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NLT/PSF -5UBJ.360
copy / OF2
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
670
TELEGRAPH BRANCH
15 X
TON SECRET
A
Action
Control: 8581
Rec'd:
July 17, 1951
NEA
FROM: Tehran
11:14 a.m.
Info
TO: Secretary of State
SS
a a Sec. 3(E) and
G
NO: 240, July 17, 3 p.m.
5-31-7f
D pr. of State letter,
EUR
PROUEST NLY
DCR
By NLT He NARS D le 10.274
PRIORITY
FROM HARRIMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ; DISTRIBUTION
ONLY AS DIRECTED BY THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE.
Sunday Grady briefed me on developments and at his suggestion
I saw Mosadeq yesterday alone except for an interpreter. I
called on him in the morning and he came to my residence in
the late afternoon. Between the talks Grady and I lunched
with Shah.
At my first talk Mosadeq received me most cordially at his
home. His only significant remark was:
"When
there
are
two
divergent points of view it is good to have the help of a
third party. Otherwise he gave me his interpretation of
events as told to and reported by Grady on numerous occasions.
I proposed that we should discuss the details of the problems
of oil production and distribution at our next meeting.
For the afternoon session he brought with him Hasibi, Under
Secretary of Finance and Saleh, chairman of the National Oil
TROMAN
Co. Walter Levy gave these two men probably their first frank
any AND
detailed education on the technical aspects of how the world-
wide oil business was conducted. While these technical dis-
C.S.
cussions were being carried on, I talked with Mosadeq about
how a settlement might be reached. He was completely rigid in
his statements. He had, no desire to talk with representatives
of the British Government or the oil company. He asked that
I propose a formula of settlement, provided it conformed to
the nine points of the recent Nationalization Law. If this
formula met his approval, I could then take it to the British.
This I declined to do, but emphasized the need for an immediate
modus vivendi. I explained the disastrous results that would
follow a shut-down of the refinery, not only in the immediate
effect on the Iranian economy but in the problem of getting the
business going again. I explained the difficulty of bringing
an operating organization together again and of selling oil
after the market had been taken over by other sources. Mosadeg
took the position that then Iran wld fall into Communist con-
trol. This he considered was the obligation of the British
and ourselves
REPRODUCTION OF TIIS
ESSAGE IS PROMIBITED
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"ocrText": "NLT/PSF -5UBJ.360\ncopy / OF2\nINCOMING TELEGRAM\nDepartment of State\n670\nTELEGRAPH BRANCH\n15 X\nTON SECRET\nA\nAction\nControl: 8581\nRec'd:\nJuly 17, 1951\nNEA\nFROM: Tehran\n11:14 a.m.\nInfo\nTO: Secretary of State\nSS\na a Sec. 3(E) and\nG\nNO: 240, July 17, 3 p.m.\n5-31-7f\nD pr. of State letter,\nEUR\nPROUEST NLY\nDCR\nBy NLT He NARS D le 10.274\nPRIORITY\nFROM HARRIMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ; DISTRIBUTION\nONLY AS DIRECTED BY THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE.\nSunday Grady briefed me on developments and at his suggestion\nI saw Mosadeq yesterday alone except for an interpreter. I\ncalled on him in the morning and he came to my residence in\nthe late afternoon. Between the talks Grady and I lunched\nwith Shah.\nAt my first talk Mosadeq received me most cordially at his\nhome. His only significant remark was:\n\"When\nthere\nare\ntwo\ndivergent points of view it is good to have the help of a\nthird party. Otherwise he gave me his interpretation of\nevents as told to and reported by Grady on numerous occasions.\nI proposed that we should discuss the details of the problems\nof oil production and distribution at our next meeting.\nFor the afternoon session he brought with him Hasibi, Under\nSecretary of Finance and Saleh, chairman of the National Oil\nTROMAN\nCo. Walter Levy gave these two men probably their first frank\nany AND\ndetailed education on the technical aspects of how the world-\nwide oil business was conducted. While these technical dis-\nC.S.\ncussions were being carried on, I talked with Mosadeq about\nhow a settlement might be reached. He was completely rigid in\nhis statements. He had, no desire to talk with representatives\nof the British Government or the oil company. He asked that\nI propose a formula of settlement, provided it conformed to\nthe nine points of the recent Nationalization Law. If this\nformula met his approval, I could then take it to the British.\nThis I declined to do, but emphasized the need for an immediate\nmodus vivendi. I explained the disastrous results that would\nfollow a shut-down of the refinery, not only in the immediate\neffect on the Iranian economy but in the problem of getting the\nbusiness going again. I explained the difficulty of bringing\nan operating organization together again and of selling oil\nafter the market had been taken over by other sources. Mosadeg\ntook the position that then Iran wld fall into Communist con-\ntrol. This he considered was the obligation of the British\nand ourselves\nREPRODUCTION OF TIIS\nESSAGE IS PROMIBITED"
}