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    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency Report 8-48, Review of the World Situation",
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    "id": "213875930",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency Report 8-48, Review of the World Situation",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875930",
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    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "\"NATIONA\nARCHIVES AMO\nRECORDS\nSERVICE\nEs COVERNING\nof Soviet political control and economic reorganization from being confirmed by inter-\nnational agreement. From the Soviet point of view, the value of freezing by interna-\ntional accord the favorable situation that has been developed since the end of the war\nis clearly indicated. Vishinsky's handling of the Conference suggests steam-roller\ntactics designed to this end; and the position taken will leave the USSR and the\nSatellites in solid agreement even if what emerges from the Conference is not formally\nagreed by the United States, Great Britain, and France. Subject to later modification\nby other factors, such as economic weakness and internal resistance, this action will\ntend to consolidate the strategic pattern at which the USSR has consistently aimed\nin Southeastern Europe.\nThe steady uniformity with which Yugoslavia has supported the Soviet line in\nthis Conference does not suggest that the rift with the Kremlin has been closed but\nthat the United States and Western Europe will derive no immediate advantages from\nthe controversy. If possible advantages are discovered, they will presumably show\nas part of a longer term nationalistic development and will be linked with the pres-\nsure of economic necessity in Eastern Europe.\n5.\nTHE PALESTINE TRUCE.\nThe truce arranged less than a month ago is being maintained with increasing\ndifficulty. A growing number of reports indicate the growth of intransigeance on\nthe part of Israel and a willingness to take forceful advantage of a situation that is\njudged favorable for expansion. Currently, neighboring Arab States, having barely\nweathered the pressures of domestic opinion and kept some minimum political sta-\nbility, are now involved in a large scale refugee problem and faced with a large question\nof maintaining public order.\nIf hostilities are renewed in Palestine, the possibility of a chain reaction of social\ntensions and political upsets working rapidly through the Near and Middle East must\nbe taken into account. The Arab League is less well placed to prevent this happening\nthan at any time since the war, and the United Kingdom is less sure of its relations\nwith the Arab-Moslem world and less able to exercise a restraining influence. The\ntotal situation, plainly approaching a major climax, raises a diversity of problems.\nThe basic one is the possible formation of a broad power vacuum in this strategically\nimportant region. The immediate consequence of such a development would be to\npresent the United Kingdom with a problem that is insoluble in terms of existing\nBritish economic, diplomatic, and military resources. Its longer range consequence\nwould be to challenge the security of the entire US-UK position in the Eastern Medi-\nterranean.\nIn addition, existing Soviet activities would be quick to seize upon the new op-\nportunities offered by growing tensions and spreading instability. Direct intervention\nwould not be called for, since the maximum opportunities would be generated by the\nsituation itself. The loosening of authority in the Arab States and a search for ex-\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\n3\nC.I.A. 3.29.37\nASD letter, Ap\nNLT- H / NARS Date 4-15-17"
}