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It would therefore raise an issue directly involving the dignity
and the vital interests of the Soviet State as such. It is idle
to imagine that this could be brought about by means short of war.
If, therefore, we are to consider that the basic objective out-
lined above is one which would be valid for peace as well as for
war, then we must logically state that under conditions of peace
our objective would be merely to induce Moscow to permit the re-
turn to the respective Baltic countries of all of their nationals
who have been forcibly removed therefrom and the establishment in
those countries of autonomous regimes generally consistent with
the cultural needs and national aspirations of the peoples in
question. In the event of war, we might, if necessary, wish to
go further. But the answer to this question would depend on the
nature of the Russian regime which would be dominant in that area
in the wake of another war; and we need not attempt to decide it
in advance.
In saying, consequently, that we should reduce the power and
influence of the Kremlin to limits in which they will no longer
constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international
society, we are entitled to consider that this is an objective
which can be logically pursued not only in the event of a war but
also in time of peace and by peaceful means, and that in the lat-
ter case it need not necessarily raise issues of prestige for the
Soviet Government which would automatically make war inevitable.
NSC 20/1
- 9 --
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nIt would therefore raise an issue directly involving the dignity\nand the vital interests of the Soviet State as such. It is idle\nto imagine that this could be brought about by means short of war.\nIf, therefore, we are to consider that the basic objective out-\nlined above is one which would be valid for peace as well as for\nwar, then we must logically state that under conditions of peace\nour objective would be merely to induce Moscow to permit the re-\nturn to the respective Baltic countries of all of their nationals\nwho have been forcibly removed therefrom and the establishment in\nthose countries of autonomous regimes generally consistent with\nthe cultural needs and national aspirations of the peoples in\nquestion. In the event of war, we might, if necessary, wish to\ngo further. But the answer to this question would depend on the\nnature of the Russian regime which would be dominant in that area\nin the wake of another war; and we need not attempt to decide it\nin advance.\nIn saying, consequently, that we should reduce the power and\ninfluence of the Kremlin to limits in which they will no longer\nconstitute a threat to the peace and stability of international\nsociety, we are entitled to consider that this is an objective\nwhich can be logically pursued not only in the event of a war but\nalso in time of peace and by peaceful means, and that in the lat-\nter case it need not necessarily raise issues of prestige for the\nSoviet Government which would automatically make war inevitable.\nNSC 20/1\n- 9 --\nTOP SECRET"
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