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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
7
Stalin, might have saved the Chinese Na-
tive of a peaceful world. The postwar diffi-
creased trade and loans from the west for
tional Government. The inability of the
culties stem from the fact that Stalin did
the reconstruction of the terrible devasta-
Chinese National Government to maintain
not carry out his commitments and from
tion left in the wake of the war. If they
control over China was due to the fact that
the fact that the Soviet Union has failed to
had carried out this program, they would
the Sino-Soviet agreements were not hon-
live up to the Charter of the United Nations.
have had to soft pedal for the time at least
ored by Stalin, and to other factors which
Some people claim that we sold out to
the Communist designs for world domina-
have been dealt with before these commit-
the Soviet Union at Yalta. If this were
tion-much along the lines of the policies
tees in great detail.
true, it is difficult to understand why the
they had pursued between the two wars.
I do not believe that it would serve a
Soviet Union has gone to such lengths to
On the other hand, we had constant diffi-
useful purpose for me to discuss the sub-
violate the Yalta understandings. The fact
culties with them throughout the war and
sequent course of events in China, as they
is that these violations have been the basis
they treated us with great suspicion. More-
have been testified to at length in these
of our protests against Soviet actions since
over, there were indications that they would
hearings by others who had direct contact
the end of the war. There would have been
take advantage of the Red Army occupation
with these matters.
a sell-out if Roosevelt and Churchill had
of neighboring countries to maintain con-
In conclusion, I want to reemphasize the
failed to bend every effort to come to an un-
trol, and they were supporting Communist
objectives that President Roosevelt and
derstanding with the Soviet Union and had
Parties in other countries to be in a posi-
Prime Minister Churchill sought to achieve
permitted the Red Army to occupy vast areas,
tion to seize control in the postwar turmoil.
in their relations with the Soviet Union
without attempting to protect the interests
The Kremlin chose the second course. It
during the war.
of people in those areas.
is my belief that Stalin was influenced by
Only by keeping our military forces in
the hostile attitude of the peoples of East-
CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT AIMS
being after Germany and Japan surrendered
ern Europe toward the Red Army, and that
Their primary objective was to maintain
could we have attempted to compel the
he recognized that governments established
Russia as an effective fighting ally. This
Soviet Union to withdraw from the terri-
by free elections would not be "friendly" to
problem in itself gave grave concern, not
tory which it controlled and to live up to
the Soviet Union. In addition, I believe he
only as to the military capabilities of the
its commitments. The people of the United
became increasingly aware of the great op-
Soviet forces, but also as to whether the
States and the war-weary people of Europe
portunities for Soviet expansion in the post-
Kremlin would make separate arrangements
were in no mood to support such an under-
war economic chaos. After our rapid demo-
with Hitler and leave the Western Allies
taking. This country certainly erred in its
bilization, I do not think that he conceived
stranded. The building of mutual confi-
rapid demobilization in 1945, but this is an
that the United States would take the firm
dence in the conduct of the war was not an
error for which the entire American people
stand against Soviet aggression that we have
easy task. But the fact remains that Russia
must share the responsibility. I cannot be-
taken in the past 5 years.
was an effective fighting ally, and carried
lieve that anyone seriously thinks that the
The one great thing accomplished by our
out vital military undertakings against Hit-
move to bring the boys home could have
constant efforts during and since the war to
ler.
been stopped. I still recall my grave concern
reach a settlement with the Soviet Union
In addition, Roosevelt and Churchill
when I was in Moscow at the cold reception
is that we have firmly established our moral
sought to lay a foundation during the war
the Congress gave to President Truman's
position before the world. Had these efforts
for cooperation to maintain world peace by
recommendation for universal military train-
not been made, many people of the free world
all nations, including the Soviet Union, and
ing in the fall of 1945.
would still be wondering whether we and
to find solutions to specific problems which
The most difficult question to answer is
not the Kremlin were to blame for the ten-
would result from the war, particularly with
why Stalin took so many commitments
sions that have developed. The fact that
regard to the treatment of those countries
which he subsequently failed to honor.
the Soviet Union did not live up to its un-
which would be occupied by the Red Army.
There can be no clear answer to this ques-
dertakings made clear the duplicity and the
No one was under any illusions about the
tion. I believe that the Kremlin had two
aggressive designs of the Kremlin. This fact
difficulties that we would encounter. Never-
approaches to their postwar policies, and
has provided the rallying point for the free
theless, step by step, Soviet leaders sub-
in my many talks with Stalin I felt that he
world in their collective effort to build their
scribed to principles which culminated in
himself was of two minds. One approach
defenses and to unite against aggression.
the formation of the United Nations. They
emphasized reconstruction and development
W. A. HARRIMAN.
entered into agreements designed to dispose
of Russia, and the other external expansion.
Subscribed and sworn to this 13th day of
of many specific problems. The carrying out
On the one hand, they were discussing pos-
July 1951.
of these commitments would have gone a
sible understandings with us which would
PERCY E. NELSON,
long way toward achieving Roosevelt's objec-
lead to peaceful relations and result in in-
Notary Public.
965404-40209
U. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951
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"ocrText": "CONGRESSIONAL RECORD\n7\nStalin, might have saved the Chinese Na-\ntive of a peaceful world. The postwar diffi-\ncreased trade and loans from the west for\ntional Government. The inability of the\nculties stem from the fact that Stalin did\nthe reconstruction of the terrible devasta-\nChinese National Government to maintain\nnot carry out his commitments and from\ntion left in the wake of the war. If they\ncontrol over China was due to the fact that\nthe fact that the Soviet Union has failed to\nhad carried out this program, they would\nthe Sino-Soviet agreements were not hon-\nlive up to the Charter of the United Nations.\nhave had to soft pedal for the time at least\nored by Stalin, and to other factors which\nSome people claim that we sold out to\nthe Communist designs for world domina-\nhave been dealt with before these commit-\nthe Soviet Union at Yalta. If this were\ntion-much along the lines of the policies\ntees in great detail.\ntrue, it is difficult to understand why the\nthey had pursued between the two wars.\nI do not believe that it would serve a\nSoviet Union has gone to such lengths to\nOn the other hand, we had constant diffi-\nuseful purpose for me to discuss the sub-\nviolate the Yalta understandings. The fact\nculties with them throughout the war and\nsequent course of events in China, as they\nis that these violations have been the basis\nthey treated us with great suspicion. More-\nhave been testified to at length in these\nof our protests against Soviet actions since\nover, there were indications that they would\nhearings by others who had direct contact\nthe end of the war. There would have been\ntake advantage of the Red Army occupation\nwith these matters.\na sell-out if Roosevelt and Churchill had\nof neighboring countries to maintain con-\nIn conclusion, I want to reemphasize the\nfailed to bend every effort to come to an un-\ntrol, and they were supporting Communist\nobjectives that President Roosevelt and\nderstanding with the Soviet Union and had\nParties in other countries to be in a posi-\nPrime Minister Churchill sought to achieve\npermitted the Red Army to occupy vast areas,\ntion to seize control in the postwar turmoil.\nin their relations with the Soviet Union\nwithout attempting to protect the interests\nThe Kremlin chose the second course. It\nduring the war.\nof people in those areas.\nis my belief that Stalin was influenced by\nOnly by keeping our military forces in\nthe hostile attitude of the peoples of East-\nCHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT AIMS\nbeing after Germany and Japan surrendered\nern Europe toward the Red Army, and that\nTheir primary objective was to maintain\ncould we have attempted to compel the\nhe recognized that governments established\nRussia as an effective fighting ally. This\nSoviet Union to withdraw from the terri-\nby free elections would not be \"friendly\" to\nproblem in itself gave grave concern, not\ntory which it controlled and to live up to\nthe Soviet Union. In addition, I believe he\nonly as to the military capabilities of the\nits commitments. The people of the United\nbecame increasingly aware of the great op-\nSoviet forces, but also as to whether the\nStates and the war-weary people of Europe\nportunities for Soviet expansion in the post-\nKremlin would make separate arrangements\nwere in no mood to support such an under-\nwar economic chaos. After our rapid demo-\nwith Hitler and leave the Western Allies\ntaking. This country certainly erred in its\nbilization, I do not think that he conceived\nstranded. The building of mutual confi-\nrapid demobilization in 1945, but this is an\nthat the United States would take the firm\ndence in the conduct of the war was not an\nerror for which the entire American people\nstand against Soviet aggression that we have\neasy task. But the fact remains that Russia\nmust share the responsibility. I cannot be-\ntaken in the past 5 years.\nwas an effective fighting ally, and carried\nlieve that anyone seriously thinks that the\nThe one great thing accomplished by our\nout vital military undertakings against Hit-\nmove to bring the boys home could have\nconstant efforts during and since the war to\nler.\nbeen stopped. I still recall my grave concern\nreach a settlement with the Soviet Union\nIn addition, Roosevelt and Churchill\nwhen I was in Moscow at the cold reception\nis that we have firmly established our moral\nsought to lay a foundation during the war\nthe Congress gave to President Truman's\nposition before the world. Had these efforts\nfor cooperation to maintain world peace by\nrecommendation for universal military train-\nnot been made, many people of the free world\nall nations, including the Soviet Union, and\ning in the fall of 1945.\nwould still be wondering whether we and\nto find solutions to specific problems which\nThe most difficult question to answer is\nnot the Kremlin were to blame for the ten-\nwould result from the war, particularly with\nwhy Stalin took so many commitments\nsions that have developed. The fact that\nregard to the treatment of those countries\nwhich he subsequently failed to honor.\nthe Soviet Union did not live up to its un-\nwhich would be occupied by the Red Army.\nThere can be no clear answer to this ques-\ndertakings made clear the duplicity and the\nNo one was under any illusions about the\ntion. I believe that the Kremlin had two\naggressive designs of the Kremlin. This fact\ndifficulties that we would encounter. Never-\napproaches to their postwar policies, and\nhas provided the rallying point for the free\ntheless, step by step, Soviet leaders sub-\nin my many talks with Stalin I felt that he\nworld in their collective effort to build their\nscribed to principles which culminated in\nhimself was of two minds. One approach\ndefenses and to unite against aggression.\nthe formation of the United Nations. They\nemphasized reconstruction and development\nW. A. HARRIMAN.\nentered into agreements designed to dispose\nof Russia, and the other external expansion.\nSubscribed and sworn to this 13th day of\nof many specific problems. The carrying out\nOn the one hand, they were discussing pos-\nJuly 1951.\nof these commitments would have gone a\nsible understandings with us which would\nPERCY E. NELSON,\nlong way toward achieving Roosevelt's objec-\nlead to peaceful relations and result in in-\nNotary Public.\n965404-40209\nU. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951"
}