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    "localId": "225248097",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 44, The Japan Peace Treaty Problems, Issues, and Reactions",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 44, The Japan Peace Treaty Problems, Issues, and Reactions",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 14,
            "logicalDate": "1947-11-14",
            "month": 11,
            "year": 1947
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    "seq": 3,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "ORE 44\n1\n17 November 1947\nCopy No.\nTHE JAPAN PEACE TREATY-PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND REACTIONS\nSUMMARY\nThe basic problem delaying conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan at the present\ntime lies in the question of whether Japan is to be permitted to develop a democratic\nstate or is to be eventually drawn into the Soviet orbit.\nThe Soviets for the present will negotiate only on their own terms. These terms\ninclude a veto power, the use of which could lead to an impasse in which only two\npracticable alternatives would be left: to delay formation of a treaty indefinitely or\ndraw up a treaty without Soviet participation.\nThe first of these would allow continued US occupation of Japan. This, in effect,\nwould give the US a military counterbalance to the Soviet position in the Far East and\nwould permit continued democratization of Japan. On the other hand, indefinite delay\nmight lead to the negotiation of a series of individual treaties whose possibly conflicting\nprovisions would lead to confusion and an unstable international situation. However,\nthe superior bargaining position which the US would enjoy as a result of its occupation\nof Japan might eventually cause the USSR to enter into treaty negotiations on US\nterms. This would be done by the Soviets with a view to eliminating US troops, weak-\nening US influence, and providing the USSR with greater economic and political access\nto Japan.\nThe second alternative, that of a treaty not embracing the USSR, involves the\nquestion of whether or not all other interested powers would participate. The Chinese\nhave implied that in view of Article II of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 which prohibits\nboth countries from independently entering into negotiations with Japan, they probably\nwill not be party to a treaty concluded without Soviet participation. A principal\nChinese motive behind this stand is presumably a desire to obtain US aid. A reasonable\nassurance of assistance and support would probably overcome Chinese reluctance to\nparticipate. Should the Chinese not participate, the UK has indicated that it also may\nstay out. A treaty unsigned by these three nations would have little meaning.\nAssuming a treaty without Soviet participation, general agreement on all im-\nportant points could doubtless be obtained. It would have to be recognized, however,\nthat if such a treaty were to be formulated, the USSR might be disinclined to supply\nJapan with needed raw materials from Soviet-controlled areas, and that the USSR\nwould be in a position to receive most of the benefits of the treaty without accepting\nany of its obligations and thus would remain free to violate its provisions with impunity.\nThe USSR, moreover, would have ample time to study the treaty's disadvantages and\nweak points, while the Japanese would be in a better position to manipulate US-Soviet\nmutual fear and suspicion to their own advantage.\nFurther discussion of problems arising from the Japanese peace treaty is contained\nin Enclosure A; a summary of the position of each power in Enclosure B.\nNote: This paper has been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of\nState, Army, Navy, and Air Forces.\n1"
}