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218719496
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Telegram from Ambassador Walter Gifford to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Number 669
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id
218719496
contentType
document
title
Telegram from Ambassador Walter Gifford to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Number 669
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President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, 1951-1954
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218719496
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1
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1951-08-01
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8
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1951
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nara-archive
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c73b787c951ae072
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NLTLASF-SUAT.)320
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
copy / OF 2
TELEGRAPH BRANCH
4-H-X
748
men
Action
Control: 634
NEA
Rec'd: August l, 1951
FROM: London
11:39 p.m.
Info
SS
TO:
Secretary of State
G
E
NO:
669, Aug 1, 7 Pome
AND
EUR
= SERVICER
a
DCR
SENT DEPT 669, RPTD INFO TEHRAN 43.
and
In EMBTEL 579, July 28 we stated our belief UK wld not (rpt
not) resort to force while efforts to negot with Iranians
showing progress and in any event wld consult with US in
advance. We still believe this to be the case and there=
fore for present find no (rpt no) cause for alarm about
Brit intentions. We do wish, however, report to Dept our
growing conviction that, shld negots fail and shld there be
no (rpt no) other prospect restraining Iranians, UK Govt wld
send troops into Abadan. This would be done to protect
Brit lives, but, in our opinion, such a step may lead to
decision to hold on to refinery if this proved feasible.
Churchill's and Salisbury's remarks (EMBTEL 610, July 30;
EMBTEL 651, Aug 1) leave no (rpt no) doubt that Conservatives
would want this done. More significant, however, was Attlee's
affirmation govt intended remain in Abadan, even though some
further partial withdrawal might be necessary (EMBTEL 612
July 30). Jowitt's statement yesterday that govt accepted
full implications this decision and his failure challenge
Salisbury interpretation of what this means (EMBTEL 651),
lends further emphasis to this point. Finally, we believe
that at least some members of Cab have already decided in
their own minds that it would be better to use troops than
to abandon Abadan.
Cab's attn is now (rpt now) absorbed in the hope of successful
negots on the basis which Mr.° Harriman is trying to arrange
Probability that Cab does not (rpt not) consider any decision
use of force imminent is emphasized by fact that it has
adjourned for summer Parl recess and that both Attlee and
Morrison are planning Continental yacations during coming
month.
GIFFORD
TT:VIM
EXCLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and - pr
D.p. of State
lewer, 4-21-71
B# NLT
PROTERT He NG NAR3 74.2 Date 9.24.78
FOP SHOREI
REPRODUCTION OF THIS
MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED