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{
    "localId": "213875964",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 20/2, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on Factors Affecting the Nature of the United States Defense Arrangements in Light of Soviet Policies",
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    "id": "213875964",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 20/2, A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State on Factors Affecting the Nature of the United States Defense Arrangements in Light of Soviet Policies",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875964",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 25,
            "logicalDate": "1948-08-25",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "ARCHIVES SERVICE\" AND\nTOP SECRET\nof\n(c)\nThe Soviet leaders may calculate that in the present\nchanged circumstances certain further political posi-\ntions, such as complete control of Berlin or of Vienna,\nare essential to the political defense of their satel-\nlite zone in eastern Europe, and they may feel them-\nselves obliged to strike for the achievement of these\nobjectives regardless of the resulting danger of war.\n/In this connection there is always the possibil-\nity that the Soviet leaders may miscalculate the deter-\nmination of this Government and its willingness to re-\nsort to force to protect the integrity of existing in-\nternational agreements.\n(d) It is always possible, although not probable, that in-\nternal conflicts and pressures may impel the Soviet\nGovernment to attitudes and policies which would carry\nit in the direction of armed involvement.\n(e) The possibility of further military booty may be an in-\ncentive to war for a government which has in effect\nelected to forego, in favor of political projects which\nnow look doubtful, the possible advantages of economic\ncooperation with the U. S.\n3.\nPossible fortuitous circumstances.\n(a) Where forces of mutually antagonistic great powers are\noperating in such close proximity as is the case in Eu-\nrope with the forces of the Soviet Union and of the\nwestern powers, and particularly where the fanatical\nand relatively unrestrained Soviet police element is so\nstrongly involved, there is always a danger of incidents\nwhich, although not so intended, would lead directly to\nmilitary complications.\n4. CONCLUSION:\nWeighing these various factors the evidence points to the\nconclusion that the Soviet Government is not now planning\nany deliberate armed action of this nature and is still\nseeking to a.chieve its aims predominantly by political\nmeans, accompanied--of course--by the factor of military\nintimidation. The tactics which it is employing, however,\nthemselves heighten the danger that military complications\nmay arise from fortuitous causes or from niscalculation.\nWar must therefore be regarded, if not as a probability,\nat least as a possibility, and one serious enough to be\ntaken account of fully in our military and political plen-\nning.\nNSC 20/2\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET"
}