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TOF SECRET
B.
Extent to which Soviet intentions are apt to be influenced by
successful developments of the atomic weapon in the U.S.S.R.
1. Political factors would be apt to militate against use of
the atomic weapon by the Soviet Government against major
urban and industrial areas in other countries, except by
way of retaliation for attacks made on Russia.
The Soviet leaders think in political rather than mil-
itary terms, and regard themselves as the leaders not only
of the Soviet population but of important elements in west-
ern countries, particularly in the large cities and indus-
trial areas. Their basic aim is to achieve concealed polit-
ical domination over those areas, not to destroy "them. Dur-
ing the last war, they took little part in the air effirt
directed against the German population, and have since tried
to make political capital with the Germans out of this fact.
While this was probably partly a case of making virtue out of
necessity, the available evidence speaks for a certain polit-
ical reluctance on the Soviet side to resort without provoca-
tion to methods of mass destruction aimed against civilian
elements in other countries.)
2. If the Soviet leaders felt that there would be a strong
probability of retaliation, this would be an important fac-
tor in dissuading them from taking the initiative in the
use of the atomic weapon against western cities.
Russia has few cities to lose. Only Moscow and Lenin-
grad could conceivably house the highly centralized adminis-
trative services of the Soviet Government for any length of
time; and they, like all other Soviet cities, are desper-
ately over-crowded. Similarly, Soviet industry is highly
vulnerable to air attack by virtue of
(a) the relative concentration of many of its import-
ant branches in a few large enterprises;
(b) the great intensity with which existing plant is
exploited, and the corresponding lack of reserve strength
and flexibility in the event of damage by atomic weapons.
There is no slack in the Soviet economic effort. A
relatively small number of atomic bombs could, if properly
and effectively directed, set the entire Soviet industrial-
ization program back by years and have an extremely severe
effect on any Soviet military effort. This is not to speak
of the psychological effect on the Soviet people.7
NSC 20/2
- 5 -
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"ocrText": "TOF SECRET\nB.\nExtent to which Soviet intentions are apt to be influenced by\nsuccessful developments of the atomic weapon in the U.S.S.R.\n1. Political factors would be apt to militate against use of\nthe atomic weapon by the Soviet Government against major\nurban and industrial areas in other countries, except by\nway of retaliation for attacks made on Russia.\nThe Soviet leaders think in political rather than mil-\nitary terms, and regard themselves as the leaders not only\nof the Soviet population but of important elements in west-\nern countries, particularly in the large cities and indus-\ntrial areas. Their basic aim is to achieve concealed polit-\nical domination over those areas, not to destroy \"them. Dur-\ning the last war, they took little part in the air effirt\ndirected against the German population, and have since tried\nto make political capital with the Germans out of this fact.\nWhile this was probably partly a case of making virtue out of\nnecessity, the available evidence speaks for a certain polit-\nical reluctance on the Soviet side to resort without provoca-\ntion to methods of mass destruction aimed against civilian\nelements in other countries.)\n2. If the Soviet leaders felt that there would be a strong\nprobability of retaliation, this would be an important fac-\ntor in dissuading them from taking the initiative in the\nuse of the atomic weapon against western cities.\nRussia has few cities to lose. Only Moscow and Lenin-\ngrad could conceivably house the highly centralized adminis-\ntrative services of the Soviet Government for any length of\ntime; and they, like all other Soviet cities, are desper-\nately over-crowded. Similarly, Soviet industry is highly\nvulnerable to air attack by virtue of\n(a) the relative concentration of many of its import-\nant branches in a few large enterprises;\n(b) the great intensity with which existing plant is\nexploited, and the corresponding lack of reserve strength\nand flexibility in the event of damage by atomic weapons.\nThere is no slack in the Soviet economic effort. A\nrelatively small number of atomic bombs could, if properly\nand effectively directed, set the entire Soviet industrial-\nization program back by years and have an extremely severe\neffect on any Soviet military effort. This is not to speak\nof the psychological effect on the Soviet people.7\nNSC 20/2\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET"
}