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TRUMAN c Es ARCLIVES SERVICE" RECORDG AND for and little chance of effecting at this juncture the political conquest of any countries west of the Luebeck-Trieste line. The unsuccess- ful outcome of this political offensive has in turn created serious problems for them behind the iron curtain, and their policies are today probably motivated in large measure by defensive considera- tions. However, it cannot be assumed that Soviet capabilities for subversion and political aggression will decrease in the next dec - ade, and they may become even more dangerous than at present. 7. In present circumstances the capabilities of the USSR to threaten U. S. security by the use of armed forces* are dangerous and immediate: a. The USSR, while not capable of sustained and decisive direct military attack against U. S. territory or the Western Hemisphere, is capable of serious submarine warfare and of a limited number of one-way bomber sorties. b. Present intelligence estimates attribute to Soviet armed forces the capability of over-running in about six. months all of Continental Europe and the Near East as far as Cairo, while simultaneously occupying important continental points in the Far East. Meanwhile, Great Britain could be subjected to severe air and missile bombardment. c. Russian seizure of these areas would ultimately Soviet military capabilities as set forth in this paper, while constituting potential threats to U. S. security which must be rec- ognized, do not represent an evaluated estimate of Soviet inten- tions to utilize these capabilities, do not take into account the effect of counter action, and are based upon the assumption of no important change in the territory under Soviet control or in the type of that control. NSC 20/3 nor SECRET - 4 -

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    "ocrText": "TRUMAN\nc Es ARCLIVES SERVICE\" RECORDG AND\nfor\nand\nlittle chance of effecting at this juncture the political conquest\nof any countries west of the Luebeck-Trieste line. The unsuccess-\nful outcome of this political offensive has in turn created serious\nproblems for them behind the iron curtain, and their policies are\ntoday probably motivated in large measure by defensive considera-\ntions. However, it cannot be assumed that Soviet capabilities for\nsubversion and political aggression will decrease in the next dec -\nade, and they may become even more dangerous than at present.\n7. In present circumstances the capabilities of the USSR to\nthreaten U. S. security by the use of armed forces* are dangerous\nand immediate:\na. The USSR, while not capable of sustained and decisive\ndirect military attack against U. S. territory or the Western\nHemisphere, is capable of serious submarine warfare and of a\nlimited number of one-way bomber sorties.\nb.\nPresent intelligence estimates attribute to Soviet\narmed forces the capability of over-running in about six.\nmonths all of Continental Europe and the Near East as far as\nCairo, while simultaneously occupying important continental\npoints in the Far East. Meanwhile, Great Britain could be\nsubjected to severe air and missile bombardment.\nc.\nRussian seizure of these areas would ultimately\nSoviet military capabilities as set forth in this paper, while\nconstituting potential threats to U. S. security which must be rec-\nognized, do not represent an evaluated estimate of Soviet inten-\ntions to utilize these capabilities, do not take into account the\neffect of counter action, and are based upon the assumption of no\nimportant change in the territory under Soviet control or in the\ntype of that control.\nNSC 20/3\nnor SECRET\n- 4 -"
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