Telegram from Walter Bedell Smith to Secretary of State George Marshall

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) Dupt. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973 C O P Y TOP SECRET By NLT HC , NARS Date 10-3-25 CORRECTED COPY 10 a.m. , 12/25/48 CORRECTIONS UNDERSCORED Control 8216 Rec'd Dec. 24, 1948 9:18 a.m. FROM: Moscow ARG SEK: TO: Secretary of State NO : 3008, December 23, 7 p.m. Looking backward, as year draws to close, on agitated events of 1948, we believe that several phenomena difficult to interpret currently are beginning to form a pattern indicating some revi- sion of our basic estimate of Soviet intentions. Hindsight re- flection on fundamental significance of such events as Tito-Comin- form conflict, agricultural collectivization program in East Europe, continuing Varga dispute and Berlin situation, to mention only principal factors, leads us to preliminary conclusion that : : (1) Soviet Union not only "will not deliberately resort to mili- - tary action in the immediate future" (Embassy despatch 315, April 1) but seems to be basing its policies and actions on expectation of peace for the near future, probably several years. (2) Believing itself safe from attack, Soviet Government is in fact deliberately choosing to weaken itself to a certain extent during next few years vis-a-vis West in order to gain greater strength for later inevitable conflict in which it continues be- - lieve. (3) "War scare" campaign has been carefully planned and developed over past 2 years in order to frighten Western peoples and impede West recovery efforts, facilitate maintenance internal controls on Soviet population; and hide Soviet weaknesses. (4) American policies should be carefully re-studied and re-adapted in light of this estimate and Western public opinion made aware of longer-range prospects requiring maintenance preparedness, firmness, unity and patience to degree and for period heretofore considered beyond capacity Democratic regimes. Our retrospective view of the main events leading to these conclu- sions follow: (1) Tito-Moscow break did not just happen, but resulted from deli- - berate decision of Politburo. Tito's growing independence may have TOP SECRET - 1 -