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    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency Report 11-48, Review of the World Situation",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency Report 11-48, Review of the World Situation",
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{
    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "see R Es\nsidies and economic commitments. More generally, however, the security situation\nwould enable the Japanese to emphasize the value of Japan as a strategic defense\nagainst the expansion of Asiatic Communism beyond the mainland. This value would\nprovide the basis for a still more forcible claim on financial aid and would lay the\ngroundwork for the questions as security guarantees, the reconstruction of an indus-\ntrial potential, and the reorganization of Japanese manpower for defense purposes.\nb. Korea: an adverse effect on the stability of the US-supported Republic of\nKorea can be anticipated. This will follow more from a build-up of morale among\nKorean Communists than in consequence of direct economic and military aid. A\nstrong sense of success will be passed on, particularly to the southern Communist under-\nground, as a conviction that victory is inevitable. Correspondingly increased apprehen-\nsion can be expected to affect the judgment and policy of Republican political leaders\nin the South. There is a strong actual and spiritual kinship between these leaders\nand the Chinese Nationalists who are being dispossessed. Their apprehensions may\nwell express themselves in the form of oppressive and even terroristic security measures.\nIf the direction of such measures fall into the hands of extreme Rightists, they might\neasily be carried to a point where the progress that the South Koreans have made\ntoward responsible government will be wiped out and any possible popular base for a\nRepublican regime destroyed.\nc.\nSoutheast Asia: the problem in this area falls into two parts. The first con-\ncerns the direct channels and assistance that will be opened to Communist groups\nalready operating in these areas. Since Chinese Communists are active in all of these\ngroups, it must be anticipated that a closer and easier liaison will be developed with\nthe Chinese Communist Party and hence with Soviet Communism, and that the possi-\nbility of a more comprehensive and coordinated strategy for undermining European\nand US influence will exist. The second problem concerns the Chinese minority groups\nthat are dispersed throughout the region. These groups total about 6 1/2 million\npeople and exercise considerable economic power through their control of small-scale\ncommercial enterprise. Historically, this minority has been organized in relation to\npolitical alignments in China itself, and therefore reflects the influence and propaganda\nof the Kuomintang and of the Communist Party respectively. It is possible that these\nestablished political alignments may be maintained in Southeast Asia after they have\nceased to be significant in China itself, for a retreat of Kuomintang personnel and funds\nmay create a Party structure in exile; and it is certain that Communist groups will\nbe strengthened and increased. In general, however, it is considered that these minori-\nties-after an attempt to remain neutral-will begin a cautious reassessment of their\npolitical allegiance and will, especially if there is a Coalition Government in China to\nwhich they can attach themselves, fall in line with the possible political developments\nthat have been described earlier.\nThis tendency may be speeded up if local governments in Southeast Asia\nseize on this moment of uncertainty to bring their Chinese minorities under restrictive\ncontrol with the object of preventing Chinese encroachments on their sovereignty and\nof furthering their own nationalist aims. A vigorous effort in this direction might well\nDECLASSIFIED\na 11652, Sec. 3(E) and J(D) or (E)\n3\nC.I.A. 3-29-27\nOSD letter, April 12 - 1974\nBey NO.T- Ha NARS Date 9.15.27"
}