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of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the outside world,
which is one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place
sometimes within a framework of formal peace and at other times
within the legal framework of war.
On the other hand, it is clear that a democracy cannot effect,
as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identifica-
tion of its peacetime and wartime objectives. Its aversion to war
as a method of foreign policy is so strong that it will inevitably
be inclined to modify its objectives in peacetime, in the hope
that they may be achieved without resort to arms. When this hope
and this restraint are removed by the outbreak of war, as a result
of the provocation of others, the irritation of democratic opinion
generally demands either the formulation of further objectives,
often of a punitive nature, which it would not have supported in
time of peace, or the immediate realization of aims which it might
otherwise have been prepared to pursue patiently, by gradual pres-
sures, over the course of decades. It would therefore be unreal -
istic to suppose that the U. S. Government could hope to proceed.
in time of war on the basis of exactly the same set of objectives,
or at least with the same time-table for realization of object-
ives, which it would have in time of peace.
At the same time, it must be recognized that the smaller
the gap between peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater the
likelihood that a successful military effort will be politically
successful as well. If objectives are really sound from the
NSC 20/1
- 4 -
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nof the relationship between the Soviet Union and the outside world,\nwhich is one of permanent antagonism and conflict, taking place\nsometimes within a framework of formal peace and at other times\nwithin the legal framework of war.\nOn the other hand, it is clear that a democracy cannot effect,\nas the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identifica-\ntion of its peacetime and wartime objectives. Its aversion to war\nas a method of foreign policy is so strong that it will inevitably\nbe inclined to modify its objectives in peacetime, in the hope\nthat they may be achieved without resort to arms. When this hope\nand this restraint are removed by the outbreak of war, as a result\nof the provocation of others, the irritation of democratic opinion\ngenerally demands either the formulation of further objectives,\noften of a punitive nature, which it would not have supported in\ntime of peace, or the immediate realization of aims which it might\notherwise have been prepared to pursue patiently, by gradual pres-\nsures, over the course of decades. It would therefore be unreal -\nistic to suppose that the U. S. Government could hope to proceed.\nin time of war on the basis of exactly the same set of objectives,\nor at least with the same time-table for realization of object-\nives, which it would have in time of peace.\nAt the same time, it must be recognized that the smaller\nthe gap between peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater the\nlikelihood that a successful military effort will be politically\nsuccessful as well. If objectives are really sound from the\nNSC 20/1\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET"
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