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337
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
NLT (PSF-SUBJ.) 348
TELEGRAPH BRANCH
copy / OF 2
14-15-X
TOP SECRET
A
Action
Control: 13117
is
NEA
Rec'd:
July 25, 1951
ED
FROM: Tehran
11:54 a.m.
Info
SS
TO:
Secretary of State
DECLASSIFIED
G
STATE DEPT. 2m2. 12-4-f4
EUR
NO: 380, July 25, 4 p.m.
Authority
NLT- 84-16
E
DCR
By HC NLT Date 12.28.14
PRIORITY
SENT DEPT 380, LONDON 73 (EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR)
FROM HARRIMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.
NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE.
I am naturally concerned over two subjects. First, whether
2
British Government fully understands disastrous consequences
of failure to accept in friendly manner gesture of Iranian
Government contained in proposal for negotiations through
government mission and whether British will not (rpt not)
try to spar on conditions which I believe will get them
nowhere and will destroy atmosphere essential to successful
negotiations.
British shld realize extent Iranian Government has retreated
from previous rigid positions: (A) Non-insistence on prior
acceptance of nine point nationalizatior law, (B) Readiness
to negotiate manner in which first general nationalization
law of March 20 is to be carried out; (c) Agreement to negotiate
with British Government instead of oil company although
insisting that such negotiation be on behalf of company
(D) Readiness to negotiate for foreign-owned company to
01
operate within Iran as agent for National Oil Company ;
(E) Recognition of Iran's dependence upon goodwill of
foreign companies for shipping and foreign outlets, (F)
Readiness to negotiate after clear and repeated statement
the
by me that government cannot (rpt not) expect greater income
than other producing countries under comparable circumstances,
1
8.3.
and
and (G) Acceptance of principle that they must deal with
AIOC in working out above arrangements in spite of widespread
hatred and distrust of company.
I earnestly hope you and Gifford will continue to use maximum
influence to prevent British from trying to settle any
substantive question before Minister's arrival Tehran or
to discredit Iranian Government before people by demands
113
such as for returning management of oil operations to British
before negotiation. Report coming to me from objective
American newspaper
TOP SECRET
REPRODUCTION OF THIS
MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "337\nINCOMING TELEGRAM\nDepartment of State\nNLT (PSF-SUBJ.) 348\nTELEGRAPH BRANCH\ncopy / OF 2\n14-15-X\nTOP SECRET\nA\nAction\nControl: 13117\nis\nNEA\nRec'd:\nJuly 25, 1951\nED\nFROM: Tehran\n11:54 a.m.\nInfo\nSS\nTO:\nSecretary of State\nDECLASSIFIED\nG\nSTATE DEPT. 2m2. 12-4-f4\nEUR\nNO: 380, July 25, 4 p.m.\nAuthority\nNLT- 84-16\nE\nDCR\nBy HC NLT Date 12.28.14\nPRIORITY\nSENT DEPT 380, LONDON 73 (EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR)\nFROM HARRIMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.\nNO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE.\nI am naturally concerned over two subjects. First, whether\n2\nBritish Government fully understands disastrous consequences\nof failure to accept in friendly manner gesture of Iranian\nGovernment contained in proposal for negotiations through\ngovernment mission and whether British will not (rpt not)\ntry to spar on conditions which I believe will get them\nnowhere and will destroy atmosphere essential to successful\nnegotiations.\nBritish shld realize extent Iranian Government has retreated\nfrom previous rigid positions: (A) Non-insistence on prior\nacceptance of nine point nationalizatior law, (B) Readiness\nto negotiate manner in which first general nationalization\nlaw of March 20 is to be carried out; (c) Agreement to negotiate\nwith British Government instead of oil company although\ninsisting that such negotiation be on behalf of company\n(D) Readiness to negotiate for foreign-owned company to\n01\noperate within Iran as agent for National Oil Company ;\n(E) Recognition of Iran's dependence upon goodwill of\nforeign companies for shipping and foreign outlets, (F)\nReadiness to negotiate after clear and repeated statement\nthe\nby me that government cannot (rpt not) expect greater income\nthan other producing countries under comparable circumstances,\n1\n8.3.\nand\nand (G) Acceptance of principle that they must deal with\nAIOC in working out above arrangements in spite of widespread\nhatred and distrust of company.\nI earnestly hope you and Gifford will continue to use maximum\ninfluence to prevent British from trying to settle any\nsubstantive question before Minister's arrival Tehran or\nto discredit Iranian Government before people by demands\n113\nsuch as for returning management of oil operations to British\nbefore negotiation. Report coming to me from objective\nAmerican newspaper\nTOP SECRET\nREPRODUCTION OF THIS\nMESSAGE IS PROHIBITED"
}