Ask the Scholar
Page 10 of 62
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TRUMAN
c S. ARCHIVES "NATIONAL SERVICE" RECORDS AND
TOP SECRET
by means short of war or by war-like means, as the case may be.
This concept was best expressed by Clausewitz, who wrote that,
"War is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means.
The opposite concept is that which sees national objectives
in peace and national objectives in war as essentially unrelated.
According to this concept, the existence of a state of war creates
its own specific political objectives, which generally supersede
the normal peacetime objectives. This is the concept which has
generally prevailed in this country. Basically, it was the con-
cept which prevailed in the last war, where the winning of the
war itself, as a military operation, was made the supreme object-
ive of U. S. policy, other considerations being subordinated to it.
In the case of American objectives with respect to Russia, it
is clear that neither of these concepts can prevail entirely.
In the first place, this Government has been forced, for puir-
poses of the political war now in progress, to consider more def"i-
nite and militant objectives toward Russia even now, in time of
peace, than it ever was called upon to formulate with respect
either to Germany or Japan in advance of the actual hostilities
with those countries.
Secondly, the experience of the past war has taught us the
desirability of gearing our war effort to a clear and realistic
concept of the long-term political objectives which we wish to
achieve. This would be particularly important in the event of
an
war with the Soviet Union. We could hardly expect to conclude
NSC 20/1
- 2 -
TOP SECRET
Page data
- Page
- 10
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 1cae6a69698f4e75
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 213875861
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "213875861",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875861",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum from Sidney Souers to President Harry S. Truman, with Attached National Security Council Report 20/1, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on United States Objectives with Respect to Russia",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875861",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750596/750596-04-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750596/750596-04-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750596/750596-04-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 62,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "213875861",
"label": "Memorandum from Sidney Souers to President Harry S. Truman, with Attached National Security Council Report 20/1, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on United States Objectives with Respect to Russia",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875861"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "213875861",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875861",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum from Sidney Souers to President Harry S. Truman, with Attached National Security Council Report 20/1, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on United States Objectives with Respect to Russia",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875861",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750596/750596-04-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750596/750596-04-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750596/750596-04-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 62,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875861",
"naId": 213875861,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 18,
"logicalDate": "1948-08-18",
"month": 8,
"year": 1948
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 10,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750596/750596-04-010.jpg",
"mediaId": "1cae6a69698f4e75",
"ocrText": "TRUMAN\nc S. ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL SERVICE\" RECORDS AND\nTOP SECRET\nby means short of war or by war-like means, as the case may be.\nThis concept was best expressed by Clausewitz, who wrote that,\n\"War is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means.\nThe opposite concept is that which sees national objectives\nin peace and national objectives in war as essentially unrelated.\nAccording to this concept, the existence of a state of war creates\nits own specific political objectives, which generally supersede\nthe normal peacetime objectives. This is the concept which has\ngenerally prevailed in this country. Basically, it was the con-\ncept which prevailed in the last war, where the winning of the\nwar itself, as a military operation, was made the supreme object-\nive of U. S. policy, other considerations being subordinated to it.\nIn the case of American objectives with respect to Russia, it\nis clear that neither of these concepts can prevail entirely.\nIn the first place, this Government has been forced, for puir-\nposes of the political war now in progress, to consider more def\"i-\nnite and militant objectives toward Russia even now, in time of\npeace, than it ever was called upon to formulate with respect\neither to Germany or Japan in advance of the actual hostilities\nwith those countries.\nSecondly, the experience of the past war has taught us the\ndesirability of gearing our war effort to a clear and realistic\nconcept of the long-term political objectives which we wish to\nachieve. This would be particularly important in the event of\nan\nwar with the Soviet Union. We could hardly expect to conclude\nNSC 20/1\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET"
}