Ask the Scholar
Page 18 of 20
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
exception of Czechoslovakia. France and Belgium, as well as Czechoslovakia, are
thought to be likely sources of arms and ammunition for the Jewish forces. There
have been unconfirmed reports of smuggling from France, Belgium, and Luxembourg
for Jewish terrorist groups in Palestine. The Czechs are reported willing to sell arms
to the Arabs; they would also be willing to supply arms to the Jews if the transaction
were financially advantageous. No estimate can be made of the amount and types of
weapons which would be supplied.
d. Support Obtainable in the U.S.
No information is available upon which to base an estimate of the specific num-
ber of volunteers or the amount of funds and supplies to be made available to Jewish
armed forces from US sources.
The Zionist movement is very strong in the US, but every organization claiming
to represent all American Jewry does not in fact do so, and many Zionist organizations,
while supporting the objectives of a National Home for Jews, do not advocate an
independent Jewish nation in Palestine. The American Jewish Conference, the Jewish
Congress, the New Zionist Organization, and the American League for a Free Palestine
are among the leading groups interested in the political aspects of Zionism which may
be expected to support Jewish forces. The principal non-Jewish bodies espousing the
Zionist cause are the American Palestine Committee, headed by Senator Robert F.
Wagner of New York, the Christian Council on Palestine, and the Political Action Com-
mittee for Palestine, Inc. The last-named organization has recently expended approxi-
mately $80,000 for purely military supplies. Because it is illegal to supply arms from
the US to Jewish groups in Palestine, figures are difficult to obtain, although part of
most Zionist funds collected is probably allotted to the purchase of military supplies.
While no authentic figures are available, it is estimated that support of Jewish
armed forces by US private organizations will be on the order of, or somewhat greater
than, similar support by US citizens of Government forces in the Spanish Civil War.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
If the UNGA accepts partition as the best solution of the Palestine problem, it is
almost certain that armed hostilities will result in Palestine; that the social, economic,
and political stability of the Arab world will be seriously disturbed; and that US com-
mercial and strategic interests in the Near East will be dangerously jeopardized.
Although the UNGA Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine is now considering establishing
a Commission responsible to the Security Council to oversee the implementation of par-
tition, it is unlikely that any sizable international police force will initially be available
to the Commission. It is highly probable, therefore, that Jewish and Arab forces will
clash over the attempt of the Jews to establish a Jewish state.
Into this struggle between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the people of the Arab
states will inevitably be drawn. Although most of the Arab governments will be reluc-
tant to act in opposition to a UNGA decision and against the wishes of the major
powers, nationalist, religious, and tribal pressures will compel them to support unoffi-
cially the Palestine Arabs. Inevitably the extremists, the chauvinists, will increase
their influence at the expense of those statesmen in the Arab world who believe that
the development of their countries depends on the maintenance of close ties with the
16
Page data
- Page
- 18
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 4b098598357a1ec6
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 225248232
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "225248232",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248232",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 55, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248232",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875470/875470-02-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875470/875470-02-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875470/875470-02-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 20,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "225248232",
"label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 55, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248232"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "225248232",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248232",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 55, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248232",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875470/875470-02-001.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875470/875470-02-001.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875470/875470-02-001.jpg",
"imageCount": 20,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248232",
"naId": 225248232,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 28,
"logicalDate": "1947-11-28",
"month": 11,
"year": 1947
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 18,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875470/875470-02-018.jpg",
"mediaId": "4b098598357a1ec6",
"ocrText": "SECRET\nexception of Czechoslovakia. France and Belgium, as well as Czechoslovakia, are\nthought to be likely sources of arms and ammunition for the Jewish forces. There\nhave been unconfirmed reports of smuggling from France, Belgium, and Luxembourg\nfor Jewish terrorist groups in Palestine. The Czechs are reported willing to sell arms\nto the Arabs; they would also be willing to supply arms to the Jews if the transaction\nwere financially advantageous. No estimate can be made of the amount and types of\nweapons which would be supplied.\nd. Support Obtainable in the U.S.\nNo information is available upon which to base an estimate of the specific num-\nber of volunteers or the amount of funds and supplies to be made available to Jewish\narmed forces from US sources.\nThe Zionist movement is very strong in the US, but every organization claiming\nto represent all American Jewry does not in fact do so, and many Zionist organizations,\nwhile supporting the objectives of a National Home for Jews, do not advocate an\nindependent Jewish nation in Palestine. The American Jewish Conference, the Jewish\nCongress, the New Zionist Organization, and the American League for a Free Palestine\nare among the leading groups interested in the political aspects of Zionism which may\nbe expected to support Jewish forces. The principal non-Jewish bodies espousing the\nZionist cause are the American Palestine Committee, headed by Senator Robert F.\nWagner of New York, the Christian Council on Palestine, and the Political Action Com-\nmittee for Palestine, Inc. The last-named organization has recently expended approxi-\nmately $80,000 for purely military supplies. Because it is illegal to supply arms from\nthe US to Jewish groups in Palestine, figures are difficult to obtain, although part of\nmost Zionist funds collected is probably allotted to the purchase of military supplies.\nWhile no authentic figures are available, it is estimated that support of Jewish\narmed forces by US private organizations will be on the order of, or somewhat greater\nthan, similar support by US citizens of Government forces in the Spanish Civil War.\n4. CONCLUSIONS.\nIf the UNGA accepts partition as the best solution of the Palestine problem, it is\nalmost certain that armed hostilities will result in Palestine; that the social, economic,\nand political stability of the Arab world will be seriously disturbed; and that US com-\nmercial and strategic interests in the Near East will be dangerously jeopardized.\nAlthough the UNGA Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine is now considering establishing\na Commission responsible to the Security Council to oversee the implementation of par-\ntition, it is unlikely that any sizable international police force will initially be available\nto the Commission. It is highly probable, therefore, that Jewish and Arab forces will\nclash over the attempt of the Jews to establish a Jewish state.\nInto this struggle between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the people of the Arab\nstates will inevitably be drawn. Although most of the Arab governments will be reluc-\ntant to act in opposition to a UNGA decision and against the wishes of the major\npowers, nationalist, religious, and tribal pressures will compel them to support unoffi-\ncially the Palestine Arabs. Inevitably the extremists, the chauvinists, will increase\ntheir influence at the expense of those statesmen in the Arab world who believe that\nthe development of their countries depends on the maintenance of close ties with the\n16"
}