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standpoint of national interest, they are worth consciously for-
mulating and pursuing in war as in peace. Objectives which come
into being as a consequence of wartime emotionalism are not apt
to reflect a balanced concept of long-term national interest.
For this reason, every effort should be made in government plan-
ning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to define
our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime
objectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as pos-
sible the gap between them.
III. Basic Objectives.
Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only
two:
(a) To reduce the power and influence of Moscow to
limits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the
peace and stability of international society: and
(b) To bring about a basic change in the theory and
practice of international relations observed by the government
in power in Russia.
If these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which
this country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced
to what might be considered normal dimensions.
Before discussing the manner in which these objectives could
be pursued in peace and in war, respectively, let us first exam-
ine them in somewhat greater detail.
NSC 20/1
- 5 -
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"ocrText": "TOP SBOREI\nstandpoint of national interest, they are worth consciously for-\nmulating and pursuing in war as in peace. Objectives which come\ninto being as a consequence of wartime emotionalism are not apt\nto reflect a balanced concept of long-term national interest.\nFor this reason, every effort should be made in government plan-\nning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to define\nour present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime\nobjectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as pos-\nsible the gap between them.\nIII. Basic Objectives.\nOur basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only\ntwo:\n(a) To reduce the power and influence of Moscow to\nlimits in which they will no longer constitute a threat to the\npeace and stability of international society: and\n(b) To bring about a basic change in the theory and\npractice of international relations observed by the government\nin power in Russia.\nIf these two objectives could be achieved, the problem which\nthis country faces in its relations with Russia would be reduced\nto what might be considered normal dimensions.\nBefore discussing the manner in which these objectives could\nbe pursued in peace and in war, respectively, let us first exam-\nine them in somewhat greater detail.\nNSC 20/1\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET"
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