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    "localId": "213875212",
    "label": "United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report, Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I, A Chronology of Events from March 15, 1917 to January 1, 1947",
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    "title": "United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report, Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I, A Chronology of Events from March 15, 1917 to January 1, 1947",
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    "ocrText": "56 TRENDS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR I\nTRENDS IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR I\n57\nKremlin is perhaps best illustrated by the weighty support Moscow\nSOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE\ngave to the admission of the Ukraine and White Russia as inde-\nAs it is well known, millions of Soviet citizens are brought up with\npendent members to the United Nations Organization while, on the\nthe idea of living in a 'capitalistic encirclement,\" in constant fear of\nother hand, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic\na foreign attack on the proletarian homeland. After the famous\n(R. S. F. S.R.), the largest and most important Republic of the Union,\nChurchill speech at Fulton, Mo., John Fischer was asked by 'dozens\nwas left out and had obviously to surrender the protection of its\ninterests before the international forum to the all-union authorities.\nof war-weary little people in Russia-farmers, train porters, book-\nIn the life of a nation domestic and foreign affairs hardly can be\nkeepers, who normally took no interest in politics, why these evil\nmen were trying to set the world aflame again; and why didn't Presi-\ncompartmentalized. There is a continuous interplay going on be-\ndent Truman denounce these warmongers as Stalin had?\" 16\ntween the internal and external policies of a country. Domestic\nAre the Soviet masses entirely under the spell of Communist\npractices had no doubt exerted a good deal of influence on the con-\nduct of Soviet foreign relations. Intolerance became one of the most\npropaganda, which day after 'day, in the press and on the air, tries\nto convince them that the Soviet society is the most \"advanced\"\nobvious features of Soviet international policy. Vishinsky made this\npoint perfectly clear when in one of his speeches at the first session\nand \"progressive\" form of democracy and the United States of\nAmerica is decadent and corrupt, a land of unemployment and low\nof the United Nations he made the following observation: \"We\neducational standards, racial intolerance, monopolistic capital, and\ndo not want to accept tolerance-we paid too much for it. 13\nSuspicion and mistrust are two other basic elements of Soviet\npolitical and social backwardness? Or are there some sections in\nthe Soviet population left who succeeded in preserving independence\nforeign policy, and they are very often quoted in defense of various\nSoviet diplomatic moves and actions which could otherwise not\nof judgment and in resisting the barrage of anti-foreign indoctrination?\nFortunately, the various observers seem to agree that there are\neasily be understood. After a generation-long self-isolation from\n\"almost no indications that the Russian people themselves desire\nthe free world, suspicion of individuals-as well as of peoples-who\nwar or are unfriendly to the United States.\" 17 In the thirties most\nwere critical of the Soviet system and way of life, became a habit,\nSiberians remembered Americans, according to John Scott, as good\nan obsession with official Russia.\nfellows \"who came once and helped against the Japanese but would\nSuspicion can, of course, be something very real and legitimate.\nnot stay because it was cold in Siberia, and because they had a fine\nIn the first years after the revolution, the suspicion of foreign coun-\ntries was partly carried over from the days of foreign armed inter-\ncountry of their own.\" Help rendered during the war by the United\nStates could not pass unnoticed by the ordinary Soviet citizen.\nvention in the Russian civil war. After Hitler's rise to power there\n\"The enormous good will of the people of the Soviet Union toward\nwere plenty of new reasons for the Communist state to be on guard\nAmericans seemed apparent everywhere I went,\" wrote Charles E.\nand prepared for all eventualities. Today, \"fear that there will be\nopposition to the next step in expansion\" can easily create mistrust\nKellogg who, in the summer of 1945 with several American scientists,\nin Soviet Russia.14\nwas guest of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R.18 And most\nof the Russians whom Richard E. Lauterbach met in the U. S. S. R.\nBut suspicion can also be artificially generated. It is often an\nin 1946 \"admired Deanna Durbin, the American Air Force, Camel\norganic part of the totalitarian technique for keeping the population\ncigarettes, and United States canned goods.\" The Russian\npeople\nin a state of heightened tension. The ever-present phantom of\nan\nare at present of necessity inarticulate. But it has been rightly pointed\nunprovoked foreign war serves as a welcome excuse for the drabness\nof Soviet everyday life, the constant shortage of consumer goods and\nout by Calvin B. Hoover that-\ncommodities, and for the further exertions and sacrifices asked from\nthe yearning of the great mass of the Russian people for peace, for some degree\nof personal liberty, for a more comfortable life, does not at the present weigh in\nthe Soviet population. Furthermore, there are also the alleged vested\nthe balance, but at the moment when the possibility of the passage of power from\ninterests.\none group to another becomes reality, it could have great weight indeed.20\nThe Soviet apprehension, so deeply rooted both in dogma and in Russian history-\nSOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND RUSSIAN NATIONALISM\nwrites John Fischer, a member of an UNRRA mission in the Ukraine-\nprobably has been deliberately cultivated by the country's most potent bureau-\nNew elements-the recognition of historical tradition, Soviet-\ncrats, the political police. * * * It is not the nature of any bureaucracy-\npatriotism, the idea of Slav solidarity-have been added to the political\nRussian, American, or Fiji-to go out of business voluntarily. *\n*\n*\nIf\ncredo of the Russian Communist prior to and during the fight against\nBeria and his lieutenants produced intelligence of fresh dangers, of plots for a\nnew capitalist encirclement by Russia's former allies, they would simply be obey-\nthe Axis, the so-called great fatherland war. However, basically and\ning the oldest instinct of politics, the passion of the functionary for his function.\nin spite of this thin national overlayer, the ideology of Communist\nAnd a number of western diplomats who have been working closely with the\nRussia remained the same as in the first days after the revolution.\nRussians believe that this is precisely what is happening.15\n16 Fischer, p. 102.\n13 Dulles, Soviet Foreign Policy, Life, June 3, 1946, p. 113.\n17 Hoover, p. 15.\n14 Calvin B. Hoover, Basic Elements in Soviet-American -Relations, the Virginia Quarterly Review,\n18 Washington Post, September 9, 1945.\nwinter 1947, p. 14.\n19 Richard E. Lauterbach My Fellow-Passengers in Siberia, Harper's Magazine, November 1946, p. 414.\n15 John Fischer, the Scared Men in the Kremlin, Harper's Magazine, August 1946, p. 103.\n20 Hoover, p. 16."
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