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SECRET Two major difficulties facing the Jews will be the large numbers of Arabs within Jewish territory (in the northeast Jewish sector, for instance, there are some 72,700 Arabs as opposed to 44,700 Jews) and the extreme vulnerability of outlying Jewish settlements and supply routes to Arab attack. The Jews will be forced to expend a large proportion of their forces in static defense of isolated villages and colonies, or organize many mobile units in key locations so that settlements under attack can be aided quickly. Furthermore, many units will have to be used to convoy supply cara- vans. The establishment of strong defensive positions, within which normal economic life can be maintained, and the protection of transportation routes will be the main strategy of the Jewish forces. The Zionist colonies are estimated to have sufficient stores of food for a month's supply. Owing to the fact that many agricultural laborers will be engaged in combat and that Arab attacks will prevent cultivation of the fields, the Jews will have difficulty in producing food. Moreover, mobilization over a long period of time will so strain the manpower of the Jewish community that its economy will collapse unless large numbers of immigrants and substantial material assistance are supplied from abroad. The Jews may be expected to employ small-scale, commando-type offen- sive operations against Arab concentrations if they are able to locate them, or attempts may be made to pursue retreating Arab raiders. Large-scale Jewish efforts to pene- trate territory adjoining the contemplated Jewish state are unlikely because such actions would necessitate over-extending the already vulnerable supply lines and would entail the risk of combined rear, frontal, and flanking attacks by Arabs. It is a distinct strategic advantage to the Jews that the important port of Haifa and the smaller port of Tel Aviv are included in the Jewish sectors, since any assistance to the Jews in the event of open conflict will come from the west.* It is expected, however, that all cities will be centers of heavy fighting. c. European Support for Jewish Forces. There is already in existence a well organized system for transporting Jewish DP's from Eastern Europe southward, particularly through the Balkans, to Palestine. In the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict, this system would be employed to furnish man- power to the Jewish forces in Palestine. Jewish immigrants from Poland, the Soviet Zone of Germany, Hungary, and the Balkans are gathered together in Austria, Italy, and Germany for transportation to Palestine. It has been estimated that about 1,800 Jews cross into Austria every month. In Italy, Hagana is reportedly operating a secret immigration service for the estimated 30,000 Jewish refugees registered there. Both the Rumanian and Bulgarian Govern- ments are helping Jews reach Black Sea ports in order to board ships which attempt to run the blockade into Palestine. There has been some evidence that European agents of IZL and the Stern Gang have been trained and are assisted by the USSR. The Jews will doubtless con- tinue to solicit aid from the USSR, but in the event of a Jewish-Arab war, it is unlikely that either side would receive overt material aid from the USSR or its satellites, with the * The predominantly Arab port of Jaffa, although allocated to the Arab state by UNSCOP, is cut off from the Arab hinterland and thus will not be immediately useful to the Arab forces in the event of war. 15 SECRET

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nTwo major difficulties facing the Jews will be the large numbers of Arabs\nwithin Jewish territory (in the northeast Jewish sector, for instance, there are some\n72,700 Arabs as opposed to 44,700 Jews) and the extreme vulnerability of outlying Jewish\nsettlements and supply routes to Arab attack. The Jews will be forced to expend a\nlarge proportion of their forces in static defense of isolated villages and colonies, or\norganize many mobile units in key locations so that settlements under attack can be\naided quickly. Furthermore, many units will have to be used to convoy supply cara-\nvans. The establishment of strong defensive positions, within which normal economic\nlife can be maintained, and the protection of transportation routes will be the main\nstrategy of the Jewish forces. The Zionist colonies are estimated to have sufficient\nstores of food for a month's supply. Owing to the fact that many agricultural laborers\nwill be engaged in combat and that Arab attacks will prevent cultivation of the fields,\nthe Jews will have difficulty in producing food. Moreover, mobilization over a long\nperiod of time will so strain the manpower of the Jewish community that its economy\nwill collapse unless large numbers of immigrants and substantial material assistance\nare supplied from abroad.\nThe Jews may be expected to employ small-scale, commando-type offen-\nsive operations against Arab concentrations if they are able to locate them, or attempts\nmay be made to pursue retreating Arab raiders. Large-scale Jewish efforts to pene-\ntrate territory adjoining the contemplated Jewish state are unlikely because such actions\nwould necessitate over-extending the already vulnerable supply lines and would entail\nthe risk of combined rear, frontal, and flanking attacks by Arabs.\nIt is a distinct strategic advantage to the Jews that the important port\nof Haifa and the smaller port of Tel Aviv are included in the Jewish sectors, since any\nassistance to the Jews in the event of open conflict will come from the west.* It is\nexpected, however, that all cities will be centers of heavy fighting.\nc. European Support for Jewish Forces.\nThere is already in existence a well organized system for transporting Jewish\nDP's from Eastern Europe southward, particularly through the Balkans, to Palestine.\nIn the event of an Arab-Jewish conflict, this system would be employed to furnish man-\npower to the Jewish forces in Palestine.\nJewish immigrants from Poland, the Soviet Zone of Germany, Hungary, and\nthe Balkans are gathered together in Austria, Italy, and Germany for transportation to\nPalestine. It has been estimated that about 1,800 Jews cross into Austria every month.\nIn Italy, Hagana is reportedly operating a secret immigration service for the estimated\n30,000 Jewish refugees registered there. Both the Rumanian and Bulgarian Govern-\nments are helping Jews reach Black Sea ports in order to board ships which attempt\nto run the blockade into Palestine.\nThere has been some evidence that European agents of IZL and the Stern\nGang have been trained and are assisted by the USSR. The Jews will doubtless con-\ntinue to solicit aid from the USSR, but in the event of a Jewish-Arab war, it is unlikely\nthat either side would receive overt material aid from the USSR or its satellites, with the\n* The predominantly Arab port of Jaffa, although allocated to the Arab state by UNSCOP,\nis cut off from the Arab hinterland and thus will not be immediately useful to the Arab forces in\nthe event of war.\n15\nSECRET"
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