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TOP SECRET of state prestige is involved. The same could presumably happen everywhere else throughout the satellite area without involving the formal dignity of the Soviet State. We are confronted, however, with a more difficult problem in the actual extensions of the borders of the Soviet Union which have taken place since 1939. These extensions cannot in all cases be said to have been seriously detrimental to international peace and stability; and in certain instances it can probably be consid- ered, from the standpoint of our objectives, that they can be en- tirely accepted for the sake of the maintenance of peace. In other cases, notably that of the Baltic countries, the question is more difficult. We cannot really profess indifference to the further fate of the Baltic peoples. This has been reflected in our recog- nition policy to date with respect to those countries. And we could hardly consider that international peace and stability will really have ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is faced with the fact that it has been possible for Moscow to crush these three small countries which have been guilty of no real provoca- tion and which have given evidence of their ability to handle their own affairs in a progressive manner, without detriment to the interests of their neighbors. It should therefore logically be considered a part of U. S. objectives to see these countries restored to something at least approaching a decent state of free- dom and independence. It is clear, however, that their complete independence would involve an actual cession of territory by the Soviet Government. NSC 20/1 - 8 - TOP SECRET

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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nof state prestige is involved. The same could presumably happen\neverywhere else throughout the satellite area without involving\nthe formal dignity of the Soviet State.\nWe are confronted, however, with a more difficult problem in\nthe actual extensions of the borders of the Soviet Union which\nhave taken place since 1939. These extensions cannot in all cases\nbe said to have been seriously detrimental to international peace\nand stability; and in certain instances it can probably be consid-\nered, from the standpoint of our objectives, that they can be en-\ntirely accepted for the sake of the maintenance of peace. In other\ncases, notably that of the Baltic countries, the question is more\ndifficult. We cannot really profess indifference to the further\nfate of the Baltic peoples. This has been reflected in our recog-\nnition policy to date with respect to those countries. And we\ncould hardly consider that international peace and stability will\nreally have ceased to be threatened as long as Europe is faced\nwith the fact that it has been possible for Moscow to crush these\nthree small countries which have been guilty of no real provoca-\ntion and which have given evidence of their ability to handle\ntheir own affairs in a progressive manner, without detriment to\nthe interests of their neighbors. It should therefore logically\nbe considered a part of U. S. objectives to see these countries\nrestored to something at least approaching a decent state of free-\ndom and independence.\nIt is clear, however, that their complete independence would\ninvolve an actual cession of territory by the Soviet Government.\nNSC 20/1\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET"
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