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A corollary of this is the exclusion from the Near East and contiguous ter- ritory of any power which desires instability or seeks to alienate elements presently neutral or favorably disposed to the Western Powers. The only major power with present intentions to exploit potential threats to the security of the Western Powers is the USSR; and Soviet capabilities for cre- ating instability in the Middle East depend to a considerable extent on the opportunities arising from the disposition of the Italian African colonies. The security of the US can be threatened by the adverse reaction of states or groups who feel that their legitimate interests have not been prop- erly safeguarded in any agreement to dispose of the colonies. Arab resent- ment of British and French efforts to perpetuate a policy of imperialism (ag- gravated by the US stand on the Palestine problem) nurtures a situation with inherently explosive characteristics, which could result in local uprisings against the Western Powers. The Arab League could be expected to give tacit support to such local uprisings, and non-self-governing territories, particu- larly those predominantly Moslem, could be expected to respond to Arab leader- ship by intensifying already existing efforts by local nationalist movements to throw off foreign rule. A disposition of the colonies which would reinforce the British and French positions would also (1) weaken the United Nations to the extent that, subsequent to the peace settlement, the colonies were not brought under the International Trusteeship System as clearly contemplated by the UN Charter, and (2) be construed, by non-colonial powers and non-self-governing groups, as a breach of international commitments regarding the welfare of native pop- ulations. On the other hand, an agreement providing for immediate or near- future independence for the colonies would jeopardize US objectives by fur- ther weakening the position of the UK and France. Moreover, a disposition of the colonies in which Italy would have no participation would weakem the pres- ent anti-Communist Italian Government at a time when the US seeks to strengthen it by political and economic assistance. Economically, the Italian African colonies per se have no signifi- cance with respect to US security. Indirectly, by providing a minor outlet for Italian emigrants and a limited opportunity for foreign trade, Libya could be used as an instrument to advance US economic objectives in Italy. Militarily, the Italian African calonies are of importance to US security by reason of their location, but a condition of the use of, the col- onies for military purposes is the protection of lines of communication to these areas from a military power capable of aggressive warfare. Occupying a central position in North Africa, Libya has an extensive irregular coastline on the Mediterranean (with one major and two minor ports), and vast desert stretches which separate Egypt from Northwest Africa and make Libya difficult of access from the south. The establishment of land, sea, and air bases in Libya by a power capable of aggressive warfare would either constitute a threat to French interests in Algeria and Tunisia, to British interests in the Mediterranean, to Italy, to Egypt and the Suez Canal, to Greece, and to - 2 -

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Context sent to Scholar

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    "ocrText": "A corollary of this is the exclusion from the Near East and contiguous ter-\nritory of any power which desires instability or seeks to alienate elements\npresently neutral or favorably disposed to the Western Powers. The only\nmajor power with present intentions to exploit potential threats to the\nsecurity of the Western Powers is the USSR; and Soviet capabilities for cre-\nating instability in the Middle East depend to a considerable extent on the\nopportunities arising from the disposition of the Italian African colonies.\nThe security of the US can be threatened by the adverse reaction of\nstates or groups who feel that their legitimate interests have not been prop-\nerly safeguarded in any agreement to dispose of the colonies. Arab resent-\nment of British and French efforts to perpetuate a policy of imperialism (ag-\ngravated by the US stand on the Palestine problem) nurtures a situation with\ninherently explosive characteristics, which could result in local uprisings\nagainst the Western Powers. The Arab League could be expected to give tacit\nsupport to such local uprisings, and non-self-governing territories, particu-\nlarly those predominantly Moslem, could be expected to respond to Arab leader-\nship by intensifying already existing efforts by local nationalist movements\nto throw off foreign rule.\nA disposition of the colonies which would reinforce the British and\nFrench positions would also (1) weaken the United Nations to the extent that,\nsubsequent to the peace settlement, the colonies were not brought under the\nInternational Trusteeship System as clearly contemplated by the UN Charter,\nand (2) be construed, by non-colonial powers and non-self-governing groups,\nas a breach of international commitments regarding the welfare of native pop-\nulations. On the other hand, an agreement providing for immediate or near-\nfuture independence for the colonies would jeopardize US objectives by fur-\nther weakening the position of the UK and France. Moreover, a disposition of\nthe colonies in which Italy would have no participation would weakem the pres-\nent anti-Communist Italian Government at a time when the US seeks to strengthen\nit by political and economic assistance.\nEconomically, the Italian African colonies per se have no signifi-\ncance with respect to US security. Indirectly, by providing a minor outlet\nfor Italian emigrants and a limited opportunity for foreign trade, Libya could\nbe used as an instrument to advance US economic objectives in Italy.\nMilitarily, the Italian African calonies are of importance to US\nsecurity by reason of their location, but a condition of the use of, the col-\nonies for military purposes is the protection of lines of communication to\nthese areas from a military power capable of aggressive warfare. Occupying a\ncentral position in North Africa, Libya has an extensive irregular coastline\non the Mediterranean (with one major and two minor ports), and vast desert\nstretches which separate Egypt from Northwest Africa and make Libya difficult\nof access from the south. The establishment of land, sea, and air bases in\nLibya by a power capable of aggressive warfare would either constitute a\nthreat to French interests in Algeria and Tunisia, to British interests in\nthe Mediterranean, to Italy, to Egypt and the Suez Canal, to Greece, and to\n- 2 -"
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