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Linggadjati Agreenent. Tho Dutch intorprotations strossed that the Nothor-- lands would renain the soveroign power in the Indios until the establishent of the USI, and that the Nothorlands would naintain adequate military power there until satisfactory guarantees for the continuation of Dutch interests were socurod. While the cease-fire order was finally issued effective 16 Febru-- ary 1947, the Republic steadfastly refused to be bound by Dutch interpreta- tions, mintaining that the Republic would recognize only the articles of the Agreement itself and the official correspondence between the two dele- gations. Indonesian opposition to the Linggadjati Agreement increased steadily after the initiolling of the Draft Agreement, as a result of bit- ter fighting between Dutch and Indonesian forces and of Dutch insistence on Republic adherence to their interpretations. In order to forestall rejec- tion of the Agreoment by the Republic's provisional parliament, the KNIP, Prosident Soekarno issued a presidential decreo increasing the membership of that body with representatives selected from political parties nore fa- vorably disposed to the Agreement. This nove aroused considerable debate and was finally passed only undor the threat of rosignation by Prosident Sockarno and Vico-Prosident Hatta. Final approval of the Linggadjati Agreo- ment was givon by the KNIP on 5 March 1947 in a vote of confidence in the government's policies from which the influontial Nationalist and Masjocni (Moslem) Parties abstained. The deadlock over the inclusion of the Dutch intorpretations had been brokon by a letter on 2 March 1947 from the Chairman of the Comission- General to Promier Sjahrir indicating that the Notherlands Govornment did not intend to commit the Republic to these intorpretations and that the right of the Republic to nako its own intorpretations was cloarly under- stood. This was accepted by Sjahrir on 16 March 1947 and signatures were finally affixed to the Linggadjati Agreement on 25 March 1947, and a joint economic committee was innediately established to inploment the economic provisions in the Agroement. 2. Remaining Issues a. The Basic Issue of Sovoroignty The signing of the Linggadjati Agreement left unsettled many issues in Dutch-Indonesian relations. The nost important disagreement, which con- plicates the resolution of all other issues, is on the question of sove- reignty. Proninent Indonesian leaders now regard the Republic as an inde- pendent state, claining that Dutch de facto recognition of Republicon au- thority in Java, Madura, and Sunatra (see Appendix A, Article I) amounts to recognition of sovereignty. The Dutch, on the other hand, have empha- sized that the bosic sovereign entity envisioned for the Indies in the - 5 -

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    "ocrText": "Linggadjati Agreenent. Tho Dutch intorprotations strossed that the Nothor--\nlands would renain the soveroign power in the Indios until the establishent\nof the USI, and that the Nothorlands would naintain adequate military power\nthere until satisfactory guarantees for the continuation of Dutch interests\nwere socurod.\nWhile the cease-fire order was finally issued effective 16 Febru--\nary 1947, the Republic steadfastly refused to be bound by Dutch interpreta-\ntions, mintaining that the Republic would recognize only the articles of\nthe Agreement itself and the official correspondence between the two dele-\ngations. Indonesian opposition to the Linggadjati Agreement increased\nsteadily after the initiolling of the Draft Agreement, as a result of bit-\nter fighting between Dutch and Indonesian forces and of Dutch insistence on\nRepublic adherence to their interpretations. In order to forestall rejec-\ntion of the Agreoment by the Republic's provisional parliament, the KNIP,\nProsident Soekarno issued a presidential decreo increasing the membership\nof that body with representatives selected from political parties nore fa-\nvorably disposed to the Agreement. This nove aroused considerable debate\nand was finally passed only undor the threat of rosignation by Prosident\nSockarno and Vico-Prosident Hatta. Final approval of the Linggadjati Agreo-\nment was givon by the KNIP on 5 March 1947 in a vote of confidence in the\ngovernment's policies from which the influontial Nationalist and Masjocni\n(Moslem) Parties abstained.\nThe deadlock over the inclusion of the Dutch intorpretations had\nbeen brokon by a letter on 2 March 1947 from the Chairman of the Comission-\nGeneral to Promier Sjahrir indicating that the Notherlands Govornment did\nnot intend to commit the Republic to these intorpretations and that the\nright of the Republic to nako its own intorpretations was cloarly under-\nstood. This was accepted by Sjahrir on 16 March 1947 and signatures were\nfinally affixed to the Linggadjati Agreement on 25 March 1947, and a joint\neconomic committee was innediately established to inploment the economic\nprovisions in the Agroement.\n2. Remaining Issues\na. The Basic Issue of Sovoroignty\nThe signing of the Linggadjati Agreement left unsettled many issues\nin Dutch-Indonesian relations. The nost important disagreement, which con-\nplicates the resolution of all other issues, is on the question of sove-\nreignty. Proninent Indonesian leaders now regard the Republic as an inde-\npendent state, claining that Dutch de facto recognition of Republicon au-\nthority in Java, Madura, and Sunatra (see Appendix A, Article I) amounts\nto recognition of sovereignty. The Dutch, on the other hand, have empha-\nsized that the bosic sovereign entity envisioned for the Indies in the\n- 5 -"
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