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    "ocrText": "The President\nCONFIDENTIAL\nNSC 17\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nHARRY TRUMAN ARCHIVES AND RECORDS LIBRARY\non\nU.S. GOVERNMENT\nTHE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\nJune 28, 1948\nWASHINGTON\nDECLASSIFIED\nNSC LIST 2-15-79\nBYNLT-NC NARS, Date 4.17.79\nCONFIDENTIAL\n/\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANS-\nMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO\nAN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 17\nCONFIDENTIAL\nJune 28, 1948\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\nReference: NSC Action No. 43\nAt its 9th Meeting, the National Security Council authorized the Executive\nSecretary, with the assistance of qualified representatives from the Departments\nrepresented on the Council and other interested Agencies, including the Federal\nBureau of Investigation, to prepare a study and recommendations on the above sub-\nject for Council consideration at an early date. Pursuant to this authorization,\nand on the recommendation of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,\nMr. J. Patrick Coyne, formerly Chief of the Internal Security Division of the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, was employed as a temporary consultant on the\nNSC Staff to undertake the preparation of the required study with the assistance\nof representatives of appropriate Departments and Agencies.\nThe enclosed report, entitled \"A Brief Study Concerning the Internal Secur-\nity of the United States\", prepared by Mr. Coyne, is submitted herewith for con-\nsidoration at an early meeting of the National Security Council, including for\nthis item the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney Genoral.\nIt is suggested that the National Security Council adopt the Conclusions\nand the Recommendations (page 34) contained in the enclosed report and submit\nthem to the President for approval and direction that the Recommendations be\nimplemented by the National Security Council with the cooperation of all appro-\npriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government.\nSIDNEY W. SOUERS\nExecutive Secretary\nDistribution:\nThe Secretary of State\nThe Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Secretary of Defense\nOF HARRY SECURITY\nThe Attorney General\nThe Secretary of the Army\nThe Secretary of the Navy\nThe Secretary of the Air Force\nThe Chairman, National Security\nResources Board\nNSC 17\nCONT\nNSC 17\nJune 28, 1948\nA BRIEF STUDY CONCERNING THE\nINTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\nSUMMARY\nThe enclosed report contains a resume of the more salient and important\ndata developed in the course of a recent internal security study conducted at the\ndirection of the National Security Council for the purpose of considering the need\nfor developing a coordinated internal security effort and in order to determine\nthe action necessary to effectuate such an effort, if needed.\nIt is demonstrated in the attached report that no one agency is solely\nand exclusively responsible for the internal security of the United States; that,\nas a matter of fact, these responsibilities are of great variety and are broadly\ndistributed among a number of the agencies comprising the Executive Branch of the\nGovernment; but, none-the-less, that they are closely related and should always\nbe considered so from the standpoint of insuring over-all internal securi ty. For\norientation and informative purposes a digest is included therein of the outstand-\ning responsibilities of the major agencies concerned with this subject matter.\nIn the annexed report it is indicated that the necessary and desired de-\ngree of internal security coordination has not been attained and, with numerous\nexamples being cited in support thereof, it is concluded that the United States\nis not adequately secure internally at the present time and that it is not suf-\nficiently prepared from the standpoint of the future to thoroughly and speedily\ncope with the internal security conditions with which it would be confronted in\nthe event of a critical emergency. It is the finding of this survey that there\nis wanting the knowledge and integrated action essential to the safeguarding and\nreadying of the Nation's over-all internal security and it is concluded that the\nexistence of the internal security conditions described therein is attributable\nto a considerable extent to the absence of any centralized coordinating machinery\n--which in turn is prerequisite to a proper knowledge of and integrated action\nwith respect to the internal security of the United States.\nBased upon the conclusion that there must be a thoroughly coordinated\nand integrated effort if the United States is not to be found wanting on the in-\nternal security score, it is recommended in the enclosed report that, in fur-\ntherance of that objective, there be established the position of Special Assist-\nant on Internal Security to the National Security Council. The proposed functions\nof the Special Assistant include the assessment and appraisal of the over-all in-\nternal security program on a continuing basis by working closely on a consultative,\nadvisory, coordinative and mutually cooperative basis with designated representa-\ntives of the interested agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government. The\nview is expressed that a better coordinated internal security program will ulti-\nmately result from the adoption of the aforementioned recommendation provided that\nthe sincere cooperation of the several responsible agencies is afforded this en-\ndeavor.\nNSC 17\n- 1 -\nCONF\nCONFIDENTIAL\nFor ready reference purposes, it is noted that the attached document is\nsubdivided in the ensuing manner:\nThe Objective of This Study\nPage 3\nOrigin of and Authority for this Study\nPage 3\nDiscussion of Terms\nPage 4\nCommunism is the Greatest Internal\nSecurity Threat at this Time\nPage 6\nInternal Security Responsibilities are\nExtremely Diversified and Widely\nDispersed Throughout the Executive\nBranch of the Government\nPage 22\nThe Internal Security Efforts of the\nNumerous Responsible Agencies are\nPresently Uncoordinated.\nPage 25\nConclusions\nPage 34\nRecommendations\nPage 34\nJ. Patrick Coyne\nNSC 17\n- 2 -\nCONFEDENTI AL\nREPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\nTHE OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY\nThe purpose of this study is to consider the need for developing a co-\nordinated effort in the field of internal security and, if such a need exists,\nto determine the action necessary to effectuate a coordinated internal security\neffort.\nORIGIN OF AND AUTHORITY FOR THIS STUDY\nUnder date of March 26, 1948 the Secretary of Defense directed a com-\nmunication tc the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council wherein\nhe stated:\n\"the problem of developing a coordinated effort in the field\nof internal security is urgent and important\nalthough a\nnumber of individual departments and agencies are active in\nthis field and various studies of particular problems have\nbeen and are being made, there is no assurance that there is\nsufficient coordination of security functions between all in-\nterested department and agencies at the present time or that\nthis will be so in the event of war.\"\nThe Secretary of Defense requested the National Security Council to\nconsider the problem of intornal security and the need for offective coordina-\ntion in this fiold. On April 2, 1948 the Executive Secretary of the National\nSecurity Council was directed by the Council members to arrange for the conduct\nof an internal security survey in line with the obscrvations contained in the\npreviously mentioned momorandum of the Secretary of Defense dated March 26, 1948.\nThe National Security Council's authority in ordering this survey is\ntraceable to the National Security Act of 1947 which indicates that it is the\nfunction of the National Security Council\n\"to advise the President with respect to the integration of\ndomestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the na-\ntional security so as to enable the military services and\nthe other departments and agencies of the Government to co-\noperate more effectively in matters involving the national\nsecurity,\"\nNSC 17\n- 3 -\nas well as\n\"to consider policies on matters of common interest to the\ndepartments and agencies of the Government concerned with\nthe national security, and to make recommendations to the\nPresident in connection therewith.\"\nIt was in the perspective of this statutory responsibility that the National Se-\ncurity Council directed that this study be undertaken, since the internal secur-\nity is an integral part of the national security. Accordingly, the National Se-\ncurity Council retained the writer to conduct the survey, subsequent to which\ntime this report was prepared after consultation with representatives of numer-\nous agencies including the following: Departments of State, the Army, the Navy,\nthe Air Force, Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation and Immigration and Nat-\nuralization Service), the Treasury, Commerce, Atomic Energy Commission, Central\nIntelligence Agoncy, National Security Resources Board, and the Office of Civil\nDefense Planning.\nDISCUSSION OF TERMS\nIn this report the term \"internal security\" is not used in the re-\nstricted sense of relating solely to the discovery, control and counteraction\nof activities involving espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition and general sub-\nversion, although it is recognized that such activities do relate basically and\ndirectly to the Nation's internal security. Conversely, as used in this report,\nthe term should not be construed as including within its scope the entire field\nof national security. For example, it does not extend as a matter of principal\ninterest to measures of economic security taken to counter the effects of eco-\nnomic penetration or control of the world's resources and implemented through\ntariffs, trade agreements, etc.. Similarly, it does not include as a matter of\nprimary interest measures of military security taken to counter the use of hos-\ntile military power and implemented through the use of organized armed rces;\nnor does it pertain principally to measures of political security primarily\ntaken with respect to another government and implemented through treaties, pacts\nor other diplomatic action.\nConsistent with the qualifications outlined immediately above, the\ntorm \"internal security\" as utilized herein relates to the dofense and protection\nwithin the United States and its territories of the people, the government, and\nrelated institutions from all hostile and destructive actions on the part of per-\nsons, groups and nations. It is concorned therefore with the inward defense of\nthe nation from dangerous or hostile forces. It is, accordingly, a collective\nresponsibility for collective protection of collective values by various coordi-\nnated agencies. Indicative of the practical facilities which have been estab-\nlished to insure this protection are such governmental entitios as: (1) The Na-\ntional Military Establishment, which must protect our vast coast line and\nNSC 17\n- 4 -\ncertain of the strategic military areas within our borders; (2) The State De-\npartment, which is concerned with traffic in implements of war as well as t he\nentrance and exit of individuals; (3) The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-\nvice, which must guard against illegal entries and arrange for the deportat ion\nof persons dangerous to the welfare of the country; (4) The Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation, which is responsible for the conduct of investigations with re-\nspect to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, etc.; (5) The Bureau of Customs,\nwhich is responsible for the prevention of smuggling and for determining whether\nmerchandise is of a character permitting its attempted entry into or export from\nthe United States, etc., etc..\nHARRY e TRUMAN RECORDS SERVICE LIBRARY\nU.S.\nNSC 17\n- 5 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCOMMUNISM IS THE GREATEST INTERNAL\nSECURITY THREAT AT THIS TIME\nSince this survey is mainly concerned with certain of the defects in our\ninternal security system and with possible means of eliminating these defects,\nthrough coordinated action on the part of interested agencies, this naturally\nraises a few questions: (1) From what are we as a people making ourselves inter-\nnally secure? (2) Can we establish an effective internal security system unless\nwe completely understand the nature of the hostile forces with which we are con-\nfronted? (3) Is there any one hostile force in the world today of greater threat\nto our very existence than any other hostile force or all others combined? Unless\nthese three legitimate questions are answered this survey obviously will not be\ncomplete.\nIn the light of available evidence the answers to these questions appear\nto be as follows:\n1. As indicated in the beginning of this survey, we as\na people must make our nation and way of life secure inter-\nnally from all hostile actions on the part of individuals,\ngroups and nations. From the very beginning of organized\nliving, of society, there have existed negative elements which\nwould tear down and destroy the established order by force\nand violence. Orderly change by the majority is acceptable\nand desirable but not the force and violence of a minority.\nGOVERNMENTS\n2. We cannot establish an effective internal security\nsystem unless we completely understand the nature of the hos-\ntile forces with which we are confronted. It matters not if\nit is some ancient form of tyranny, shattered Fascism, modern\nbrutality or Communism under the guise of \"new democracy\". To\nunderstand the enemy, his thought, practices and objectives,\nis to be better able to overcome the enemy.\n3. There is a hostile force confronting the United\nStates today which is a far greater threat to our existence\nthan any other threat. This hostile force is Communism.\nWorld-wide Communism is directed at the very heart of Amer-\nican life.\nIn view of this situation, there are set forth hereinafter some summary\nobservations concerning Communism, specifically as Communism is directed against\nthe internal security of the United States. This seems unavoidable for if the in-\nternal security system, which this survey seeks to improve, does not successfully\ncope with the Communist threat, then it need not worry about any other threat to\nthe internal security of this nation, because it is not impossible that there will\nbe no nation. It may well become only a part of an anti-democratic, freedomless\nworld-wide Soviet, under the guidance and direction of the mother of all Soviets,\nSoviet Russia. In different ages there have been different threats to the inter-\nnal security of the United States. In this present age the threat is Communism.\nNSC 17\n- 6 -\nUnless this fact is recognized for what it actually is and our internal security\nsystem intelligently adapted to this particular threat, then such an effort as this\nsurvey or any similar ones, is in vain. It is to this fact that we now specifi-\ncally address ourselves.\nThe Strength of the Communist Party, USA\nHaving national headquarters in New York City with active branches spread\nthroughout the nation and its territories, the Communist Party, USA, presently has\nbetween 66,000 and 68,000 enrolled members and is currently striving to recruit a\nregistered membership of 100,000. However, the importance of the Communist Party\nis not to be determined by its numerical strength for, as the Honorable J. Edgar\nHoover points out, \"What is important is the claim of the Communists themselves that\nfor every Party member there are ten others ready, willing and able to do the\nParty's work.\" Emphasizing this point the Communist Party's General-Chairman,\nWilliam Z. Foster, writes:\n\"The actual strength of the Communist movement in the United\nStates is not something that can be accurately stated in just\nso many figures. It has to be measured largely by the gen-\neral mass influence of the Party and its program. If elec-\ntions for a number of reasons, are not an exact register of\nthe Party strength.\" \"The real power of the Party is seen in\nthe mass movements which it initiates itself, or to which, initi-\nated by other revolutionary organizations, it gives its full sup-\nport.\" \"While they indicate that the Party has only made a\nstart at the mobilization of the potentially revolutionary\nforces in the United States, they, at the same time, sum up in-\nto a picture of a Party gradually entrenching itself among the\nmasses, especially the most exploited sections, and slowly\nbuilding youthful bone and muscle in preparation for the gigan-\ntic revolutionary work that lies ahead.\" \"Today our Party is\nsmall and the parties of the capitalists are large and strong,\nbut the day will surely come when the Communist Party will be\nthe only political party in the United States. On that day it\nwill be the Party of the victorious proletarian revolution.\"\nThe foregoing expresses rather well why the actual membership figure of\nthe Communist Party of the United States is very misleading. Had William Z. Foster\nbeen inclined to reveal some of the more secret strategy of the Communist Party, he\ncould have pointed out that the Party prefers to keep its revolutionary membership\nsmall and highly selective as the mobile vanguard of the revolution. A small Party\nis more readily disciplined, more highly unified and more easily directed than is a\nlarge mass party. The mass following of the Communist Party is organized into\n\"front\" groups and similar instruments of Communism. William Z. Foster, had he so\ndesired, could have explained in more detail how the strength of Communism in the\nUnited States and elsewhere is cleverly concealed and organized on different levels.\nOn the first level there will be found the open Communist Party member who admits\nhis membership. On a second level there will be found the person who is a convinced\nCommunist but deliberately refrains from joining the Party and will deny his Com-\nmunist convictions because by so doing he can work more effectively in spreading\nNSC 17\n- 7 -\nIDENTIAL\nthese subversive doctrines. On a third level there will be found what is commonly\nreferred to as the \"fellow traveller\" who, for reasons of his own, generally sup-\nports the policies and program of the Party though not a member. On the fourth\nlevel there will be found the \"sympathizer\" who may not accept the entire Party pro-\ngram but is in agreement with much of it and entertains some kindly feelings for cer-\ntain Communists and their objectives. On the fifth level there will be found the\n\"opportunist\" who, in order to further his own selfish interests, will \"play ball\"\nwith the Communists; will support them in some matters on various occasions, be-\nlieving he can \"use\" the Communists to his own advantage. (This type, who may be a\npublic office seeker, a professional man, a labor leader or even a business man,\nusually realizes sooner or later that he was the one who was \"used\" and not the\nCommunists.) On the sixth level will be found what is often referred to as the\n\"confused liberal\" who, while disagreeing with the over-all philosophy of Communism\nand its anti-democratic methods, still believes that it is possible to cooperate with\nCommunism in finding an immediate practical solution to pressing social problems.\nOn the seventh level there will be found well meaning, socially minded, charitable\npeople who are deceived by Communist slogans and propaganda and are soon unknow-\ningly supporting Communist \"front\" organizations and mass movements. It is in this\ncomplex and comprehensive pattern of activities combining both legal and illegal\noperations that the real strength of the Communist Party rests and not in the mem-\nbership of the Party per se. This is an internal security consideration which must\nnot be overlooked.\nSome Basic Ideas of the Communist Party, USA\nSome basic ideas in Communist philosophy are these: (1) Nature is all;\nthere is no God, no soul, no immortality. Contradiction is at the heart of reality;\nall things emerge from constant motion. Nature created itself, controls itself,\nperpetuates itself. (2) Man is not a free moral agent in the traditional sense as\nhe is bound by necessity, by the inexorable laws of nature. Neither does man have\nany individual dignity or personal worth. He has worth only as a member of society.\n(3) The State is an instrument of force and suppression and all non-Communist States\nmust be destroyed by violence with the Communist State finally \"withering away\" in\nthe face of the approaching stateless and classless society. (4) Individual oppor-\ntunity should not be given to non-Communists. (5) Society should not be based on\nany moral law derived from supernatural concepts or non-class sources as is done in\nwestern civilization. (6) Desired changes in the social order cannot be brought\nabout through peaceful, legal, constitutional means. These changes can be brought\nabout only through violent revolution engineered by the minority, the professional\nrevolutionaries of the Communist Party. (7) This revolutionary theory and method\ncorresponds to the nature of history which is a materialistic process ultimately de-\ntermined by the economic factor, a history of class struggle based on private prop-\nerty which must be banished. (8) Following the revolution a dictatorship of the\nproletariat of indefinite length is essential, based on force in order to annihilate\nall opposition, to crush those who would oppose the revolution. On destroying all\nthe opposition the dictatorship of the proletariat will disappear by stages as the\nCommunist society -- stateless, classless, Godless -- finally emerges in which all\nproperty will be owned in common, all people will live in common, all minds will\nthink in common.\nV STATE and HARRY'S I ADVRETT\nNSC 17\n- 8 -\nThe irreconcilable nature of Communism and American democracy becomes at\nonce apparent on contrasting some of the following basic ideas of democracy with\nthose of Communism. In American democracy (1) \"we hold these truths to be self-\nevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator\nwith certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pur-\nsuit of Happiness, and that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among\nmen, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed\"; (2) private prop-\nerty is not intrinsically harmful -- on the contrary it is the use of private prop-\nerty which determines its moral quality; (3) man is a free responsible moral agent;\n(4) the State is legitimate and must not be destroyed - on the contrary it must be\npreserved in order to serve man; (5) there must be equal individual opportunity for\nall; (6) society must be based on moral law as tried and tested for centuries in\nwestern civilization; (7) progressive changes in society are highly desirable and\nmust be brought about. through peaceful, legal, constitutional means at the instiga-\ntion of the majority of the people; (8) history is not a materialistic process de-\ntermined ultimately by the economic factor; (9) all men are equal before God and\ntherefore have inherent dignity, unalienable rights, personal worth and are sacred\nas individuals apart from society of which they are a part.\nFrom this contrast of Communist and democratic ideas the general outlines\nof the conflict on the ideological level can be seen. And Communists are quick to\nrealize the importance of ideological penetration as a basis for subsequent revolu-\ntionary action. The Communists begin their attack with ideas and intend to finish\nit with guns if necessary. With ideas they spread their poisonous germs in every\nphase of American life either openly or by subtleties and indirection. These ideas\nseep into American politics, American economics, American educational institutions,\nAmerican neighborhoods and American homes. These ideas, as do most ideas, have\npractical consequences. They serve to confuse and divide the American people. They\nserve to engender bitter conflicts between various segments of the American people.\nThey serve to increase social tensions. They all converge on the immediate objec-\ntive, expressly, the weakening of traditional democratic thought. And this has a\nvery direct bearing on our internal security system making its problems arduous,\nvaried and many. For these Communist ideas do not remain in the realm of theory.\nThey are adroitly brought to earth and put into daily action -- militant action.\nIt is this militant action which constitutes the attack against our democratic in-\nstitutions, linked as it is to the intrigues of foreign Communists. It is these\ndemocratic institutions that the internal security system of our nation is charged\nwith the grave responsibility of protecting.\nThe Anti-Democratic and Militaristic Form of Organization of the Communist Party,\nUSA\nThe Communist ideological penetration of the United States develops quite\nlogically into a militant, practical, day to day campaign against all of our demo-\ncratic institutions. First the idea and then the act. The former \"softens up\" the\npeople for the latter. And the Communist Party is the vehicle of application in\nthis country along with other Communist Parties scattered throughout the world. The\nCommunist writer A. B. Magil points out: \"This Party calls itself Communist because\ncommunism is its final aim.\" This should be carefully noted for it reflects quite\nclearly that democracy is not the desired end of the Communist Party, as it so\nNSC 17\n- 9 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nAL\nhypocritically proclaims, but rather Communism which is something basically differ-\nent from American democracy. It is not only basically different in the end but al-\nso in the means to the end for whereas democracy recommends only legal means Com-\nmunism recommends illegal means as well. V. I. Lenin urged that \"systematic, all\nsided, illegal work\" be conducted \"in spite of laws.\" He insisted that \"it is\nobligatory to combine legal forms with illegal forms of the struggle\nIt is nec-\nessary\nto resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers and illegal methods, to\nevasion and subterfuges,\" concealing the truth without compunction whenever it is\nhelpful to the spread of Communism to do so.\nThe anti-democratic and militant form of organization of the Communist\nParty is very well described by Joseph Stalin who is recognized by all Communists\nthroughout the world as their most outstanding leader. Joseph Stalin writes:\n\"Every army at war must have an experienced General Staff if\nit is to avoid certain defeat. All the more reason therefore\nwhy the proletariat must have such a General Staff if it is\nto prevent itself from being routed by its mortal enemies. But\nwhere is this General Staff? Only the revolutionary party of\nthe proletariat can serve as this General Staff. A working\nclass without a revolutionary party is like an army without a\nGeneral Staff. The Party is the Military Staff of the prole-\ntariat.\"\nThe same anti-democratic and militant form of organization of the Com-\nmunist Party, USA, is described in the following fashion by the present head of\nthat Party:\n\"Our Party, different from the Socialist Party, creates no il-\nlusions amongst the workers that they can vote their way to\nemancipation, that they can capture the ready-made machinery\nof the state and utilize it for the emancipation of the work-\ning class\nThe working class must shatter the capitalist\nstate. It must build a new state, a new government, a workers'\nand farmers' government, the Soviet Government of the United\nStates\nNo Communist, no matter how many votes he should se-\ncure in a national election, could, even if he would, become\npresident of the present government. When a Communist heads a\ngovernment in the United States -- and that day will come just\nas surely as the sun rises -- that government will not be a cap-\nitalistic government but a Soviet government, and behind this\ngovernment will stand the Red Army to enforce the Dictatorship\nof the Proletariat\nOur Party is a revolutionary Party. It\naims not simply to ease conditions a bit under capitalism for\nthe workers but to abolish capitalism altogether,\nEspecially\nmust we undertake to mobilize the masses of workers in de-\nfense of the Soviet Union,\nIn the last few years, in all\nthe important countries, revolutionary Communist partieshave\nbeen built up. They have sunk their roots deep among the masses.\nUnder the leadership of the Communist International they are\nNSC 17\n- 10 -\nAT\nmobilizing their forces. The power of this great movement con-\nstantly grows. When the international capitalist class, when\nthe imperialists of the world, assisted by their social-democratic\nlackeys, deem the time opportune and strike at the Soviet Union\nthe blow they are now preparing, they will wake up to a crash-\ning defeat. When that war begins, the Communist International\nand the millions of workers throughout Europe and other coun-\ntries that follow its lead will not simply adopt a defensive\n'MATIGNAL AND LIBRARY\n1\npolicy, they will not merely seek to stop their governments\nfrom attacking the Soviet Union. On the contrary, they will put\nGOVERNMENT\ninto effect the great Leninist strategy. They will turn the im-\nperialist war against the Soviet Union into a civil war of the\nworkers against capitalism. They will destroy the capitalist\norder and begin the building of the proletarian society.\"\nThe Communist Party, USA, then, as are all Communist parties, is mili-\ntant in organization, militant in practice and militant in its objectives. The\nCommunist Party, USA, and its representatives are in constant, ceaseless warfare\nwith all non-Communist ideas, non-Communist methods and non-Communist institutions.\nOrganized like an army they attack, retreat, zig-zag, attack again, relentlessly\npushing forward in accordance with the strategy of their world plan of operations\nbased on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. They are unified in thought, unified\nin command, unified in action and unified in the goal they are seeking. But they\nare very flexible in tactics and strategy as they move forward like a far-flung\narmy against the non-Communist world which is neither unified in thought, command,\naction nor goal and which is especially lacking in unanimity insofar as combatting\nthe expansion and entrenchment of Communism is concerned.\nThis is the Communist Party in operation here in the United States. This\nis the internal security problem of our day. To better understand it there will\nbe next considered in greater detail the nature of this subversive Communist Party.\nThe Nature of the Communist Party, USA\nTo establish the nature of the Communist Party and the objectives of its\nrepresentatives beyond any dispute it may be well to consider the evidence presented\nby William Z. Foster, the most authoritative and the most influential top-ranking\nCommunist in our country. Mr. Foster writes:\n\"One day, despite the disbelief of the capitalists and of their\nstill more cynical Social Fascist lackeys, the American workers\nwill demonstrate that they, like the Russians, have the intelli-\ngence, courage and organization to carry through the revolution.\nThe American capitalist class, like that of other countries, is\nliving on the brink of a volcano which, sooner than it dreams,\nis going to explode. George Bernard Shaw is right: the time\nwill surely come when the victorious toilers will build a monu-\nment to Lenin in New York.\" \"American capitalism, like capital-\nism in other countries, is travelling the same road to revolu-\ntion. The chronological order of the United States' entry into\nthe developing revolution is, as yet, a matter of speculation;\nNSC17\n- 11 -\nCONFIDENTI\nAT\nbut it would be sheer assumption to conclude that because this\nis the strongest capitalist country, it will be the last to go\ninto revolution.\" \"To put an end to the capitalist system will\nrequire a consciously revolutionary act by the great toiling\nmasses led by the Communist Party; that is, the conquest of the\nState power, the destruction of the State machine created by\nthe ruling class, and the organization of the proletarian dic-\ntatorship.\" \"The leader and organizer of the proletarian dic-\ntatorship is the Communist Party.\"\n\"The Communist Party bases its work directly upon the mills,\nmines, and factories. Its principle is to make every shop a\nfortress of Communism. It concentrates its work upon the heavy\nindustries and those of a war character.\" \"The Communist Party\nof the United States, in line with its program of class strug-\ngle, unites with the revolutionary workers of the world.' \"The\ntoiling masses of the United States will not submit to the cap-\nitalist way The working class of this country will tread the\npath of the workers of the world, the overthrow of capitalism\nand the establishment of a Soviet government.' \"The leader of\nthe revolution in all its stages is the Communist Party.\"\n\"Thus, for the United States as well as other countries, the\nSoviet Union is a plain indicator of the society that is to be\nIt foreshadows the broad lines along which the future Soviet\nAmerica will develop.\" \"The Red flag is the flag of the revolu-\ntionary class, and we are a part of the revolutionary class, and\nall capitalist flags are flags of the capitalist class, and we\nowe no allegiance to them. \"The American revolution. will de-\nvelop even more swiftly in all its phases than has the Russian\nrevolution. This is because in the United States objective con-\nditions are more ripe for revolution than they were in old Russia.\"\n\"The American Soviet government will join with other Soviet gov-\nernments in a world Soviet Union.'\n\"The American Soviet government will be the dictatorship of the\nproletariat. \"Under the dictatorship all the capitalist par-\nties -- Republican, Democratic, Progressive, Socialistic, etc. --\nwill be liquidated, the Communist party functioning alone\nLikewise, will be dissolved all other organizations that are\npolitical props of the bourgeois rule, including chambers of com-\nmerce, employer associations, rotary clubs, American Legion,\nY.M.C.A., and such fraternal orders as the Masons, Odd Fellows,\nElks, Knights of Columbus, etc.\" \"Science will become mater-\nialistic God will be banished from the laboratories as well\nas from the schools.\" \"In industry, transport and communication\nthis will mean the immediate taking over by the State of all\nlarge factories, mines and power plants, together with all mu-\nnicipal and State industries\nIn agriculture it will involve\nthe early confiscation of the large landed estates in town and\ncountry, including church property. \"In finance it will\nNSC 17\n- 12 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nmean the nationalization of the banking system...\" \"The social-\nization program will be carried through on the basis of confis-\ncation without remuneration.. \"Such a program is not a matter\nof mere speculation. This is the line that developed in the So-\nviet Union and it is the one that will develop here.\"\n\"The capitalists will not give up of their own accord; nor can\nthey be talked, bought or voted out of power. To believe other-\nwise would be a deadly fatalism, disarming and paralyzing the\nworkers in their struggle. No ruling class ever surrendered\nto a rising subject class without a last ditch open fight.\"\n\"Capitalism will not grow into Socialism. The great masses of\ntoilers must be in a revolutionary mood; they must have the\nnecessary organization and revolutionary program; they must\nsmash capitalism. This all means they must be under the general\nleadership of the only revolutionary party, the Communist Party.\nThe real measure of a revolutionary situation in any given coun-\ntry is the strength of the Communist Party.\" \"The Republican\nparty is the party of finance capital, of the great bankers and\nindustrialists of Wall Street, of which the Morgan interests\nstand at the head. \"The Democratic party is no less the party\nof the big capitalists.\"\n\"American imperialism is now strong. Its champions ridicule the\nidea of a revolution, But their assurance is not now quite so\nsure as it was a couple of years ago... They are beginning to\nfeel a deadly fear. The Russian revolution is to them such a\nterrible reality. But they console themselves with the thought\nthat 'it can never happen in this country,' and they scorn the\nat-present weak Communist party. But they overlook the detail\nthat the same attitude was taken towards the pre-revolution\nBolsheviki. Especially did the Socialist Moguls of the Second\nInternational look upon them as narrow sectarians and upon Lenin\nas a fanatical dreamer. But one thing is certain, American\ncapitalism is part and parcel of the world capitalist system\nand is subject to all its basic weaknesses and contradictions;\nit travels the same way to its destruction as capitalism in gen-\neral.\" \"The world capitalist system is in decay. All the\nking's horses and all the king's men cannot save it, Its gen-\neral crisis deepens; the masses develop revolutionary con-\nsciousness; the international revolutionary storm forces gather.\"\n\"And capitalism will die sword in hand, fighting in vain to beat\nback the oncoming revolutionary proletariat,\" \"The American\nrevolution will doubtless carry with it all those countries of\nthe three Americas that have not previously accomplished the\nrevolution.\"\nThis is what William Z. Foster, head of all Communist activities in the\nUnited States tells us about the end which all Communists have in view for the\nUnited States. And one of their tools or tactics used to achieve this end is con-\nstant, ceaseless, persistent attacks on all phases of our democratic life. They\nNSC 17\n- 13 -\nIDENTIAL\nCONF\nattack our foreign policy. They attack our domestic policy. They attack our\nschool system. They attack our economic systen. They attack our churches.\nThey attack our local, state and federal governmental system. No segment of\nour democratic way of life and its institutions remains untouched by incessant,\nvicious Communist attacks organized and directed by the Communist Party, the\n\"General Staff\" of the revolution. And, it is this Communist Party of the United\nStates of America, described in its own Constitution as being based on \"the prin-\nciples of scientific-socialism, Marxism-Leninism\" which draws its entire ideas,\nprinciples and practices from Karl Marx, V. I. Lenin, Joseph Stalin and their\nfollowers, and maintains a close contact with Communist parties of foreign na-\ntions. This is the basis of their international pattern of conspiracy.\nThe Internationalisn of the Communist Party, USA\nIt has been indicated above that the Constitution of the Communist\nParty, USA, clearly states that this Party is based on the principles of Marxism\nand Leninism. This is not to be misconstrued as meaning that the Communist Party,\nUSA, views Marx and Lenin as mere historical characters of the past worthy of\npraise or their principles as being dusty, inert norms of past procedure pres-\nently useful as propaganda. On the contrary the Communist Party, USA, look upon\nMarx and Lenin and also Stalin as models and guides, and their principles as liv-\ning, vibrant norms of current procedure which are to be followed without question\nor deviation; likewise, it looks for leadership to foreign Communist sources.\nTo make this point clear we have only to refer to the authoritative declaration\nof Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States.\nDennis, in his panphlet, \"The Third Party and the 1948 Elections\", writes:\n\"If in this decisive year of 1948, we are to avoid vacilla-\ntion, soctarianism, and opportunistic mistakes, we-all of\nus-must live and breathe the science of Marxisn. We must\nacquire a new and more profound grasp of the theory and\nlessons to be learned from such Marxist classics as the\nCommunist Manifesto, Lenin's Imperialisn, Stalin's Founda-\ntions of Loninism, Dinitrov's Report To The 7th World Con-\ngress, and the History of the CPSU, as well as from such\nauthoritative Marxist political journals as the now publi-\ncation of the Communist Information Bureau, For A Lasting\nPeace, For A Poople's Democracy.\"\nWhat is the significance of this statement? This statement by Eugene\nDennis, General-Secrotary, second only in influence and rank to William Z. Fos-\nter, General-Chairnan of the Communist Party, USA, is of particular significance\nto the internal security system of the United States in view of the themes of\nthe \"Marxist classics\", the contents of which Dennis insists that all Amrican\nCommunists \"live and breathe\". These \"Marxist classics\" will be next consid-\nered in the order listed by Donnis.\nNSC 17\n- 14 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\n1. The theme of the Communist Manifesto written by Karl\nMarx and Frederick Engels may be found summed up in these words:\n\"In short, the Communists everywhere support every\nrevolutionary movement against the existing social\nand political order of things Let the ruling\nclasses tremble at a Communist revolution. The\nproletarians have nothing to lose but their chains.\nThey have a world to win. Workingmen of all coun-\ntries unite!\"\n2. The theme of V. I. Lenin's Imperialism may be found\nsunned up in these words:\n\"In the United States economic development in the\nlast decade has been even more rapid than in Ger-\nmany, and for this very reason the parasitic char-\nU.S. ARCHIVED TROMAN \"NATIONAL REGORDS AND LIBRARY\nacter of modern American capitalism has stood out\nwith particular prominence.' \"Private property\nbased on labour of the small proprietor, free com-\npetition, democracy, i.e., all the catchwords with\nwhich the capitalists and their press deceive the\nworkers and the peasants are things of the past.\"\n\"Inperialism is the epoch of finance capital and\nof monopolies 11 the economic quintessence\nof imperialism is monopoly capitalism.\" \"Imperial-\nisn is the eve of the prolctarian social revolution.\"\n3. The theme of Joseph Stalin's Foundations of Loninism may\nbe found sunned up in these words:\n\"Lonin was a Marxist and Marxism is, of course, the\nbasis of his world outlook. If \"Leninism is not\nnerely Russian, but an international phenomenon\nrooted in the whole of international dovelopment...\n\"We must now speak of world prolotarian revolution\n...the revolution in the victorious country must re-\ngard itself as a means of hastening the victory of\nthe proletariat in other countries... \"The revolu-\ntionary will accept a reform in order to use it as\nan aid in combining legal work with illegal work, to\nintensify under its cover, the illegal work for the\nrevolutionary preparation of the nasses for the over-\nthrow of the bourgeoisie n \"The victory of the\ndictatorship of the proletariat signifies the sup-\npression of the bourgeoisic, the snashing of the\nNSC 17\n- 15 -\nCONF\nCONF\nbourgeois state. \" \"The dictatorship of the pro-\nletariat is a revolutionary power based on the use\nof force against the bourgeoisie the dictatorship\nof the proletariat is the rule--unrestricted by law\nand based on force...\"\n4. The theme of Georgi Dinitrov's (Dimitrov is now the\nCommunist Premier of Bulgaria) Report To The 7th World Con-\ngress may be found summed up in these words:\n\"\nFascisn in power is the open terrorist dictat-\norship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic\nand most imperialist elements of finance capital\n\" \"Let us take for example the United States\nof America In contradiction to German fascisn,\nwhich acts under anti-constitutional slogans,\nAmerican fascisn tries to portray itself as the\ncustodian of the constitution and 'American\ndemocracy.\n\"We want our Parties (meaning Communist) in the\ncapitalist countries to come out and act as real\npolitical parties\nWe want Communists of each\ncountry promptly to draw and apply all the les-\nsons that can be drawn from their own experience\nas the revolutionary vanguard\nAnd we want\nall this because only in this way will a nil-\nlion strong revolutionary army, led by the Con-\nmunist International and possessed of so great\nand wise a pilot as our leader Comrade Stalin\nbe able to fulfill its historical mission with\ncertainty-to sweep fascism off the face of the\nearth and, together with it, capitalism!\"\n\"The first thing that must be done, the thing\nwith which to commence, is to form a united\nfront 11 \"It is perfectly obvious that the in-\ntorosts of the American proletariat demand that\nall its forces dissociate themselves from the\ncapitalist parties without delay. It must at\nthe proper time find ways and suitable forms of\npreventing fascism from winning over the broad\ndiscontonted masses of toilers. And here it\nmust be said that under American conditions the\ncreation of a mass party of toilers, a 'Workers'\nand Farmers' Party' night serve as a suitable\nform. Such a party, would be a specific form\nNSC 17\n- 16 -\nCONFIDENT IAL\nof the mass people's front in America that should\nbe set up in opposition to the parties of the trusts\nand the banks and likewise to growing fascisn. Such\na party, of course, will be neither Socialist nor\nCommunist. But it must be an anti-fascist party and\nmust not be an anti-Communist party. The program d\nthis party must be directed against the banks, trusts\nand monopolies It goes without saying that such a\nparty will fight for the election of its own candi-\ndates.. Our conrades in the United States acted\nrightly in taking the initiative for the creation of\nsuch a party... We should develop the most wide-\nspread movement for the creation of such a party,\nand take the lead in it. In no case must the initia-\ntive of organizing the party be allowed to pass to\nelements desirous of utilizing the discontent of the\nmasses which have becone disillusioned in both the\nbourgeois parties, Democratic and Republican, in\norder to create a 'third party' in the United\nStates as an anti-Communist party, a party directed\nagainst the revolutionary movement.\"\nGeorgi Dinitrov, in his closing connonts to the 7th\nWorld Congress, declared:\n\"The victory of socialism in the Soviet Union-a\nvictory of world-historic significance-gives rise\nin all capitalist countries to a powerful movement\ntoward socialism. \"It strongthens the Soviet\nUnion as the base of the world proletarian revolu-\ntion. \"Wo are the disciples of Marx and Engels,\nLenin and Stalin... With Stalin at their head the\nmillions of our political army overcoming all dif-\nficulties and courageously breaking through all\nbarriers must and will level to the ground the\nfortress of capitalism and achieve the victory\nof socialism throughout the whole world.\"\n5. The theme of the History of the CPSU (Conmunist Party\nof the Soviet Union) may be found sunned up in these words:\n\"Marx and Engels taught that it was impossible to\nget rid of the power of capital and to convert cap-\nitalist property into public property by peaceful\nmeans, and that the working class could achieve\nthis only by revolutionary violence against the\nNSC 17\n- 17 -\nCONNIDENTIAL\nCONTIDENTIAL\nbourgeoisie, by a proletarian revolution, by estab-\nlishing its own political rule-the dictatorship of\nthe proletariat-which must crush the resistance..\n\"In combining legal with illegal, parliamentary with\nextra-parliamentary forms of struggle, it is some-\ntimes useful and even essential to reject parliamen-\ntary forms \"The new period is one of open class\ncollisions, of revolutionary action by the proletar-\niat, of proletarian revolution, a period when forces\nare being directly mustered for the overthrow of in-\nperialism and the seizure of power by the proletar-\niat \"The study of the history of the C.P.S.U.(B)\nstrengthens our certainty of the ultimate victory of\nthe great cause of the Party of Lenin-Stalin, the\nvictory of Communism throughout the world.\"\n6. The theme of For A Lasting Peace, For a People's De-\nnocracy, the publication of the Communist Information Bureau\nof Belgrade (Coninform) created September 19, 1947, nay be\nfound sunned up in these words:\n\"Fundamental changes have taken place in the inter-\nnational situation as a result of the Second World\nWar and in the post-war period. Inasmuch as the\nUSSR and the countries of the new democracy became\nobstacles to the realization of the imperialist\nplans-two camps were forned-the inperialist and\nanti-democratic camp having as its basic ain the\nestablishment of world domination of American in-\nperialism and the smashing of democracy, and the\nanti-inperialist and democratic camp having as its\nbasic aim the undermining of imperialism. \"The\nstruggle between the two dianetrically opposed\ncamps-the imperialist and the anti-imperialist\ncamp-is taking place in a situation marked by fur-\nther aggravation of the general crisis of capital-\nisn, the weakening of the forces of capitalisn...\n\"Hence the imperialist camp and its leading force,\nthe United States, are displaying particularly ag-\ngressive activity... If \"Yesterday's aggressors--\nthe capitalist magnates of Germany and Japan--are\nbeing groomed by the United States of America for\na new role, that of instruments of the imperialist\npolicy of the United States in Europe and Asia...\"\n\"Under these circumstances it is necessary that the\nanti-inperialist, democratic camp should close its\nNSC 17\n- 18 -\nCONFIDENTI AT\nranks, draw up an agreed program of actions and work\nout its own tactics against the nain forces of the\nimperialist camp, against American imperialism. If\n\"This imposes a special task on the Communist Parties\nthe Communist Parties must take the lead in resist-\ning the plans of imperialist expansion and aggression\nin all spheres-state, political, economic and ideo-\nlogical; they must close their ranks, unite their ef-\nforts This is now one of the principal tasks of the\nCommunist Parties \" \"We salute the fraternal Com-\nmunist Parties which are heading the struggle\nagainst the Anglo-Anerican plans of expansion to\nenslave Europe.\n\"World War II and post-war history have demonstrated\nthat socialism is now on the order of the day the\nCommunist Parties have become a powerful force-the\nCommunists are the backbone of popular resistance to\nthe predatory plans of American imperialism The\nCommunist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks),\ncreated and educated by the great geniuses of revolu-\ntionary theory, Lenin and Stalin, serves as an ex-\nGOVERNMENT NHD UPCRET\nanple to all fraternal Communist Parties. n \"Today\nCommunism is a mighty and invincible force, the stand-\nard of struggle for millions\nHowever, the Commun-\nist Parties are aware that this is but the beginning\nof the struggle. They are not dizzy with success, for\nthey know that the ultimate victory over the forces of\nimporialism will not come of its own accord, that it\nwill have to be fought for. A severe and strenuous\nstruggle lies ahoad.\"\nThese, then, are the \"Marxist classics\", which Eugene Dennis, General\nSocretary of the Communist Party of the United States, insists that all Ameri-\ncan Communists \"nust live and breathe\" during \"this decisive year of 1948\" and\never thereafter. It is precisely this threat. which must be fully understood\nin all its national and international ranifications, if we are to have an in-\nternal security system worthy of the name. World Communism is the greatest\nsingle menace today to the continued existence of the United States and its\ndemocratic way of life. The themes of these \"Marxist classics\", presented\nas they were in the very words of their Communist authors, speak for them-\nselves in affirming the point.\nNSC 17\n-19 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nIn furtherance of its conspiratorial and anti-American objectives,\nthe Communist Party, USA, has made and is constantly making repeated efforts\nto penetrate, exploit and, where possible, dominate various phases of Ameri-\ncan life. It has set its sights upon the undermining and infiltration of\nlabor and government. It has very extensively penetrated the vital trans-\nportation and communication fields. It has repeatedly sought -- and success-\nfully so - to exploit the Nation's foreign nationality groups. It has es-\ntablished fronts of every description to facilitate the accomplishment of its\nanti-American objectives. It has infiltrated cultural, social and related\ntype organizations for the same end. It has incited race prejudice and rxe\nhatred under the mendacious guise of furthering legitimate racial causes. In\nthe field of labor, for example, its success has been literally appalling, for\nit has made strides which are of sufficient intensity and gravity to seriously\nimpair the internal security of the United States and to possibly render us\nincapable of waging complete war, if necessity demanded it.\nWhile the United States Government is today without any carefully\ndrawn plan to assist in coping with this Communist conspiracy, the Communist\nParty, foreseeing the possibility of war and/or the day when the U. S. Govern-\nment may consider it timely and proper to prepare such a plan, has formulated\nminute designs for going completely underground. Yet, paradoxically, it has\nbecome more militant in its open activities. Examples of this phenomenon are\nits open participation in the Presidential Campaign of Henry Wallace and the\nelection canpaigns on a National and State level of persons susceptible to Con-\nmunist Party influence, its donunciation of the U. S. Government's policies on\nPalestine, the European Recovery Program, the Italian elections, its efforts\nto organize mass meetings, delegations and propaganda campaigns against the\nGovernment's foreign policy whenever it conflicts with the policy of the Soviet\nUnion, its attempt in the field of labor to consolidate its hold on key unions\ndespite existing legislation and the efforts of non-Conmunist labor leaders to\ndislodge the Communists from control, etc., etc.\nCommunism and the Communist Party, supplemented by its numerous an-\ncillary fronts, and abotted by its association with foreign agents and foreign\nagencies unquestionably constitute the greatest single menace and the nost com-\nplex problem confronting our internal security system today. Until this fact\nis recognized, the necessary modifications in our internal security system\ncannot be mde.\nCommunism is an international conspiracy directed generally against\nthe inherent dignity, freedom and sacredness of the individual; against all\nGod-given rights and values; against the Judaic-Christian code of morals on\nwhich our western civilization rests; against our established norms of law and\norder; against all our peaceful democratic institutions.\nNSC 17\n- 20 -\nCONF IDENT IAL\nCommunism is organized deception and violence directed specifically\nagainst the United States because its conspirators fully realize that it is\nthe strength and the ideals of the United States which stand between them and\nthe conquest and enslavement of the world.\nCommunism can be successfully combatted in two main spheres. One\nsphere includes diplomacy, education, economics, religion, public administra-\ntion and the like. This course of action should be concerned with the wi de\napplication of positive democracy, with making democracy work for every per-\nson irrespective of race, color, creed, social standing or financial worth.\nThis sphere, obviously, is beyond the scope of this survey. The second sphere\nrelates to the Nation's internal security and it is here that our efforts to\ncombat Communism must be nade. However, any efforts on our part to combat\nCommunism and similar hostile forces by modifying and improving our internal\nsecurity system through the coordination of different interested agencies\nwill be fruitless unless the peculiar nature of the Communist menace is fully\nunderstood. It will stagnate unless intelligent, unselfish, calm, vigorous\naction is taken now to cope with this menace without prolonged disagreemnts\nand apathetic procrastination.\nNSC 17\n- 21 -\nGONF\nINTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES ARE\nEXTREMELY DIVERSIFIED AND WIDELY DISPERSED\nTHROUGHOUT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT\nThe Governmental agencies concerned with the field of internal security\nare many in number and divergent in duties. Some manifestly have greater degrees\nof interest and responsibility than others. No one agency has sole and exclusive\nresponsibility for the internal security of the United States. In so far as the\nspecifically delineated internal security responsibilities of the various agen-\ncies are concerned it should be noted that while, in some instances at least,\ntheir individual responsibilities are extremely diversified and widely di spersed\nthroughout the Executive Branch of the Government, these responsibilities are\nnone-the-less closely related and should always be considered so from the stand-\npoint of insuring over-all internal security.\nSince at least a general knowledge thereof is a basic prerequisite to\nan understanding of the need for developing a coordinated internal security ef-\nfort, there is set forth hereinafter a brief resume of the outstanding internal\nsecurity responsibilities of the major agencies concerned with this field. The\nlisting is bviously not all-inclusive but merely representative of the agencies\nhaving degrees of responsibility in the field.\nThe Department of State has responsibilities which relate\nto (1) the control of traffic in arms, ammunition and imple-\nments of war (munitions control); (2) the control of aliens\nseeking admission to the United States (visa control); (3) the\ncontrol of certain classes of aliens wishing to leave the\nUnited States (exit control); and (4) the use of discretionary\nauthority in the matter of granting or refusing to issue a\npassport, and of restricting, withdrawing or cancelling a\npassport (passport control).\nThe Department of Justice, aside from the investigative\nand related functions mentioned hereinafter as being under\nthe jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and\nthe Immigration and Naturalization Service, is responsible\nfor the formulation of administrative policies, procedures\nand prosecutive actions comerning all of the statutes which\ncome within the purview of that Department's jurisdiction.\nThe Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for num-\nerous segments of the over-all internal security field such\nas (1) the conduct of investigations rolating to violations\nof the U. S. Code concerning treason, overthrow of govern-\nment, espionage, sabotage, sedition, the Neutrality Act,\nthe Voorhis Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the\nAtomic Energy Act of 1946, and related statutes; (2) the\nconduct of investigations of certain individuals who are\nemployees of the U. S. Government or applicants for\nNSC 17\n- 22 -\nCOME TAT,\nemployment by the U. S. Government in connection with the\nAtomic Energy Act of 1946 as well as with respect to spe-\ncific employees of specialized agencies such as the Greek-\nTurkey Aid Mission, the Economic Cooperation Administration,\nthe \"Voice of America\", etc.; and (3) the conduct of inves-\ntigation of certain employees and applicants for employment\nwith the Federal Government in accordance with the terms of\nExecutive Order 9835 which prescribes procedures for the ad-\nministration of an employee's loyalty program in the Execu-\ntive Branch of the Government. The Immigration and Natural-\nization Service has general responsibility for the immigra-\ntion and nationality laws including (1) the prevention of\nillegal entries of aliens; (2) the inspection of all per-\nsons applying for admission to the United States as well\nas the exclusion or deportation of those legally inad-\nmissible; (3) the recording of each person arriving in\nthe country; (4) the examination of petitions for natural-\nization and the investigation of naturalizations illegally\nor fraudulently procured; and (5) the custody of aliens in-\nterned in the United States during time of war as well as\nthe supervision of paroled alien enemies.\nThe Department of the Army has responsibilities relat-\ning to the internal security field which include (1) the\nsafeguarding of classified information and nateriel within\nArmy installations and civilian installations engaged in\nclassified contracts or research for the Departments of the\nArmy and the Air Force; (2) defense of the Arny establish-\nment against espionage, sabotage, treason, disaffection and\nsubversion; (3) the furnishing of adequate, timely and reli-\nable intelligence within the Department of the Army; and\n(4) dofense of Federal property and personnel thereof in\ncertain emergency instancos, aside from instances of organ-\nized attack, requiring the use of Federal troops (o.g., do-\nmestic violence, insurrections, riots, etc.).\nThe Department of the Navy has internal security re-\nsponsibilities which are concerned with (1) the safeguarding\nof classified Naval information and nateriel within the Naval\nestablishment and civilian installations engaged in classi-\nfied contracts or research for the Department of the Navy;\n(2) the defense of the Naval establishment against espionage,\nsabotage, treason, disaffection and subversion; and (3) the\nproviding of adequate, timely and reliable intelligence\nwithin the Department of the Navy.\nNSC 17\n- 23 -\nThe Department of the Air Force has responsibilities in\nthe internal security field which include (1) the safeguard-\ning of classified information and materiel within the Air\nForce; (2) defense of the Air Force establishment against\nespionage, sabotage, treason, disaffection and subversion;\nand (3) the furnishing of adequate, timely and reliable in-\ntelligence within the Department of the Air Force.\nThe Department of the Treasury has responsibilities in\nthe internal security field which include (1) protection of\nthe President of the United States; (2) prevention of smuggl-\ning; (3) determining whether merchandise is of a character\npermitting its attempted entry into or export from the United\nStates; and (4) enforcement of the National and Federal Fire-\narms Acts.\nThe Atomic Energy Commission has responsibilities con-\ncerned with the control of restricted data relating to the\nmanufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production\nof fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material\nin the production of power.\nThe National Security Resources Board has the responsi-\nbility of advising the President concerning the coordination\nof military, industrial and civilian mobilization. Indica-\ntive of the Board's internal security interest is that seg-\nment of its functions which relates to the stratogic reloca-\ntion of industries and Government, the continuous operation\nof which is essential to the Nation's security.\nIn addition to the agencies specifically mentioned above, there are\nnumerous others which have varying degrees of interest in the internal security\nfield such as: (1) the Federal Communications Connission from the standpoint of\nregulating and, in certain instances, nonitoring interstate and foreign commerce\nin communication by wire and radio; (2) the Department of Agriculture from such\na standpoint as the perpetration of unconventional attacks upon human, plant or\nanimal life through the medium of bacteriological warfare; (3) the Public Health\nService from the standpoint of its concern with the health of the Nation, a nat-\nter which is important in peacetire and which assumes added importance in t ine\nof hostilities; (4) the Central Intelligence Agency from the standpoint of se-\ncuring and providing foreign intelligence necessary for the better operation of\nthe internal security structure, even though it is fully recognized from an ex-\namination of the law which constituted the Central Intelligence Agency that it\nhas no internal security functions as such; etc., etc.\nNSC 17\n- 24 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nTHE INTERNAL SECURITY EFFORTS OF THE NUMEROUS\nRESPONSIBLE AGENCIES ARE PRESENTLY UNCOORDINATED\nIn the course of this study it was demonstrated that very commendable\nefforts have been made repeatedly - but on a limited basis - to effect coordi-\nnation with respect to specific internal security problems; however, these en-\ndeavors have at no time approached the subject of over-all internal security.\nThe administrative devices which have been created to cope with individual in-\nternal security and related problems as well as the countless formal and informal\ninterdepartmental conferences which have been convened have been very helpful but\nat the same time they have not been sufficiently broad to encompass the entire\nfield. Resulting from these specific, but limited, efforts to effect coordination\nwere such entities as:\n1. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference which\nwas created by the President to coordinate the handling of\ninvestigations of espionage, sabotage, and counterespionage\nby the members of the Conference, consisting of the Federal\nBureau of Investigation and the intelligence divisions of the\nNational Military Establishment.\n2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)\nwhich was created to formulate. recommendations to the Secretary\nof State on questions having both military and political aspects\nand to coordinate the views of the member departments in matters\nof interdepartmental interest.\n3. The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee\n(SANACC), which succeeded SWNCC and which was created to\nreconcile and coordinate the action to be taken by the member\ndepartments on matters of common interest and to be responsi-\nble for the coordination of policy on politico-military\nquestions referred to it.\n4. The SANACC Subcommittee for Military Information\nControl which was created to advise and assist in the estab-\nlishment of policies and procedures relating to the disclosure\nof classified military information to foreign governments.\n5. The Interdepartmental Committee for Industrial\nSecurity which was created in June 1948 to keep under con-\ntinuous review the problems of industrial security.\n6. The Security Advisory Board, a subcommittee of SANACC,\nwhich was initially created in April 1946 and whose functions\nwere redefined in part by Executive Order 9835 which was signed\nby the President on March 21, 1947. The latter order stipulates\nNSC 17\n- 25 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONF\nthat the Security Advisory Board shall draft rules applicable\nto the handling and transmission of confidential documents and\nother documents and information which should not be publicly\ndisclosed. According to this Order, upon approval by the\nPresident the drafted rules shall constitute the minimum\nstandards for the handling and transmission of such documents\nand information, and shall be applicable to all departments\nand agencies of the executive branch.\n7. The Committee on Planning for Defense Against Uncon-\nventional Forms of Attack which was established for the purpose\nof considering the question of unconventional attack and which\nhas only recently recommended the establishment of a unit under\nthe Secretary of Defense to explore the possible forms of uncon-\nventional attack and to consider counter-measures available to\nforestall them.\n8. The Interdepartmental Committee on the Export of Un-\nclassified Technological Information (UTI) which was created\nto determine the type of controls over such exports which\nmight be attempted, the time when such controls should be\napplied and the countries to which export of certain unclassi-\nfied technological information should be denied.\nWhile the utilization of the aforementioned and numerous other committees\nhave been instrumental in enhancing and implementing our internal security coverage,\ncomplete inter-agency coordination in this field is lacking, a fact which was clear-\nly demonstrated by the agencies having major degrees of interest in this field.\nRepresentative, Unsolved, Internal Security Problems\nIn the course of this study information was secured relative to the\nprincipal unsolved security problems currently existing which are of interest and\nconcern to and which are being encountered by the respective agencies in planning\nfor and in the actual execution of their assigned responsibilities. An examina-\ntion of these major, unsolved, security problems reflects that only a minor number\nare intra-agency in character, whereas the vast majority are interdepartmental in\nnature; i.e., they are problems, the solution of which is dependent upon the co-\nordinated consideration and action of two or more interested agencies. Indicative\nof the foregoing are the following illustrative - but obviously not all-inclusive\n- examples of security problems which have not been completely resolved up to\nthis time and which should be resolved immediately to the maximum extent practic-\nable, since the appearance on the scene of an emergency may otherwise find the\nUnited States insecure internally.\nNSC 17\n- 26 -\nCONF IDENTIAL\n1. The State Department should undertake a special\nstudy of the visa program with a view to initiating more\nstrict policies and procedures insofar as the flow of ques-\ntionable aliens to the United States is concerned. Penetra-\ntion of the United States by foreign agents (espionage,\nsabotage, propaganda, etc.) occurs through the visa medium\nor through the illegal entry method. As regards the former,\nit is a well established fact that known and suspected foreign\nagents, including Communists, have come into the United States\nthrough the visa program. In the course of the suggested study\nconsideration should be afforded the matter of checking the\nfiles of State, Army, Navy, Air, Federal Bureau of Investiga-\ntion, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Central\nIntelligence Agency on visa applicants. The study should ex-\ntend to the question of establishing an interdepartmental visa\ncontrol mechanism, if such an instrument is found necessary,\nin order to obviate the continuing penetration of the United\nStates through the visa system of individuals who are either\npotentially or actually hostile to this country.\n2. In the event an interdepartmental visa and/or exit\ncontrol mechanism is not found necessary at this time, the\nstudy mentioned above should none-the-less extend to the\nARCHIVED TRUMAN HIMMONAL GOVERNMENT INVOICE AND LIBRARY\nquestion of readying for immediate use whatever control pro-\ngrams are deemed necessary for application in the event of\nfuture emergencies. The policies and procedures to be utiliz-\ned thereunder should be worked out in the greatest detail\npracticable in order that time will not be unnecessarily\nwasted should an emergency require the immediate application\nof such controls.\n3. Much remains to be done in the way of preventing\nillegal entry into the United States and expelling those\nillegally here. In view of the large number of illegal\nentries which are reportedly occurring on a continuing basis,\nappropriate corrective steps should be taken in the interests\nof the Nation's internal security. Since it is quite probable\nthat foreign agents are currently gaining access to the United\nStates through the illegal entry method and inasmuch as it is\na well established fact that espionage agents and saboteurs\nhave so entered in the past, particular stress should be\nplaced upon this aspect of our internal security. The Immi-\ngration and Naturalization Service advises in this connection\nthat increased personnel are necessary in order to cope with\nthis problem.\nNSC 17\n- 27 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENT TAB\n4. As regards the expulsion of illegal entrants, it is\nobserved that there has been a noteworthy acceleration in the\nprogram of initiating deportation proceedings against aliens\naffiliated with subversive entities. This program should be\nadditionally expedited and implemented in furtherance of the\nNation's internal security.\n5. Although repeated efforts have been made with nega-\ntive results to establish a centralized system of records\npertaining to aliens, the entire question should again be\nreactivated inasmuch as the existing and widespread decentrali-\nzation of alien records militates against a strengthened internal\nsecurity system.\n6. A study of the passport program of the State Department\nshould be undertaken with a view toward altering existing polic-\nies and procedures to any extent found necessary in order to\nbetter insure our internal security at the present time. In\naddition to the foregoing, this study should extend to the pre-\nparation of such passport mechanisms and procedures as should\nbe readied for immediate application in the event of a break in\nrelations or war with another power. The following are among\nthe several items which should be considered in the course of\nthis passport program study: (a) A new type passport should now\nbe devised for immediate utilization in the event of a break in\nrelations or war; (b) In the case of such eventualities as the\nforegoing, travel outside of the United States should be limited\nto instances of imperative necessity; (c) Under such conditions\npassports should be required of all American citizens who desire\nto travel anywhere in the world; (d) The names of all applicants\nfor passport facilities should be checked against the security\nand intelligence files of the several agencies prior to the\nissuance of a passport; etc., etc.\n7. Since much of the espionage activity currently being\ncarried on in the United States centers about foreign diploma-\ntic establishments in this country and certain of the personnel\nattached thereto, a positive policy should be immediately formu-\nlated with regard to the question of declari such personnel\npersona non grata when there is a substantial showing that they\nare engaged in espionage or related intelligence activities ex-\ntending beyond the bounds of diplomatic propriety and against the\ninternal security of the United States.\nNSC 17\n- 28 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENT TAL\n8. A definite policy should likewise be formulated\nregarding the removal of non-diplomatic personnel attached\nto embassies, consulates and other official establishments\nof foreign governments in the United States who are found\nto be engaged in espionage and related activities inimical\nto the Nation's internal security.\n9. In furtherance of the Nation's internal security,\ndefinite policies should be established with regard to per-\nsons coming within the provisions of the International\nOrganizations Immunities Act who use such organizations as\nthe United Nations as covers for the conduct of espionage\nand intelligence activities in derogation of the internal\nsecurity interests and soverignty of the United States.\n10. A study should be undertaken at this time for the\npurpose of formulating policies to be pursued with respect\nto the handling of diplomatic and other official personnel\nattached to foreign embassies, consulates, special missions\nand the United Nations in the event of a break in relations\nor a state of war existing between the United States and any\nforeign country. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor found\nus without any plan of action and with confusion and insec-\nurity resulting. Rather than again increase our degree of\nvulnerability and insecurity by waiting for the exigencies\nof the situation to impel us into action, we should now work\nout the procedures to be followed as regards protective custody,\ndetention, surveillance, etc., of such personnel.\n11. The searches of the persons and baggage of travelers\nentering or leaving the United States should be increased in\nnumber and comprehensiveness.\n12. Appropriate steps should be taken to afford closer\nscrutiny to vessels of foreign registry, particularly Soviet,\nas well as to establish more effective controls over alien\nseamen. In this connection it has been noted, for example,\nthat Soviet and satellite nationals travelling as crew mem-\nbers or as passengers on Soviet vessels have entered and de-\nparted from the United States without their names appearing\non the ships' manifests, without having their identifying\ndocuments checked, and without having their baggage searched\nfor the purpose of preventing the introduction into the United\nStates of sabotage devices or the removal from the United\nStates of information of an intelligence and espionage character.\nNSC 17\n- 29 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nIt has been indicated that this situation was made possible in\nlarge measure due, on the one hand, to shortage of personnel\nin the Bureau of Customs and the Immigration and Naturaliza-\ntion Service, and, on the other, to the reluctance on the part\nof the Department of State to afford closer coverage to Soviet\nvessels.\n13. An appropriate program, including legislation and/or\nexecutive orders if necessary, should be drafted allowing for\nthe immediate apprehension and detention in the event of an\nemergency of United States citizens of non-military status who\nconstitute a threat to the Nation's internal security. Bearing\nin mind that the vast majority of the members of the Communist\nParty, USA, are United States citizens, it should never be for-\ngotten that a substantial segment thereof would function in\nsabotage, espionage, intelligence and related capacities against\nthe United States and in behalf of the Soviet Union in the event\nof war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Accordingly,\nit is essential that immediate steps be taken to insure the\nability of the government to cope with this situation in the\nevent of such a contingency. At the present time there exists\nno legislation, no executive orders, nor other expressions of\npolicy on this vitally important question. It is, therefore,\nan absolute necessity that a detailed program be worked out,\nincluding the preparation of policies and procedures to be\nfollowed with regard to the arrest, detention, parole and re-\nlease of United States citizens who are deemed to constitute a\ndanger in time of emergency to the internal security of this\ncountry. Communists, Trotskyites and other subversives should\nbe included in the aforementioned category.\n14. Provisions similar to those mentioned in item 13 should\nbe formulated to allow for the proper handling of subversive indi-\nviduals in the military forces of the United States.\n15. The various statutes in the United States Code pertain-\ning to internal security should be studied with a view toward\nstrengthening their provisions in the light of present and possible\nfuture conditions. In this connection it is to be noted that the\nInterdepartmental Intelligence Conference drafted a bill many\nmonths ago which relates to the internal security and which, if\nenacted, would amend and implement the Espionage Act of 1917 in\nseveral aspects. To date no concrete results have come from the\nunanimous recommendations and action of the Interdepartmental In-\ntelligence Conference and the Attorney General's Office with res-\npect to this bill. In furtherance of the internal security, it is\nfelt that every effort should be made immediately to obviate any\nfurther delay in the submission to the Congress of a strengthened\nbill on Espionage.\nNSC 17\n- 30 -\nCONF. DENTIL\n16. In furtherance of the Nation's internal security the\nquestion should be resolved immediately of prosecuting the\nleaders of the Communist Party and related subversive entities\non an organizational basis under the Voorhis Act or the Foreign\nAgents Registration Act of 1938 and on an individual basis for\nadvocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States\nby force or violence under the Smith Act (Sections 10-13, Title\n18, U.S. Code).\n17. In preparing for the eventuality of war an alien enemy\ncontrol program should be readied for the registration, arrest,\ndetention, parole and release of alien enemies determined to\nconstitute a danger to the Nation's internal security.\n18. Provision should be effectuated for the security and\nprotection within the government in a practical, uncomplicated\nmanner of all classified government data.\n19. Provision should be effectuated for the security and\nprotection in a practical, uncomplicated manner of classified\ninformation relating particularly to data of a military nature\navailable to industrial organizations throughout the country.\n20. Contrary to procedures currently existing, there should\nbe uniform specifications emanating from the three departments of\nthe National Military Establishment as regards the handling in\nindustry of personnel clearances and of each category of contract\nlet by the National Military Establishment. In addition, only one\nagency should be charged with the responsibility of maintaining\ncentral records of firms cleared for work on classified contracts\nof the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. (In the\ncourse of this study it was indicated that not infrequently three\nsecrecy agreements and three personnel clearance procedures will\nbe in effect in one plant handling contracts for each of the\nDepartments comprising the National Military Establishment.)\n21. Visits to the United States by foreign officials for\nindustrial inspection and related purposes should be reduced to\nan absolute minimum in instances wherein the internal security\nmay be adversely affected. Prior to the actual approval of such\nvisitations, the names of the individuals in question should first\nbe checked against the files of State, Army, Navy, Air, Federal\nBureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service\nand Central Intelligence Agency.\nNSC 17\n- 31 -\nCONF IDENTIAL\nIllustrative of the outstanding security import of\nthe foregoing is the case of the ten Soviet engineers, des-\ncribed as experts in various phases of municipal planning,\nwho toured the major cities of the United States for a six\nmonths' period beginning in the latter part of 1946. The\ntour was effectuated with the approval of the State Depart-\nment and letters of introduction to municipal officials were\nprovided them by the Federal Works Agency. During their in-\nspections the Soviet engineers took copious notes and obtain-\ned many blueprints, diagrams and photographs of sewage systems,\nwater systems, gas systems, power plants, transportation\nterminals, bridges and other strategic points in such cities\nas Washington, D.C.; New York City; Chicago, Illinois; and\nPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania. Obviously, through the medium of\nthis special mission considerable information of an intelli-\ngence nature concerning the internal security of the United\nStates was obtained by the Soviet Union. This information\nin the possession of the Soviet Union is presently of poten-\ntial danger to the United States, and in the event of war\nbetween the United States and the U.S.S.R. would be actually\ndetrimental to the internal security of this country. Aside\nfrom its security aspects the foregoing example is demonstra-\ntive of the fact that policies relating to the internal sec-\nurity have been -- and still are - in effect in one agency\nwhich militate against the effective execution of the respon-\nsibilities of another. While the Federal Bureau of Investi-\ngation has counter-espionage and counter- intelligence res-\nponsibilities, it would appear incongruous for one agency of\nthe Government's executive branch to conduct surveillances\nand related investigation of the ten Soviet engineers when\nanother agency approved their entry and still a third\nfacilitated their endeavor while in the United States.\n22. There should be formulated an intelligent program\nwith specific responsibility being placed in one Department\nto insure the security and physical protection of the Nation's\nwill\nvital industrial installations. The SANACC presently has this\nmatter under consideration.\n23. There should be established a similar program designed\nto insure the security of the Nation's vital communication,\ntransportation and other public utilities.\n24. The security and physical protection of government\nbuildings should be afforded consideration. Any study given\nthis subject should properly be integrated with the matter of\ngovernmental decentralization.\nNSC 17\n- 32 -\nCONFIDENT IAL\n25. There should be prepared the necessary plans to insure\nadequate and uniform service censorship measures to be utilized\nwithin the National Military Establishment in time of war. These\nregulations should be standardized in order to avoid the disparity\nin service censorship regulations which existed within the armed\nservices during World War II.\n26. Under appropriate authority a civilian censorship plan\nshould be readied for immediate application in the event of war\nand it should extend to the matter of control over such inter-\nnational communications as mail, telegraph, telephone and radio.\nPreliminary consideration is currently being afforded this matter\nby the National Security Resources Board.\n27. The problems attendant upon the possibility of unconven-\ntional attack should, from the standpoint of internal security as\nwell as from the standpoint of over-all national security, be\nafforded study on a continuing basis.\n28. At the present time insufficient information of an in-\ntelligence character is being received by the interested agencies\nof the United States Government relative to the U.S.S.R., its\nsatellites and other nations. In the interests of the internal\nsecurity as well as other phases of the national security this\nsituation should be afforded detailed consideration and attention.\nEvery effort should be made to accelerate the gathering and develop-\nment of pertinent political, military and related intelligence\nabroad.\nAn analysis of the foregoing listing of illustrative problems, which\nhave as yet been afforded either partial or no solution, will reflect that the\nmajority thereof are inter-departmental in nature in that they are of interest\nand concern to two or more agencies of the Government. A further examination\nwill reflect that the solution of these problems is dependent upon the coordi-\nnated consideration and action of the several departments concerned. There does\nnot now exist, however, any medium to insure complete and continued coordination\nin the over-all internal security field.\nNSC 17\n- 33 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONCLUSIONS\n1. The United States is not adequately secure internally\nat the present time.\n2. The United States is not sufficiently prepared from\nthe standpoint of the future to thoroughly and expe-\nditiously cope with the internal security conditions\nwith which it would be confronted in the event of\na. a break in relations with other major powers,\nb. an attack upon the United States of either a\nconventional or unconventional type, or\nC. a declaration of war by or upon the United States.\n3. There is lacking within the Executive Branch of the\nGovernment the degree of knowledge and integrated ac-\ntion essential to the safeguarding and readying of\nthe Nation's over-all internal security and by virtue\nthereof policies are initiated and actions pursued in\none department which militate against the interests\nand responsibilities of another, to the ultimate det-\nriment of the Nation's internal security.\n4. Coordination of the entire field is prerequisite to a\nproper knowledge of and integrated action with respect\nto the internal security of the United States.\n5. The existence of the conditions described hereinbefore\nis attributable in some measure to the lack of any\nmechanism of over-all internal security coordination.\n6. There must be a more thoroughly coordinated and in-\ntegrated effort if the United States is not to be\nfound wanting on the internal security score in the\nevent of an energency.\nRECOInENDATIONS\n1. It is recommended that there be established the position of\nSpecial Assistant on Internal Security to the National Security Council, in\norder to assure a more thoroughly coordinated effort in the field of over-\nall internal security.\nNSC 17\n- 34 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2. The function of the Special Assistant on Internal Security should\nbe to assist the National Security Council in fulfilling its responsibility of\nadvising the President with respect to matters involving the national secur ity,\nas outlined in Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947. It is proposed\nthat he should execute this function by assessing and appraising the over-all\ninternal security program in a resolute and contimuing manner by working closely\non a consultative, advisory and coordinative basis with the interested depart-\nments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government and by furnishing\nsuch assistance as may be helpful to the respective departments and agencies in\ntheir efforts to resolve their internal security problems and discharge their\ninternal security responsibilities in a coordinated fashion. The Special As-\nsistant on Internal Security should, however, exercise no power or authority\nover any department or agency.\n3. To implement the foregoing, the agencies having interests and re-\nsponsibilities in the internal security field should be made cognizant of the\ncreation and function of this position and each should be requested to desig-\nnate a representative to consult with and aid the Special Assistant on Internal\nSecurity when necessary in his consideration of internal security matters of\ninterest.\n4. In order that the National Security Council may properly perform\nits function each agency having any jurisdictional responsibility or interest\nin the field should be requested to call to the attention of the Special Assist-\nant any najor development of internal security significance and particularly any\nunsolved problem which is germane to the Nation's internal security. When,\nthrough this medium or independently through his assessing and appraising func-\ntions, the Special Assistant develops knowledge of the existence of an internal\nsecurity condition requiring attention, he should, through consultation with\nthe interested agencies, arrange for then to conduct an appropriate study con-\ncerning it with a view to their reaching a mutually agreeable and acceptable\nsolution relative thereto, submitting their findings and a statement of action\nto the Special Assistant for the advice and assistance of the National Securi ty\nCouncil - provided that there does not already exist a properly constitute a\nentity (e.g., SANACC, The Committee on Planning for Defense Against Unconven-\ntional Forms of Attack, etc.) for the handling of the matter in question. If\nthe latter situation obtains, the matter should be referred to that entity for\nattention with said entity taking the appropriate action and sinilarly advising\nthe Special Assistant relative thereto for the advice and assistance of the Na-\ntional Security Council.\n5. In line with the foregoing and in order to further assist the Na-\ntional Security Council in executing its legally delineated functions, the Spec-\nial Assistant on Internal Security should be required to submit a quarterly re-\nport to the National Security Council on his assessment and appraisal as well\nas on the status of the Nation's internal security program.\nNSC 17\n- 35 -\nIDENTIAL\n6. In the course of this study frequent and detailed consideration\nwas afforded the advisability of recommending the committee mechanism, com-\nprised of representatives from the many interested agencies, as the solution\nto this all-important problem of developing a truly coordinated internal secur-\nity effort. However, searching inquiry, coupled with the very helpful and\nstudied views of a number of the agencies involved, has led to the considered\nconclusion that the proposal submitted for adoption is preferable to one en-\nbodying the committee mechanism as the means of achieving coordinated internal\nsecurity. It was the opinion of officials in several of the agencies concerned\nthat any coordinating committee which night be established should rightfully\nhave included in its membership representatives from the many agencies having\nmajor internal security responsibilitics. The thought was accordingly expressed\nthat by sheer force of numbers such a committee would experience a cumbersome\nand unproductive existence; that it would be unwieldy in its operations; and\nthat it would have difficulty in attaining its intended goal. Concern was like-\nwise expressed lest such a committee become operational in nature and lest it\nencroach upon the individual responsibilities of the several agencies or upon\nthe established functions of the various interdepertnental entities which have\nbeen created to consider and resolve specific problems coming within the gen-\neral internal security field.\n7. Reverting to the recommendation previously outlined, the belief\nis expressed that the realization thereof will do much in the way of effectuat-\ning a better coordinated internal security effort, for it is felt that the com-\nbined appraising and coordinating functions of the Special Assistant will com-\nplement one another to the end that our Nation will become progressively more\nsecure. The mere creation of this position will not, however, constitute a\nfacile panacea for solving the involved and diverse problems of internal se-\ncurity. Sincere cooperation on the part of the many interested agencies is\nessential; in fact, the degree of success of such an endeavor will be in di-\nrect proportion to the neasure of cooperation provided. The advantages to be\nderived from such cooperation are obvious; the disadvantages accruing fron the\nlack of a cooperative and coordinative endeavor extend to the existence of a\nstate of national weakness and unpreparedness which may ultimately affect the\nvery life of our nation.\nNSC 17\n- 36 -\nCONFIDENTIAL\nBARRY ARCHIVIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS UNITED\nU.S. GOVERNMENT\nU. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\n1749-S-1947\nNSC mg.717 mg If, 17"
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