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Executs
Chart5
ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES
The over-all economic capabilities of the Soviet Union for the achieve- -
ment of its ultimate aim of bringing about the defeat or capitulation of
the US and its allies appear on the surface to be shockingly inadequate.
For example, the total productive strength of the USSR in the four key
commodities illustrated on the chart opposite==granting optimistic Soviet
reports of production--compares with that of the US in a ratio of one to
four.
However, the present ability of the USSR to achieve success in its
struggle with the on-Communist world cannot be determined from this
comparison alone. Actual Soviet capabilities far exceed apparent
capabilities because of the Kremlin's ability tobring to bear on a particu-
lar effort a very large share of its total strength. Since the Soviet econ-
omy has not been developed to serve consumers' needs, an unusually
large proportion of its industrial production can be devoted to extra-
ordinary purposes. Consequently, the USSR with its existing economic
strength can sustain a mammoth war effort for a prolonged period. For
instance, it prosecuted the last war with an annual steel availability of
less than 10 million tons one half of its present capacity. There is
little doubt, therefore, that it could successfully equip and supply the
maximum number of men it could put into the field with a total steel
production appreciably less than the present rate. The same is generally
true of other commodities, except fissionable materials about which the
situation is not known.
Secret
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"ocrText": "Executs\nChart5\nECONOMIC CAPABILITIES\nThe over-all economic capabilities of the Soviet Union for the achieve- -\nment of its ultimate aim of bringing about the defeat or capitulation of\nthe US and its allies appear on the surface to be shockingly inadequate.\nFor example, the total productive strength of the USSR in the four key\ncommodities illustrated on the chart opposite==granting optimistic Soviet\nreports of production--compares with that of the US in a ratio of one to\nfour.\nHowever, the present ability of the USSR to achieve success in its\nstruggle with the on-Communist world cannot be determined from this\ncomparison alone. Actual Soviet capabilities far exceed apparent\ncapabilities because of the Kremlin's ability tobring to bear on a particu-\nlar effort a very large share of its total strength. Since the Soviet econ-\nomy has not been developed to serve consumers' needs, an unusually\nlarge proportion of its industrial production can be devoted to extra-\nordinary purposes. Consequently, the USSR with its existing economic\nstrength can sustain a mammoth war effort for a prolonged period. For\ninstance, it prosecuted the last war with an annual steel availability of\nless than 10 million tons one half of its present capacity. There is\nlittle doubt, therefore, that it could successfully equip and supply the\nmaximum number of men it could put into the field with a total steel\nproduction appreciably less than the present rate. The same is generally\ntrue of other commodities, except fissionable materials about which the\nsituation is not known.\nSecret"
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