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AMD 7 SERVICE TOP OECRET Assuming, then, that there might be a portion of Soviet ter- ritory on which we would find it expedient to tolerate the contin- ued existence of Soviet power, upon the conclusion of military op- erations, what should be our relationship to it? Would we consent to deal with it at all? If so, what sort of terms would we be willing to make? First of all, we may accept it as a foregone conclusion that we would not be prepared to conclude a full-fledged peace settle- ment and/or resume regular diplomatic relations with any regime in Russia dominated by any of the present Soviet leaders or persons sharing their cast of thought. We have had too bitter an experi- : ence, during the past fifteen years, with the effort to act as though normal relations were possible with such a regime; and if we should now be forced to resort to war to protect ourselves from the consequences of their policies and actions, our public would hardly be in a mood to forgive the Soviet leaders for having brought things to this pass, or to resume the attempt at normal collabora- tion. On the other hand, if a communist regime were to remain on any portion of Soviet territory, upon the conclusion of military opera- tions, we could not afford to ignore it entirely. It could not fail to be, within the limits of its own possibilities, a potential menace to the peace and stability of Russia itself and of the world. The least we could do would be to see to it that its possibilities for mischief were so limited that it could not do serious demage, NSC 20/1 - 38 - TOP SECRET

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    "ocrText": "AMD\n7\nSERVICE\nTOP OECRET\nAssuming, then, that there might be a portion of Soviet ter-\nritory on which we would find it expedient to tolerate the contin-\nued existence of Soviet power, upon the conclusion of military op-\nerations, what should be our relationship to it? Would we consent\nto deal with it at all? If so, what sort of terms would we be\nwilling to make?\nFirst of all, we may accept it as a foregone conclusion that\nwe would not be prepared to conclude a full-fledged peace settle-\nment and/or resume regular diplomatic relations with any regime in\nRussia dominated by any of the present Soviet leaders or persons\nsharing their cast of thought. We have had too bitter an experi-\n:\nence, during the past fifteen years, with the effort to act as\nthough normal relations were possible with such a regime; and if\nwe should now be forced to resort to war to protect ourselves from\nthe consequences of their policies and actions, our public would\nhardly be in a mood to forgive the Soviet leaders for having brought\nthings to this pass, or to resume the attempt at normal collabora-\ntion.\nOn the other hand, if a communist regime were to remain on any\nportion of Soviet territory, upon the conclusion of military opera-\ntions, we could not afford to ignore it entirely. It could not\nfail to be, within the limits of its own possibilities, a potential\nmenace to the peace and stability of Russia itself and of the world.\nThe least we could do would be to see to it that its possibilities\nfor mischief were so limited that it could not do serious demage,\nNSC 20/1\n- 38 -\nTOP SECRET"
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