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{
    "localId": "213875964",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 20/2, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on Factors Affecting the Nature of the United States Defense Arrangements in Light of Soviet Policies",
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    "id": "213875964",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875964",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 20/2, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on Factors Affecting the Nature of the United States Defense Arrangements in Light of Soviet Policies",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875964",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 25,
            "logicalDate": "1948-08-25",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 13,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nto defend them in the event they should become militar-\nily involved with the U.S.S.R. relate in large measure\nto their doubts as to the stability and long-term con-\nsistency of U. S. policy. A U. S. defense effort laid\nout on long-term lines will be much more apt to reassure\nthem than one aimed at a given peak of probable likeli- -\nhood of war but subject to later downward fluctuations.\n(c) From the standpoint of the possibility of an actual\nwaging of war with Russia, a defense effort laid out on\na permanent basis would lack the advantages of being\nable to meet a particular peak danger by a peak effort\nin military preparedness; but it would have distinct\nadvantages if military complications were to occur at\na time other than that which we had calculated to be\nthe most likely one.\n2.\nA U. S. defense effort founded on the idea of meeting a peak\nof war danger by a peak of military preparedness.\n(a) As a deterrent to the Soviet Union, this type of effort\nwould be effective only for the period toward which it\nwas directed; for the subsequent period it would have\nthe reverse effect. If the Soviet leaders knew that\nwe were undertaking a defense effort of this nature\n(and it is certain that they would know it), they would\nbe able to plan for maximum military and political pres-\nsure at a date when our own military effort might be ex-\npected to have subsided.\n(b) From the standpoint of encouragement to peoples resist-\ning Soviet pressures, this type of defense effort would\nhave only a limited value. To the extent that it gave\nthe impression that U. S. plans were sporadic and unde-\npendable, it might do more harm than good.\n(c) From the standpoint of actual waging of war, such a de-\nfense effort could conceivably have advantages only in\nthe event that our calculations as to the likely timing\nof Soviet military aggression were correct. At present,\nwe have no adequate means of arriving at a correct cal-\nculation of such a factor. But in any case we must al-\nways beax in mind that the defense effort itself would\nundoubtedly alter the situation on which our expectancy\nhad been based; for it would probably act as an effect-\nive deterrent for that particular period and we would\nprobably not be called upon actually to use our forces\nat the time for which we had planned their maximum\nstrength. This means that there would be relatively\nlittle likelihood of our forces being used for waging\nNSC 20/2\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET"
}