Telegram from Ambassador Henry Grady to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Number 390

NLT (PSF SUBJ.)347 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State COPY / of 2 TELEGRAPH BRANCH 1 TOP SECRET Action Control: 13781 759 Rec'd: NEA July 26, 1951 FROM: Tehran 10:33 a.m. Info SS TO: Secretary of State DECLASSIFIED G EUR NO: 390, July 26, Noon E.O. 13526 E Authority LP. HST 2013-010, d5 DCR NARA Pmt Date 1/15/2016 PRIORITY SENT DEPT 390, LONDON (EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR) 78. FROM HARRIMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. NO (RPT NO) DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE. Wednesday night British Counsellor, at request of Ambassador, showed me memorandum of latter's conversation with Foreign Minister. In memo, he explained to Foreign Minister that although what he wld say was not (rpt not) in reply to pro- posal submitted through me, British Government would require satisfactory réplies to four points quoted in my previous telegram before sending mission. Going over them in re- verse order, Ambassador said he assumed point (D) was covered by proposal. Foreign Minister replied that he could not (rpt not) say definitely without consulting his associates since he had not (rpt not) been involved in discussions with me. This latter is correct. Foreign Minister "had courage to agree" point (c) was covered. Discussion regarding point (B) was inconclusive. As to point (A), Ambassador told Foreign Minister there was only two ways to satisfy fully his government either by accepting court decision or returning to status quo. Although Foreign Minister did not (rpt not) take responsibility for definite reply, his reaction was adverse. (Busheri told me this morning that British Ambassador had made it clear to him that four point message was sent from London before receipt of Iranian pro- posal. He also told me that under these circumstances Ambassador will not (rpt not) get reply from Iranian Govt and I think this best as otherwise Ambassador would receive negative reaction on some aspects which would probably commit Iranian Government to rigid position making negotia- tions far more difficult for mission. According to memo, British Ambassador then discussed ways inarue which tension might be relieved and suggested recall to Tehran of extremist Makki. Foreign Minister did not (rpt not) seem unreceptive to this suggestion. (Relief of tension is only matter I suggested the Ambassador discuss with Iranian Government British Counsellor REPRODUCTION OF THIS TOP SECRET MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED