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TOP SECRET The British Government: a. Formally accepted the "principle of national- - ization" of the Iranian oil industry as a basis for negotiation. b. Agreed to avoid withdrawing British AIOC personnel from Iran as long as possible. C. Avoided all mention of the ICJ ruling calling on Iran to permit AIOC to operate normally pending the outcome of negotiations. These concessions reveal a genuine desire on the part of both Iran and the UK to work out a settlement. Moreover, al- though neither Iran nor the UK have retreated from their basic positions, Harriman's discussions in Tehran and London have indicated that by patient negotiation ways may be found of reaching a settlement. However, if agreement is to be reached the following conditions will probably have to be met: a. Iran must have at least titular control of all oil operations within Iran. b. The company which operates the oil installations, even though a subsidiary of AIOC, must be registered as an Iranian company and its connection with AIOC must be disguised. C. British technicians under British management must continue to operate the oil installations. d. Iran must receive at least 50 percent of the profits from Iranian oil. - 2 - TOP SECRET

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Context sent to Scholar

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Page context
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nThe British Government:\na.\nFormally accepted the \"principle of national- -\nization\" of the Iranian oil industry as a basis\nfor negotiation.\nb.\nAgreed to avoid withdrawing British AIOC\npersonnel from Iran as long as possible.\nC.\nAvoided all mention of the ICJ ruling calling on\nIran to permit AIOC to operate normally pending\nthe outcome of negotiations.\nThese concessions reveal a genuine desire on the part of\nboth Iran and the UK to work out a settlement. Moreover, al-\nthough neither Iran nor the UK have retreated from their basic\npositions, Harriman's discussions in Tehran and London have\nindicated that by patient negotiation ways may be found of\nreaching a settlement. However, if agreement is to be reached\nthe following conditions will probably have to be met:\na.\nIran must have at least titular control of all oil\noperations within Iran.\nb.\nThe company which operates the oil installations,\neven though a subsidiary of AIOC, must be registered\nas an Iranian company and its connection with AIOC\nmust be disguised.\nC.\nBritish technicians under British management must\ncontinue to operate the oil installations.\nd.\nIran must receive at least 50 percent of the profits\nfrom Iranian oil.\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET"
}