Telegram from Ambassador Henry Grady to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Number 276
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OCR Page 1 of 3NLT(PSF-5UBS.) 361
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
COPY 1 0F2
186
TELEGRAPH BRANCH
25-21-X
nor
A
Action
II
Control: 9980
NEA
Rec'd: July 19, 1951
FROM: Tehran
12:55 p.m.
Info
pe
SS
TO: Secretary of State
po
G
T
EUR
NO: 276, July 19, Noon
DCR
and
PRIORITY
FROM HARRIMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.
NO (RPT NO) DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY SECRETARY'
OFFICE.
Grady had five friendly Iran political figures to dinner
Tuesday night which gave me an informal opportunity to ex-
plain the economic consequences of oil shut-down and necessity
of working out arrangements in some form with British. They
appeared to agree that a solution with British should be
reached. They also said that the opportunity provided by my
presence must not (rpt not) be lost. On other hand, they
pointed out that they had little influence on Mosadeq at moment
and that he had captured popular emotion and wide-spread sup
port.
Wednesday morning Ala, Minister of Court, present Tuesday
night, called on me. We had a long and frank discussion.
He
explained the Shah's position, saying that he realized the
issues at stake and yet could not (rpt not) safely take any
direct action. The country is so strongly behind Mosadeq
that no (rpt no) other individual could now obtain popular
approval of a deal with British. He believes every effort
and the
TRUBAN
must be made to persuade Mosadeq to be reasonable. Ala said
Commission
that even Mosadeq could not (rpt not) repudiate the nine
point Nationalization Law but could interpretate the points
C.s.
liberally and make additions. In any event British political
influence in Iran affairs must be stopped both by oil officials
and British Govt. He referred to shooting trips" by Mili-
tary Attache which in fact were for purpose of contacting tri-
bal leaders.
LGS
I told him I had come to conclusion that only way to break
impasse was through govt to govt (British-Iran discussions
and suggested the advisability of a member of British Cabinet
coming to Tehran while I was still here
gurg
bogges
orre
I said I was sure his govt could attain its political objectives
Br a Sec and any
as above
at State 5-31-74
wir 73.3
mor SEGRIT
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