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    "ocrText": "106198\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP\nSIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS\nREGARDING THE DISPOSITION OF THE\nITALIAN AFRICAN COLONIES\nBARRY\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\n: SERVICE:\nORE 39\n25 July 1947\nCopy No. 1\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or 18\nc. 6-13-78\nBel HLT- HC. MARS Date 7-2-74\n\"This document contains information affecting the na-\ntional defense of the United States within the meaning of\nthe Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its\ntransmission or the revelation of its contents in any\nmanner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.\"\nORE 39\n25 July 1947\nCOPY NO.\nSIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE\nDISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN AFRICAN COLONIES\nThe conflict of interests in Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland\nmakes the ultimate disposition of those colonies one of the most complex of\nthe problems on which agreement is being sought by the USSR, the UK, the US,\nand France. The possible repercussions of this conflict will be of long-range\nimportance.\nEach of the Big Four has broad political and economic objectives in\nMediterranean Africa and the Near East. The capabilities of the Big Four for\nattaining their respective objectives depend importantly on what ultimate dis-\nposition is made of the Italian African colonies. Important as is this aspect\nof the matter, the Italian colonial issue is also part of a more important is-\nsue: the future political orientation of the Italian State. (An attending de-\npendent issue, which will also affect the tactics of concerned states in\nstriving for preferred positions in the Italian colonies, is the outcome of\nBig Four efforts to implement the Italian Treaty provisions for the adminis-\ntration of Trieste.)\nThe relative urgency of the over-all Italian issue relegates the\nspecific issue of the disposition of the Italian colonies to subsidiary\nstatus, not because the latter is unimportant, but because the sequence of\nfuture developments in Italy will in part govern the stand taken by the Big\nFour Powers in their efforts to dispose of the colonies. Because the nature\nof future developments in Italy is presently obscure, Big Four tactics de-\nsigned to further respective broad objectives by capitalizing on the Italian\ncolonial issue are still in part unformulated. Therefore, while it is pos-\nsible to consider significant aspects attending the disposition of the Ital-\nian African colonies, their interdependence with developments in Italy must\nconstantly be kept in mind.\nThe immediate significance of the Italian African colonies to the\nsecurity of the US lies in the fact that their disposition has important im-\nplications affecting the present critical relations between the Soviet Union\nand the Western Powers. From a long-range point of view, however:, the col-\nonies are important to US security because of their proximity to the stra-\ntegic Near East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean areas, where the accom-\nplishment of US objectives requires administrations which are stable and\nfavorably disposed toward the US.\nPolitically, the attainment of these conditions depends on the es-\ntablishment or continuance in power of politics in the Near East which will\nsupport the Western Powers now represented in this area, while providing for\nthe orderly recognition of the legitimate aspirations of native elements.\n- 1 -\nA corollary of this is the exclusion from the Near East and contiguous ter-\nritory of any power which desires instability or seeks to alienate elements\npresently neutral or favorably disposed to the Western Powers. The only\nmajor power with present intentions to exploit potential threats to the\nsecurity of the Western Powers is the USSR; and Soviet capabilities for cre-\nating instability in the Middle East depend to a considerable extent on the\nopportunities arising from the disposition of the Italian African colonies.\nThe security of the US can be threatened by the adverse reaction of\nstates or groups who feel that their legitimate interests have not been prop-\nerly safeguarded in any agreement to dispose of the colonies. Arab resent-\nment of British and French efforts to perpetuate a policy of imperialism (ag-\ngravated by the US stand on the Palestine problem) nurtures a situation with\ninherently explosive characteristics, which could result in local uprisings\nagainst the Western Powers. The Arab League could be expected to give tacit\nsupport to such local uprisings, and non-self-governing territories, particu-\nlarly those predominantly Moslem, could be expected to respond to Arab leader-\nship by intensifying already existing efforts by local nationalist movements\nto throw off foreign rule.\nA disposition of the colonies which would reinforce the British and\nFrench positions would also (1) weaken the United Nations to the extent that,\nsubsequent to the peace settlement, the colonies were not brought under the\nInternational Trusteeship System as clearly contemplated by the UN Charter,\nand (2) be construed, by non-colonial powers and non-self-governing groups,\nas a breach of international commitments regarding the welfare of native pop-\nulations. On the other hand, an agreement providing for immediate or near-\nfuture independence for the colonies would jeopardize US objectives by fur-\nther weakening the position of the UK and France. Moreover, a disposition of\nthe colonies in which Italy would have no participation would weaken the pres-\nent anti-Communist Italian Government at a time when the US seeks to strengthen\nit by political and economic assistance.\nEconomically, the Italian African colonies per se have no signifi-\ncance with respect to US security. Indirectly, by providing a minor outlet\nfor Italian emigrants and a limited opportunity for foreign trade, Libya could\nbe used as an instrument to advance US economic objectives in Italy.\nMilitarily, the Italian African colonies are of importance to US\nsecurity by reason of their location, but a condition of the use of the col-\nonies for military purposes is the protection of lines of communication to\nthese areas from a military power capable of aggressive warfare. Occupying a\ncentral position in North Africa, Libya has an extensive, irregular coastline\non the Mediterranean (with one major and two minor ports), and vast desert\nstretches which separate Egypt from Northwest Africa and make Libya difficult\nof access from the south. The establishment of land, sea, and air bases in\nLibya by a power capable of aggressive warfare would either constitute a\nthreat to French interests in Algeria and Tunisia, to British interests in\nthe Mediterranean, to Italy, to Egypt and the Suez Canal, to Greece, and to\n- 2 -\nTurkey, or would place the occupying power in a position to afford some de-\ngree of protection to these same areas. Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, by\ncontrast, are isolated from the Mediterranean and Middle East areas and their\nremote location precludes attaching to them any importance in possible mili-\ntary operations in Northwest Africa. However, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea,\nas well as Libya, flank the lines of communication by sea or air between\nSoutheast Asia and the countries of Western Europe. In addition, Somaliland\nand Eritrea would, in the hands of a military power capable of aggressive war-\nfare, threaten the security of Ethiopia, the British and French Somalilands,\nthe Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and Kenya (the latter a focal point in British plans\nfor an African defense system subsequent to British withdrawal from Egypt).\nBritish and French objectives in the North Africa-Near East area are\nnot dissimilar, and, except for traditional tendencies to take whatever steps\nare necessary to maintain the status quo, the aims of these governments are\nnot contrary to US aims. The UK and France now realize that their respective\npositions with regard to non-self-governing territories can be materially im-\nproved by mutual support. The UK seeks to offset loss of influence and con-\ntrol in Egypt and Palestine by strengthening its position in East Africa and\nin Libya. France seeks to avert any uprising in French North Africa, and\nalso resists any attempts to weaken its colonial position relative to that\nof the UK; hence French opposition to any disposition of Libya favoring na-\ntive independence, and French reluctance to support a plan providing for\nparamount British participation in administration of the Italian colonies.\nIn any case the French chiefly fear any radical change in status of the North\nAfrican colonies as a precedent damaging to France: hence the strong French\nsupport of Italy's claim to its pre-war colonies.\nItalian aims are based on the need of the present administration to\nuse all possible means of achieving political stability and economic rehabil-\nitation within Italy. The contributions toward these objectives resulting\nfrom a return of the Italian colonies to Italy, either outright or as a UN\ntrusteeship, are envisaged by the Italian Government to be (1) a rise in the\nnational prestige, strengthening Italy's position in its foreign relations;\n(2) a rise in popular morale, which was brought to a low ebb by what Italians\nconsidered a harsh peace; and (3) an increase in opportunities, however lim-\nited, for strengthening the nation's economy. While a return of the colonies\nto Italy (or the designation of Italy as administering authority of a trust\nterritory under the UN) would make a definite contribution to Italian morale\nand political stability, this consideration will probably not be decisive\nin maintaining the present anti-Communist administration in Italy. To bar\nItaly from participation would, however, nullify to some extent the gains re-\nsulting from US assistance by other means.\nIn contrast to Italian aims, the Arab League seeks to strengthen\nitself by securing independence for all Arab states now under foreign rule,\nincluding Libya. While the Arab League has made positive demands with regard\nto the disposition of the Italian colonies, it has to an even greater degree\nstressed its opposition to the reestablishment of Italian colonial control,\n- 3\nor the creation of a trusteeship administered by non-Arab powers. The Arab\nLeague probably estimates that the return of the colonies to Italian control\ndeserves its most militant opposition because (1) it represents a probable\ncompromise in view of possible inability of the Western Powers to secure So-\nviet approval to an agreement favoring Western colonial powers to the exclu-\nsion of the USSR; and of probable reluctance by the Western Powers to agree\nto a form of trusteeship in which Soviet participation could threaten their\nobjectives; (2) the League believes that a reversion of the colonies to Ital-\nian control, among the possible alternatives, gives the least promise of a\ndemarche leading to ultimate independence for the colonies.\nSoviet objectives in the Near and Middle East and in the Mediter-\nranean area have been and can again be advanced by using the Italian colonies\nissue (1) as a bargaining point to gain concessions from the Western Powers\nin other areas (e.g., the Trieste negotiations) (2) to extend Soviet influ-\nence into the Mediterranean and African areas; or (3) at minimum, to create\nconditions of instability both in the Moslem world and in Italy.\nIn the face of the need for resolving the conflict of interests\namong the Western Powers and the Arab states, the USSR can be counted upon to\nfavor a course of action in which the potentials for instability are inherent.\nThere are indications that the USSR has not yet decided which course this is\nto be. The failure of the USSR to join the UN Trusteeship Council is diffi-\ncult to reconcile with the Soviet proposal that each Italian colony be placed\nunder a ten-year joint trusteeship of one of the Big Four Powers and Italy,\nor with the Soviet agreement that, in case of deadlock in the Big Four, it\nwill accept the recommendation of the UN General Assembly (where the USSR\ndoes not have veto power).\nThe USSR probably estimates that the US, the UK, and France will not\nagree to any disposition of the Italian colonies which would permit the USSR\na free hand in one of the Italian colonies, for the intrusion in the Mediter-\nranean or Red Sea area of a new major world power would constitute a major\nthreat to the security of all three of these powers. The USSR hopes to use\nthe Italian colonial issue to advance its cause as a champion of the native\npeoples in non-self-governing territories by placing upon the US, the UK, and\nFrance the onus for failure to give independence to the native population, or\nfor failure to permit the realization of Arab League aspirations. Depending\non the course of negotiations among the Big Four over the Italian colonies,\nthe USSR also hopes to discredit the present Italian regime by attributing a\nBig Four failure to return the colonies to Italy to lack of international\nconfidence in Italy's future under moderate leadership. Furthermore, the\nUSSR must reserve a position favorable to Italian participation in the col-\nonies in order to gain additional popular support for the return of Communists\nto the Italian Government. Thus the Communists would be quick to claim credit\nfor any agreement under which Italy would be permitted a substantial degree of\nparticipation in the future of the colonies, while assuring for themselves\ncontrol of the colonies if Italy becomes a Communist state. On the other hand,\nshould an anti-Communist government survive in Italy, Italian participation in\nthe control of the colonies would provide the Soviet Union with a much desired\n4\nopportunity to conduct a sub rosa campaign among non-self-governing peoples\nagainst the \"bourgeois imperialists of the West\".\nIn view of the above considerations, it is estimated that the USSR\nis now in an apparently strong position to achieve political gains, no matter\nwhat ultimate disposition is made of the Italian colonies. But the USSR can\nnot presently profitably espouse either the Italian Communist or the Arab\nstates to join an issue which is relatively a minor one when compared to the\nmaj or issue: the future political complexion of the Italian state. Signifi-\ncant interdependent factors in this major issue are the ratification of the\nItalian Peace Treaty and the Marshall aid program for Europe, the latter of\nwhich has increased Soviet reluctance to ratify any of the peace treaties un-\ntil Soviet control of satellite countries has been firmly established.\nIf it is assumed that the fate of Italy can be settled under con-\ndit.ons which will permit an eventual implementation of the present Italian\nTreaty and a continuation of active participation by the USSR in UN affairs,\nthe USSR will seek to resolve the Italian colonial issue by compromise within\nthe Council of Foreign Ministers, thus avoiding any prolonged debate in the\nUN General Assembly subsequent to the referral of the issue to that body by\nthe Big Four.\nIf it cannot be assumed that the Italian Treaty will be ratified\nand that Soviet participation in UN activities will continue, the Italian\nAfrican colonies in terms of their effect on US security will be relatively\nunimportant, and their disposition determined without reference to Soviet\ndemands, but in the light of the then existing positions of the Western\nPowers.\nAdditional information concerning the Italian African colonies is\ncontained in the following Enclosures hereto:\nEnclosure A - Present Status of the Italian African Colonies\nEnclosure B - Proposals for Disposition\nEnclosure C - Background in Brief\nEnclosure D - Selective Bibliography\n5 1 I\nENCLOSURE A\nPRESENT STATUS OF THE ITALIAN AFRICAN COLONIES\nThe Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea, and Somaliland are at pres-\nent administered by the British forces in occupation. A portion of Libya\n(the Fezzan) is administered by a de facto French military administration.\nProvisions for their ultimate disposal are contained in the Treaty\nof Peace with Italy (dated 10 February 1947), in which Italy renounces all\nright and title to the colonies. The USSR, the UK, the US, and France are\ncommitted jointly to determine the final disposal of the colonies within one\nyear from the coming into force of the Treaty immediately upon the deposit\nof the instruments of ratification by the Big Four). Disposal is to be made\n\"in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests\nof peace and security, taking into consideration the views of the interested\ngovernments\". If the Four Powers are unable to agree within the specified\ntime, \"the matter shall be referred to the General Assembly of the United\nNations for a recommendation, and the Four Powers agree to accept the recom-\nmendation and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it\".\nTo date the US, the UK, and France have ratified the Treaty, but\nhave not deposited the ratifying instruments. On 31 July, the Constituent\nAssembly voted approval of ratification by the Italian Government, provided\nsuch action followed ratification by all the Big Four Powers. The USSR has\nnot ratified the Treaty, and favors delaying the deposit of the instruments\nof ratification until all signatories are ready to deposit ratifications of\nthe peace treaties for Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland--a procedure\nwhich might delay entry into force of the Italian treaty for an indefinite\nperiod.\n- 6\nENCLOSURE B\nPROPOSALS FOR DISPOSITION\n1. LIBYA.\nLibya's importance in world strategy was clearly demonstrated in 1940-43,\nand in any future operations on a similar scale the major powers would realize\nthe importance of the control of Libya and the need of denying it to hostile\npowers. Since Libya is of small importance economically, the strategic con-\nsideration is the main motive in present negotiations.\nThe powers must also keep in mind the effect the ultimate disposition of\nthe colonies will have on public opinion in Italy, the Arab States, the colo-\nnies themselves, and in other non-self-governing areas, notably French North\nAfrica. Although Italy profited strategically, it never really profited eco-\nnomically by its possession of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland; hence the loss\nof these territories would provoke but limited resentment in Italy. Libya,\nhowever, was of some actual importance to the Italians, and its loss would\noccasion intense general resentment. Should the USSR support Italian claims\nand they should be denied, the USSR could be counted on to exploit this re-\nsentment. Any gesture of support for the Arab States would help build up\nArab good will. The aspirations of natives and European residents, particu-\nlarly in Libya, must be taken into consideration in view of the present insta-\nbility of the populations and the efforts of Communists to exploit discontent.\nThough Italy, by signing the peace treaty on 10 February 1947, renounced\nits right to its colonies,* the Italian Government has requested a trustee-\nship over them, basing the case on the fact that Italy was subsequently ac-\ncorded co-belligerent status by the Allies; that all three colonies were\nacquired before the rise of Fascism: that Libya before the war had become an\nintegral part of Italian economy: that the colonies were developed through\nItalian effort; and that many Italians have migrated there.\nThe French support the Italian claim as the best solution from their own\npoint of view. The French are keenly aware that any settlement in Libya will\naffect the situation in French North Africa, where there is at present a\nstrong independence movement promoted in part, but not consistently, by Com-\nmunist agents. If Libya were granted independence as the British at one time\nproposed, the agitation for a similar status in French North Africa would be\ndangerously aggravated. Even the provision in the US trusteeship proposal\nthat allows for independence in ten years would give an encouragement to the\nnatives in French North Africa.\nEqually unpalatable to the French would be any of the various Arab propos-\nals such as an Egyptian or an Arab League protectorate. Any such solution\nSee Article 23 of Italian Peace Treaty.\n- 7\nwould encourage the Arabs in French North Africa to end French control.\nIn general, the French would prefer control by a European colonial power\n--the Italians rather than the British because the French oppose any great ex-\ntension of British power in Africa. The French intention is to get some advan-\ntage in the Fezzan area of Libya, in addition to the clear recognition that the\nboundaries of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa with Libya (and\nof French Somaliland with Eritrea), are those preceding the January 1935 agree-\nment between Laval and Mussolini.\nBritish interest in Libya centers in Cyrenaica, which would make a substi-\ntute British base for those about to be abandoned in Egypt and Palestine.\nBritain's first proposal was for a division of the colony into its component\nparts, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, each to have a separate trusteeship. Then\nthe British supported the US proposal for a collective UN trusteeship over\nLibya. But in April 1946 the British abandoned this position and recommended\nimmediate independence for a united Libya. The next month, however, the Brit-\nish agreed to a possible Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania, if the UK were\ngranted a trusteeship over Cyrenaica. Recently it was reported that the UK\ngeneral staff is demanding bases in Cyrenaica as vital to current British mil-\nitary plans for Africa. It is expected therefore that the British may again\npropose a divided Libya. The British have steadily opposed Italian trustee-\nship, in part because of their wartime pledges to the Senussi in Cyrenaica\nthat the Italians would never again return to control.\nThe USSR would favor any plan that would mean an immediate or an eventual\nSoviet share in the control of Libya. With this in view, they have favored a\ndivided Libya with an individual trusteeship for themselves over Tripolitania.\nThey have also proposed a joint trusteeship with Italy over Tripolitania, while\none of the other powers took a joint trusteeship with Italy over Cyrenaica.\nLater the USSR supported the French proposal for Italian trusteeship over Libya.\nEgypt has presented territorial claims to parts of Libya and has proposed\na plebiscite to ascertain whether the people of Libya would prefer to become\nindependent, or to become an integral or an autonomous part of Egypt. Egypt\nalso proposed that, if independence were impossible, Egypt or the Arab League\nbe designated the administering authority, but full independence for Libya may\nbe assumed as Egypt's first choice. The Arab League supports Egypt.\nThe US has consistently supported a proposal which is essentially the same\nfor all three colonies, involving multiple trusteeships. In the case of Libya,\nthe Administrator of the trusteeship would be appointed by and be responsible\nto the Trusteeship Council of the UN and would be advised by a committee con-\nsisting of members from the US, USSR, UK, France, and Italy, as well as a na-\ntive and a European inhabitant. After ten years, Libya would become indepen-\ndent.\n- 8\nII. ERITREA.\nEconomically, Eritrea was a liability to Italy before the war, and there\nis no prospect that it will ever become any more valuable to a colonial power\nas a place of settlement, as much of it is virtually unfit for white men.\nIts position on the Red Sea and in proximity to the Near East, however, must\nbe given careful consideration.\nThe USSR and US have put forward multiple trusteeship plans for Eritrea,\nthat of the US being identical with its proposal for Libya with the exception\nthat a territorial cession would be made giving Ethiopia access to the sea\nthrough the port of Assab. The original Soviet plan was also for a multiple\ntrusteeship, but the administrator would be appointed by \"one of the four\npowers\", and his deputy by the Italian Government. The Soviets now back the\nFrench plan for an individual Italian trusteeship. The first of the Soviet\nplans would obviously put the Soviets in position to exercise some, and pos-\nsibly considerable, control of the management of Eritrea; and the latter, if\nSoviet designs succeeded in Italy, would mean full control of the colony for\nthe USSR. (The Soviets have shown an increased tendency to back Italian\ntrusteeship for all the colonies.)\nThe British have generally supported the US trusteeship proposal and have\nbeen particularly strong in opposition to the French stand favoring Italian\ntrusteeship. Specifically, however, the British support the Ethiopian claim\nto a \"greater part\" of Eritrea.\nThe Eritrean situation has been further complicated by the territorial\nclaims of Egypt and Ethiopia. The Egyptians advance historical claims to\nMassawa and Eritrean territory contiguous to the Sudan, on the basis of which\nthey believe it should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Anglo-Egyptian\nSudan. More important are the claims of Ethiopia, based on past possession of\nthe territory, ethnic similarities, and the righting of an old wrong done\nEthiopia by the Italians. At the Paris Peace Conference, Ethiopia had the\nsupport of Canada, Yugoslavia, China, and India in its claims. It is recog-\nnized that the addition of this territory would strengthen Ethiopia as a mem-\nber of the UN.\nIII. ITALIAN SOMALILAND.\nStrategic and economic considerations in respect to Italian Somaliland\ndo not differ materially from those affecting Eritrea.\nIn general, the US has consistently supported multiple trusteeship,\nthough for Italian Somaliland there is no time limit or guarantee of eventual\nindependence.\nThe British, while at first supporting the US plan, later brought forward\ntheir own proposal for a united Somaliland, including the Italian and British\nsection and the Ethiopian Ogaden, all under a UK trusteeship.\n- 9 -\nFailing to gain support for this plan, the British apparently abandoned\ntheir plan for Greater Somalia. British plans in East Africa depend on the\nfuture status of Cyrenaica. If the disposition of Cyrenaica makes it possible\nfor the British to retain their position in the Mediterranean, then the neces-\nsity for developing their interests in Italian East Africa will be mitigated.\nHowever, if the disposition of Cyrenaica does not make it possible to retain\ntheir Mediterranean line and a shift to East Africa becomes necessary, the\nBritish may seriously consider reviving the Greater Somalia scheme or assuming\ntrusteeship over Italian Somaliland.\nFrance and the USSR have favored return to Italian trusteeship.\nEthiopia objects to any trusteeship, including that under the British\nplan, and has advanced territorial claims to the colony.\n- 10 -\nENCLOSURE C\nBACKGROUND IN BRIEF\nI. LIBYA.\n1. Physical Characteristics.\nLibya, located on the south coast of the Mediterranean Sea between\nEgypt and Tunisia on the Mediterranean-Far East supply route, has an area of\n390,000 square miles (six times that of Italy). Its value is in its strategic\nposition and relatively good harbor facilities, since economically it has only\nvery limited agricultural resources, with no known important mineral deposits.\nLibya is divided into three regions, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Libyan\ndesert, including Kufra. Since 80% of the total area is non-productive, pos-\nsibilities for settlement are limited. Of the 78,000 square miles of produc-\ntive area, 58,500 square miles is arid grazing land unsuitable for any other\npurpose; 17,000 square miles used for grazing and uncertain crops of barley in\nscattered patches: and 2,500 square miles suitable for static farming. Such\nfarming is limited to the coastal strips of Tripoli-Misurata, and the plateau\nof Cyrenaica, which are separated by the 400-mile wide strip of desert south\nof the Gulf of Sirte. Owing to the scant rainfall and the geological struc-\nture of the country, water supplies are poor: surface water is almost non-\nexistent, and there are no rivers. Hence development of irrigation is limited.\n2. Population Characteristics.\nThe total population of Libya is 1,061,000, concentrated almost entirely\n(80%) in the productive coastal areas, and decreasing from north to south into\nthe desert. The coastal strip includes the five largest towns, Tripoli, Homs,\nMisurata, Benghasi and Derna, and most of the foreign population. About one-\nthird of the total population is urban and two-thirds rural. Only a very small\nproportion is nomadic. (Even in the southern district of Fezzan there are ap-\nproximately 25,000 settled inhabitants as against 5,000 nomad. ) The Jewish pop-\nulation has been established for generations. The Italian population reached\nits peak (65,000) in 1940.\nPopulation (1946)\nArea\nArab and Berber\nJews\nItalians\nTotal\nMoslems\nTripolitania\n690,000\n26,000\n38,000\n754,000\nCyrenaica\n254,000\n5,000\n---\n259,000\nLibyan Desert\n48,000 (1936)\n---\n---\n48,000\nTOTAL\n992,000\n31,000\n38,000\n1,061,000\n- 11 -\n3. Recent Developments.\nPrior to Italian acquisition in 1912, Libya, from the 16th century on,\nwas under Ottoman administration.\nIn the late 19th Century scramble for African territory, Italy marked\nLibya for its own, as the only North African area not already preempted by\nFrance or Britain, and by extensive bilateral bargaining secured quit claims\nfrom all the major powers. Fearing that Turkish rule there might be rendered\neffective at long last, in consequence of the Turkish revolution of 1908,\nItaly made unprovoked war on Turkey in 1911 in order to seize the colony be-\nfore it was too late. The outbreak of the Balkan Wars (1912) compelled Turkey\nto sue for peace, ceding the territory, but it took the Italians twenty years\nto complete the subjugation of the natives. Until 1919 Italian control was\nlimited to a few coastal areas. The resistance of the Senussi, whose capital\nwas at Kufra, was not subdued until 1933.\nFrom 1928 onwards the Italian government made particular efforts to\nattract Italian settlers to Libya, with indifferent success, although small\nItalian communities were by this means established in the more fertile coastal\nareas. Under Italian administration the territory was divided into two col-\nonies, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, until 1934, when a reunited Libya was es-\ntablished as a province of metropolitan Italy.\nItalian expansion before and under the Fascists was based on a concern\nfor the balance of power in the Mediterranean. It was also hoped that Libya\nmight help meet the need for raw materials and serve as an outlet for surplus\npopulation. Libya failed to prove a source for raw materials and only by gov-\nernment financial and moral support gave limited relief in the late 1930's to\nItaly's population pressure. Libya can absorb settlers on a limited scale,\nbut the annual Italian increase of population far exceeds Libya's total capac-\nity.\nThe nationalist spirit in Libya, evidenced by the continued Arab re-\nsistance to Italian expansion efforts, appeared during World War II in several\nforms. Libyans in Cairo formed committees to work for the liberation and in-\ndependence of their country. Many others joined the Libyan Arab Force, raised\nto fight with the British Army in the Western Desert.\nAfter the defeat of the Axis forces in Libya, a British Military Admin-\nistration was set up in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; the French continued to\nadminister the Fezzan in the south of Libya, an area which they had earlier\noccupied. Libyan complaints have been loud against British occupation forces,\ncentering at present around famine conditions which have resulted from crop\nfailures. The British are accused of discrimination in treating Cyrenaica as\nalmost an ally, while Tripolitania is still regarded as an ex-enemy country.\nBoth areas have been ruled by proclamation, but the Italian penal code, as\nmodified by the removal of fascist legislation, has been maintained in Tripol-\nitania. The British defend their position on the ground that they are govern-\ning on a \"care and maintenance\" basis until final disposition of Libya has been\ndetermined.\n- 12 -\nArab feeling against the Italians personally is not great, but dis-\nlike of them as an administering force is very extensive, especially in\nCyrenaica. Although the entire Italian population of Cyrenaica was with-\ndrawn on the evacuation of enemy forces, 38,000 stayed on in Tripolitania\nduring and after the war, some in administrative positions, most of them en-\ngaged in agriculture.\nArab-Jewish relations have been peaceful since the arrival of some\nJews early in the Christian era, and of others over the past several hundred\nyears from other parts of the Mediterranean. Anti-Jewish riots took place in\nTripolitania in 1945, but consisted largely of looting by unemployed and\ncriminal elements against Jews as an economic rather than a racial group.\nPolitically, conditions differ in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. The\nstrongest political force in Cyrenaica, and to a certain extent in Tripoli-\ntania, is that of the Senussi sect headed by El Sayyid Idris, grandson of its\nfounder. But the ability of this group to provide some kind of governmental\nadministration in the area appears to be questionable, for the type of admin-\nistration control which the Senussi might be able to exercise would hardly\namount to full governmental functions in the Western sense. Sayyid Idris,\nwho is himself heavily subsidized by the British, apparently realizes that\nthe material resources at his disposal would not suffice for the country's\nneeds as to an effective administration. Unless the country were permitted\nto relapse into some kind of primitive government incompatible with modern\nrequirements, even a Senussi administration for Cyrenaica alone would need\nsome foreign support and, if reluctant to accept it at once, would be obliged\nafter a while to depend on it.\nThere is no other native stabilizing force in Libya aside from the\nSenussi movement. In Tripolitania, the Nationalist Party, headed by Salem\nMuntasser, is the oldest, but is of little importance now. Its aim is the\nindependence of Libya under the Emirship of El Sayyid Idris. The United\nFront Party claims to represent some 400,000 Arabs (about 60%), with aims\nsimilar to those of the Nationalists. The Kutla Party separated from the\nNationalists in protest at the formation of the United Front Party. While\nits main objectives parallel closely those of the other two parties, there\nare these exceptions: (1) Advocation of closer ties with the Arab League:\nand (2) Rejection of the plan for a Senussi Emirate. The Egypt-Tripolitanian\nUnion, reported to be backed by Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab\nLeague, has but little support.\nA real problem in any plan to place the function of government in the\nhands of indigenous elements is the almost complete lack of a professional\nclass (although to no greater extent than in Iraq and Trans-Jordan in 1919).\nThe Nationalists distinguish between administrative officials, which they feel\nthey can supply, and professional and technical men, who can be hired from\nabroad until better educational facilities have trained indigenous students\nto fill these posts.\n- 13 -\nIt must be kept in mind that there are no indications of desire among\nthe Lityan population to have a non-Moslem power take over the administration\nof the country.\nII. ERITREA.\n1. Physical Characteristics.\nEritrea's area of 45,000 square miles falls into four natural divi-\nsions: the western plains and hill country: the central and northern mountain\nchain including an extension of the Ethiopian plateau; the southern highlands,\nand the Red Sea coastal plain or desert. The country has 670 miles of coast-\nline along the Red Sea, one of the world's most important traffic routes.\nEritrea's port of Massawa is the best harbor between Port Sudan and Mombassa.\nOnly the central plateau around Asmara is fit for European habitation, the\nclimate elsewhere being featured almost all of the year by intense heat and\nexcessive humidity.\nBecause arable land is limited and rainfall uncertain, Eritrea can\ncount on very little agricultural production. Thus populations of the western,\ncentral, and Red Sea areas are nomadic or semi-nomadic; and the people of the\nsouthern highlands, who can raise food, must presently import part of their\nrequirement. No oil or workable deposits of iron, lead, manganese or copper\nhave been found, and reports of pitchblende deposits are as yet unconfirmed.\nGold, salt, sulphur, feldspar, and china clay are produced but not in signifi-\ncant quantities. There is little likelihood that the country will ever be\nindustrialized or that the prevailing unfavorable pre-war trade balance will\nchange.\n2. Population Characteristics.\nThe native population of 760.000 is heterogeneous. Based on religion\nthe division is about equal between Moslems and Christian Copts. In addition\nthere are 40,000 Italians who live mainly in Asmara. The Christian Copts are\nfound largely on the south central plateau, which once formed the northern half\nof the Ethiopian province of Tigrai, and are related ethnically, culturally and\nreligiously to the inhabitants of that province. To the north and west of this\nplateau area live Moslems (Beni Amer tribe), related to the Sudanese across the\nfrontier. The rest of the Moslems live south of Massawa along the Red Sea\ncoast, and are, for the most part, Danakils, related to the Somali tribes of\nEthiopia and French Somaliland.\n3. Recent Developments.\nAfter the 16th Century Eritrea was first under the shadowy suzerainty\nof the Ottoman Empire and then under that of Egypt, except for the southern\nplateau, which was part of Ethiopia. Starting with the annexation of Assam in\n1882, after its purchase from a native Sultan by an Italian steamship company,\n14 I 1\nItaly, by a series of treaties with native potentates and other European\npowers, extended her rule to the port of Massawa and then occupied the area\nbetween these two ports. In 1890 the Red Sea colonies were united by royal\ndecree into one province, under military administration, named the colony\nof Eritrea.\nIn 1896, civil administration was introduced into Eritrea and the\ncolony made steady but rather slow progress. Only 3,000 to 4,000 settlers\nhad arrived by 1935. After the conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, Eritrea was\nmade an integral part of the Italian East African Empire, and settlement in-\ncreased. The Italians claimed 75,000 \"settlers\" by 1941.\nBritish Imperial troops occupied Eritrea in 1941 and large numbers\nof Italians were evacuated and repatriated. The Allies repaired the harbor\nof Massawa, wrecked by the Italians, and used it for supplying forces in\nEgypt. In addition, 60 airfields were developed, most of which are now in\npoor condition, but could again be made serviceable. The colony has been\nunder British Military Administration since the occupation.\nNative feeling is anti-European. Most of the Copts and Moslems dis-\nlike the Italians because of the Fascist doctrine of racial superiority, and\nthe conquest of Ethiopia. The majority of Moslems oppose rule by Coptic\nChristians and union with Ethiopia. The Eritrean Moslem League, containing\nsome collaborationists who naturally favor independence, has been organized\nto place the Moslems in a bargaining position when the final disposition of\nthe colony is made. The Copts are divided into two main groups. Probably\nthe most active of these groups is the Unionists, young Asmara intelligentsia\nwho want outright incorporation into Ethiopia, and are spreading propaganda\nto this effect, backed financially by the Ethiopian Government. The Feder-\nalists (or Separatists), a very recent bloc separated from the Unionists,\nrepresent a more liberal and educated minority of Copts, plus a few Moslems,\nwho desire the incorporation of the colony into the Ethiopian Empire as a\nfederated state.\nIII. ITALIAN SOMALILAND.\n1. Physical Characteristics.\nItalian Somaliland extends from the Gulf of Aden southwest along\nthe shore of the Indian Ocean about 1400 miles to the frontier of Kenya. The\nterritory runs inland from the coast to a depth of 250-300 miles, having a\nboundary, for the most part entirely artificial, with British Somaliland,\nEthiopia, and Kenya Colony. Almost all of this boundary is on the edges of\nthe Ethiopian plateau. Except on the plateau, the country has torrid tempera-\ntures and little rainfall.\nThe territory is exceptionally deficient in natural resources of any\nvalue to a colonizing nation. Most of the country is hot, flat desert covered\n- 15 -\nwith thorn scrub. Agriculture is confined to the two river valleys of the\nJuba and Web Shibeli. Nomadic tribes raise some cattle, but even this industry\nis limited by the prevalence of the tsetse fly in the south. Mineral deposits,\nwith the exception of salt, have been found too insignificant to merit ex-\nploitation. There is one natural harbor in Kismayu and an artificial harbor,\nconstructed by the Italians, at Mogadishu, the capital.\nThe inhabitants have always carried on a trade in dressed skins,\ncattle, frankincense, myrhh, and gum arabic. In addition, the Italians, after\n1922, tried energetically to develop a profitable agriculture, cotton being\nthe principal crop cultivated. This was done, however, only through government\nsubsidies, and the colony was always operated by the Italians at a considerable\nloss.\n2. Population Characteristics.\nThe majority of the population (1,150,000) are Somalis, a branch of\nthe Hamitic race. The same race inhabits the whole Somaliland area as well as\nsoutheast Ethiopia. There are about 5,000 Italians (almost all of them concen-\ntrated at Mogadishu) and a scattering of Indians and Arabs.\nThe Somalis are Moslems, are divided into complex nomadic tribes, and\nare constantly engaged in bloody feuds over the water rights on which their\nnomadic existence depends. Little unity exists among them, nor is any likely\nto be achieved by them in the future.\n3. Recent Developments.\nIn 1889, southern Somalia was leased to Italy by the Sultan of Zanzi-\nbar, and northern Somalia was put under Italian protection by treaties with\nnative sultans. In 1924, Jubaland (the area between the present border of\nKenya and the Juba River) was ceded to Italy by the British in settlement of\nItalian claims in Africa arising from the Treaty of London. Italian Somali-\nland was incorporated into Italian East Africa in 1936 and administered as one\nof the six provinces of that Empire.\nThe area was occupied by British Imperial forces in 1941 and has\nsince been under British Military Administration. Italians have been permit-\nted to retain most of their privileges. Farming and industrial production has\nbeen stimulated by British loans.\nNative feeling is generally anti-European and specifically anti-Ital-\nian, a condition brought about largely by the Italian agricultural policy which\ninvolved an indefinite period of what amounted to slavery for Somali women and\nchildren on Italian farms. Some reports indicate, however, that this animosity\nis gradually dying down.\nIn any case, the natives do not have and are incapable of forming any\norganization which would be capable of reasonable self-government or of resis-\ntance to colonization.\n- 16 -\nENCLOSURE D\nSELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY\n1. Department of State\na. DRN Information Note No. 62, dated 25 April 1947 (SECRET) - Documents\nPertaining to Proposals for the Disposition of Former Italian Colo-\nnies in Africa.\nb. OIR Report No. 4326, dated 17 April 1947 (SECRET) - Proposals for the\nDisposition of the Italian Colonies in Africa.\nc. Intelligence Research Report OCL-4209, dated 2 January 1947 (CONFIDEN-\nTIAL) - A Survey of National Minorities in Foreign Countries.\nd. ORI/EAI No. 1090.142, dated 10 May 1946 (SECRET) - Italian Colonies\nin Africa: Negotiations over the Future of Libya, Eritrea, and Italian\nSomaliland.\ne. Interim Research and Intelligence Service Research and Analysis Branch,\ndated 31 December 1945 (SECRET) - Problems Involved in the Italian\nSettlement.\n2. War Department\nMilitary Intelligence Service, WDGS, Intelligence Research Project No. 3256,\ndated 22 May 1947 (SECRET) - Survey of Italian East Africa.\n3. Council on Foreign Relations\nAmerican Interests in the War and Peace Series: The Future of the Italian\nColonial Empire, dated May 1944 (CONFIDENTIAL).\n4. Foreign Policy Association\nForeign Policy Reports, 1 January 1946. McKay: The Future of Italy's\nColonies. (Includes additional sources.)\n- 17 -\nGERMANY\nFRANCE\nU.\nS.\nS.\nR.\nL.\nA\nSWITZ.\nUSTR\nHUNGARY\nATLANTIC\nRUMANIA\nOCEAN\nARAL\nSEA\nSEA\nBULGARIA\nCORSICA\n\"\nPORTUGAL{\nSPAIN\nA\nBANIA\nSARDINIA\nE\nR\nS\nTURKEY\nE\n$\nSICILY\nc\nR\nGIBRALTAR\nT\nTUNISIA\nN\nSYRIA\nFR.\nN\ns E A\nI\nR\nA\nQ\nMOROCCO\nSUEZ\nI\nR\nA\nN\nTRIPOLITANIA\nCYRENAICA\nKUWAIT\nALGERIA\nORO\nEGYPT\nPersion Gulf\nINDIA\nRIO DE\nLIBYA\nFEZZAN\nSAUDI ARABIA\nZ\nio\nFR. WEST AFRICA\nHADRAMAUT\nANGLO EGYPT.\nFR.\nNIGERIA\nSUDAN\nEQUATORIAL\nBRIT.\nLAND\nABYSSINIA\nAFRICA\nITALIAN AFRICAN\nINDIAN\nCOLONIES\nUGANDA\nOCEAN\nItaly and Home Islands\nKENYA\nBELGIAN\nFormer Italian Colonies in Africa\no\nCONGO\nTANGANYIKA\nCIG-6774\nU. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\n1541-S-1947"
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