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{
    "localId": "213875964",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 20/2, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on Factors Affecting the Nature of the United States Defense Arrangements in Light of Soviet Policies",
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    "id": "213875964",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 20/2, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on Factors Affecting the Nature of the United States Defense Arrangements in Light of Soviet Policies",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875964",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 25,
            "logicalDate": "1948-08-25",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 11,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750605/750605-03-011.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "TRUMAN\nTOT SECRET\n13.\n2. As a deterrent.\nThis is of outstanding importance. There is no question\nbut that if the opposing strength is estimated to be so great\nthat there would be little possibility of final fictory, the\nRussians will not deliberately resort to the use of armed\nforce. On the other hend, excessive military weakness here\nand in western Europe might indeed create a factor which\nwould operate to overcome the other reasons why the Soviet\nGovernment would not be inclined to use armed force, and\nmight thus constitute a compelling invitation to aggression.\nThere is no evidence that anything likely to occur in\nRussia within the foreseeable future will in any way alter\nthis situation. We must reckon that the necessity for the\nmaintenance of armed forces as a deterrent will continue un-\ndiminished as long as the Soviet power, as we know it today,\ncontinues to be dominant in Russia, and probably even longer.\n3. As a source of encouragement to nations endeavoring to re-\nsist Soviet political eggression.\nThe peoples who consider themselves as lying between\nthe U.S. S. R. and the U. S. and who are endeavoring to re-\nsist Soviet political pressures are strongly influenced by\nwhat may be called the shadows of the armed strength main-\ntained by the two great powers. If the shadow of the So-\nviet armed strength remains. too formidable, in comparison\nwith ours, this may well have a paralyzing effect on the\nwill to resist in western Europe and may become an import-\nant factor in enabling the Russians to achieve their aims\nby political rather than military means. It is therefore\nnecessary for this country to maintain the outward evidences\nof firm armed strength and resolution as a means of stiffen-\ning the attitude of those peoples who would like to resist\nSoviet political pressures.\nLike the requirement of armed force as a deterrent,\nthis requirement may be expected to endure at least as long\nas the communist party remains the dominant power in Russia.\nThere is no reason to expect the achievement of any politi- -\ncal understanding with the Soviet leaders which could appre-\nciably offset the need for strong U. S. forces as a. factor\nof encouragement to the peoples in western Europe. This\nnecessity is not likely to pass even with the termination\nof the present Soviet regime.\nNSC 20/2\n- 7 --\nTOP SECRET"
}