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other port of comparable usefulness. The Turks regard the Gulf of
Iskenderun as essential to the defense of Southern Turkey, and believe
that Syria is neither strong enough nor reliable enough to maintain se-
curity in this area. They also fear that acceptance of the Syrian
claims might establish a dangerous precedent and thus serve to rein-
force Soviet claims against northeastern Turkey.
An amicable settlement of the potentially dangerous Hatay
problem would be a great contribution to the political stability of
the Near East. The likelihood of a compromise appears remote, how-
ever, because Turkey refuses even to discuss the question of sover-
eignty while existing nationalistic sentiment in Syria probably will
not allow the Syrian Government to negotiate on any basis which im-
plies acknowledgment of Turkish rights. The Turks are willing to con-
sider minor frontier rectifications and the concession of port facili-
ties in Iskenderun harbor. If the two countries could meet in a
friendly atmosphere, it is possible that, by using these considerations
as a basis for discussion, they might find a satisfactory solution. If,
on the other hand, the Syrians do appeal, for example, to the Security
Council, they can probably count not only on the support of Arab states,
which naturally side with Syria in the dispute, but also on that of the
USSR and its satellites. Under these conditions, Western support of
Turkey will alienate the Arab states, while support of Syria will weaken
Turkish morale and resistance to the USSR. This dilemma would be averted
if the raising of the Hatay issue could be postponed until the volatile
feelings of the young nationalistic Syrian state have subsided, permit-
ting a calmer atmosphere for bilateral discussion.
Further discussion of the Hatay question is contained in the
Enclosure hereto.
- 2 -
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"ocrText": "other port of comparable usefulness. The Turks regard the Gulf of\nIskenderun as essential to the defense of Southern Turkey, and believe\nthat Syria is neither strong enough nor reliable enough to maintain se-\ncurity in this area. They also fear that acceptance of the Syrian\nclaims might establish a dangerous precedent and thus serve to rein-\nforce Soviet claims against northeastern Turkey.\nAn amicable settlement of the potentially dangerous Hatay\nproblem would be a great contribution to the political stability of\nthe Near East. The likelihood of a compromise appears remote, how-\never, because Turkey refuses even to discuss the question of sover-\neignty while existing nationalistic sentiment in Syria probably will\nnot allow the Syrian Government to negotiate on any basis which im-\nplies acknowledgment of Turkish rights. The Turks are willing to con-\nsider minor frontier rectifications and the concession of port facili-\nties in Iskenderun harbor. If the two countries could meet in a\nfriendly atmosphere, it is possible that, by using these considerations\nas a basis for discussion, they might find a satisfactory solution. If,\non the other hand, the Syrians do appeal, for example, to the Security\nCouncil, they can probably count not only on the support of Arab states,\nwhich naturally side with Syria in the dispute, but also on that of the\nUSSR and its satellites. Under these conditions, Western support of\nTurkey will alienate the Arab states, while support of Syria will weaken\nTurkish morale and resistance to the USSR. This dilemma would be averted\nif the raising of the Hatay issue could be postponed until the volatile\nfeelings of the young nationalistic Syrian state have subsided, permit-\nting a calmer atmosphere for bilateral discussion.\nFurther discussion of the Hatay question is contained in the\nEnclosure hereto.\n- 2 -"
}