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TOP SECRET "WAZIONAL AND RECORDS STRVICE" c. War might arise through miscalculation, through fail- - ure of either side to estimate accurately how far the other can be pushed. There is the possibility that the USSR will be tempted to take armed action under a miscalculation of the de- termination and willingness of the United States to resort to force in order to prevent the development of a threat intoler- able to U. S. security. 12. In addition to the risk of war, a danger equally to be guarded against is the possibility that Soviet political warfare might seriously weaken the relative position of the United States, enhance Soviet strength and either lead to our ultimate defeat short of war, or force us into war under dangerously unfavorable conditions. Such a result would be facilitated by vacillation, ap- peasement or isolationist concepts in our foreign policy, leading to loss of our allies and influence; by internal disunity or sub- version; by economic instability in the form of depression or in- flation; or by either excessive or inadequate armament and foreign aid expenditures. 13. To counter threats to our national security and to create conditions conducive to a positive and in the long term mutually beneficial relationship between the Russian people and our own, it is essential that this government formulate general objectives which are capable of sustained pursuit both in time of peace and in the event of war. From the general objectives flow certain specific aims which we seek to accomplish by methods short of war, as well as certain other aims which we seek to accomplish in the event of war. NSC 20/3 TOP SECRET - 7 -

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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n\"WAZIONAL\nAND\nRECORDS\nSTRVICE\"\nc. War might arise through miscalculation, through fail- -\nure of either side to estimate accurately how far the other can\nbe pushed. There is the possibility that the USSR will be\ntempted to take armed action under a miscalculation of the de-\ntermination and willingness of the United States to resort to\nforce in order to prevent the development of a threat intoler-\nable to U. S. security.\n12. In addition to the risk of war, a danger equally to be\nguarded against is the possibility that Soviet political warfare\nmight seriously weaken the relative position of the United States,\nenhance Soviet strength and either lead to our ultimate defeat\nshort of war, or force us into war under dangerously unfavorable\nconditions. Such a result would be facilitated by vacillation, ap-\npeasement or isolationist concepts in our foreign policy, leading\nto loss of our allies and influence; by internal disunity or sub-\nversion; by economic instability in the form of depression or in-\nflation; or by either excessive or inadequate armament and foreign\naid expenditures.\n13. To counter threats to our national security and to create\nconditions conducive to a positive and in the long term mutually\nbeneficial relationship between the Russian people and our own, it\nis essential that this government formulate general objectives which\nare capable of sustained pursuit both in time of peace and in the\nevent of war. From the general objectives flow certain specific\naims which we seek to accomplish by methods short of war, as well\nas certain other aims which we seek to accomplish in the event of\nwar.\nNSC 20/3\nTOP SECRET\n- 7 -"
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