Italy in the Ethiopian affair.\n(2) Far from defending the Spanish Republic at Geneva, they fled to\nLondon and organized a \"Non-Intervention Committee\" which held\na blanket over the Spanish tragedy until the Republic was\nstrangled to death under it by Mussolini, Hitler and France.\nWhen Russia tried belatedly to help the Spanish Republic, the\ncry of \"Communism\" was accepted, for a time at least, even in\nRCHIVESIAND\nthe United States.\n(3) The rape of Austria followed, throwing all Eastern Europe open\nto Hitler.\n(4) Then when Czechoslovakia's turn quickly came, the British and\nFrench Governments begged Hitler to take what he wanted peaceably,\nmaking Poland's doom sure. But the deepest significance of the\nMunich \"conference\"was the exclusion of Russia. She was sent\nback to Asia, to await her turn in Hitler's sweep to world power.\n(5) When Hitler tore up the Munich Pact in March 1939, Britain and\nFrance at once threw out guarantees of the independence of Poland\nand Rumania -- guarantees which they were totally powerless to\nmake good. Only Russia could defend Poland and she would have\nto do it virtually alone, because of the German West Wall. Even\nthen, third rank negotiators were sent to get the alliance with\nRussia.\n(6) The Russians chose instead to make a deal with Hitler which would"
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