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ORE 16
10 APRIL 1947
COPY NO. 1
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA *
The Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable
conflict with the capitalist world. It therefore
seeks to increase its relative power by building up
its own strength and undermining that of its assumed
antagonists.
In Latin America, in particular,
Soviet and Communist influence will be exerted to
the utmost to destroy the influence of the United
States and to create antagonisms disruptive to the
Pan American system.
CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING SOVIET OBJECTIVES.
The pattern of Soviet objectives in Latin America differs sharply
from that in other areas because of the following four considerations,
which are to a varying extent peculiar to this area:
a. Latin America as a whole lies within striking distance
of US naval and air power, and could be shut off from the outside
world by a US naval blockade. The Latin American Republics there-
fore cannot be of much use to the USSR, either as military allies
or as sources of supply, in any future war.
b. The USSR has nothing to gain by integrating its economy
with that of Latin America as long-term commercial exchange ar-
rangements would oblige it to do. This is only in small part be-
cause Soviet and Latin American import requirements and export
surpluses do not dovetail. The imaginative and resourceful So-
viet state trading agency could, by careful manipulation of three-
cornered trade, make them dovetail, especially since it could in-
clude in its calculations the import requirements and export sur-
pluses of the satellite powers with their highly variegated eco-
nomic resources. The USSR, however, must assume that large-scale
Soviet trade arrangements involving Latin America's strategic ma-
terials would elicit an immediate and effective answer from the
US. Moreover, the post-war USSR realizes that it is not in a
This report has the concurrence of the intelligence agencies of
the War and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces. A state-
ment of dissent by the Department of State is contained in Enclos-
ure "A" hereto.
ORE 1, "Soviet Foreign and Military Policy."
the
ARCHUSES
SERVICE
- 1 -
C.S.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "ORE 16\n10 APRIL 1947\nCOPY NO. 1\nSOVIET OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA *\nThe Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable\nconflict with the capitalist world. It therefore\nseeks to increase its relative power by building up\nits own strength and undermining that of its assumed\nantagonists.\nIn Latin America, in particular,\nSoviet and Communist influence will be exerted to\nthe utmost to destroy the influence of the United\nStates and to create antagonisms disruptive to the\nPan American system.\nCONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING SOVIET OBJECTIVES.\nThe pattern of Soviet objectives in Latin America differs sharply\nfrom that in other areas because of the following four considerations,\nwhich are to a varying extent peculiar to this area:\na. Latin America as a whole lies within striking distance\nof US naval and air power, and could be shut off from the outside\nworld by a US naval blockade. The Latin American Republics there-\nfore cannot be of much use to the USSR, either as military allies\nor as sources of supply, in any future war.\nb. The USSR has nothing to gain by integrating its economy\nwith that of Latin America as long-term commercial exchange ar-\nrangements would oblige it to do. This is only in small part be-\ncause Soviet and Latin American import requirements and export\nsurpluses do not dovetail. The imaginative and resourceful So-\nviet state trading agency could, by careful manipulation of three-\ncornered trade, make them dovetail, especially since it could in-\nclude in its calculations the import requirements and export sur-\npluses of the satellite powers with their highly variegated eco-\nnomic resources. The USSR, however, must assume that large-scale\nSoviet trade arrangements involving Latin America's strategic ma-\nterials would elicit an immediate and effective answer from the\nUS. Moreover, the post-war USSR realizes that it is not in a\nThis report has the concurrence of the intelligence agencies of\nthe War and Navy Departments and of the Army Air Forces. A state-\nment of dissent by the Department of State is contained in Enclos-\nure \"A\" hereto.\nORE 1, \"Soviet Foreign and Military Policy.\"\nthe\nARCHUSES\nSERVICE\n- 1 -\nC.S.\nSECRET"
}