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{
    "localId": "213875825",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 24, A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on United States Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin",
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    "id": "213875825",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 24, A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on United States Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875825",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1948-07-28",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "FUE SECRET\nThe daily cost of air transport supply operations is al- -\nready very great and will naturally increase with augmentation\nof tonnage. In addition, it should be borne in mind that even\naugmented air lift can include little provision for clothing,\nmaintenance material, raw material, or industrial supplies,\nwhich means that conditions in the western sectors of Berlin\nincluding unemployment, morale, and stamina of the population\nwill steadily worsen even though food, medical, military,\ncoal, gasoline, and Diesel supplies remain adequate for main-\ntaining an existence level for the population.\nFinally, it is always possible that the Soviets may de-\nvise and employ means, by interference in the air corridor,\nof vitiating or stopping air transport operations, or by other\npressures within Berlin nullifying its purpose.\nNevertheless, as initially stated, minimum Berlin supply\nrequirements can be met by air transport for at least a con-\nsiderable, though probably not an indefinite, period. For\nthis reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are firmly of the opin-\nion that air transport supply should be continued and should\nbe augmented immediately as necessary to meet the minimum re -\nquirements since this is providing and should continue to pro-\nvide a cushion of time during which some other solution to the\nBerlin problem may be found and during which appropriate ac- -\ntion may be taken toward meeting all eventualities.\nCareful consideration has been given to the alternative\nof attempting to supply Berlin by armed convoy if the air\ntransport method proves inadequate or is hampered or prevented\nby air corridor interference. The possibility of success in\nresort to this alternative is remote unless a favorable change\nin Soviet attitude be presupposed or, a still more remote pos-\nsibility, unless the attempt in itself causes a favorable\nchange. If a favorable change in Soviet attitude is to be\npresupposed, then it follows that the armed convoy method\nwould be unnecessary. In any case, Soviet passive interfer-\nence, such as road and bridge obstruction or destruction,\ncould make the armed convoy method abortive, while Soviet\ninterference by military action, whether simply for prevention\nor deliberately as a result of war decision, would not only\nmake the convoy method abortive but would shift the stage from\none of local friction to that of major war involvement.\nThe Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that plans should be\nmade for attempting to supply Berlin by composite armed convoy\n(British, French, and United States) so that we may be ready\nNSC 24\n- 2 -\nTOP SEORET"
}