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    "localId": "225248253",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 56, The Political Future of Spain",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 56, The Political Future of Spain",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 5,
            "logicalDate": "1947-12-05",
            "month": 12,
            "year": 1947
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{
    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nto a successor regime guaranteeing democratic liberties \"full diplomatic relations and\nthe taking of such practical measures to assist in the solution of Spain's economic\nproblems as may be practicable in the circumstances prevailing.\" In the UN General\nAssembly, December 1946, the US Delegation supported the resolution condemning\nthe Franco Government of Spain and recommending that it be debarred from member-\nship in international agencies associated with the UN, and that the member nations\nwithdraw their Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid. This resolution was not\nspecifically reaffirmed, but was left in force, following renewed discussion of the\nSpanish question in the UN General Assembly session of 1947.\nSpanish National Syndicalism, the political mould which Franco and his advisers\nhave shaped for their country, is proclaimed as \"unalterably opposed to liberal capi-\ntalism\" as well as to \"Marxist materialism\", so that Franco's present conciliatory\nattitude toward the Western democracies seems more a reflection of Spain's need to\ncome to terms with the \"lesser of two evils\" than a manifestation of sincere or lasting\nfriendship. Franco's deference to the US is contingent upon the maintenance of US\nmilitary, economic, and political leadership, and thus carries no guarantee of continuity\nin a future of changed circumstances. Already the Spanish Government is seeking to\nlessen its dependence on the dollar by barter agreements and by cultivating diplomatic\nand commercial relations with the Arab states, apparently with the objective of obtain-\ning petroleum from Arab sources, as well as of improving its relations with native Moroc-\ncans.\nWhile the stability of the Franco regime is demonstrable, another aspect of the\nsituation requires emphasis: the Franco regime is presiding over a continuing na-\ntional deterioration. Barring a more drastic change in policies and greater gains in\neconomic strength than seem possible so long as present national leadership results\nin Spain's exclusion from the European Recovery Program, the indefinite prolongation\nof the regime means an intensification of the factors that favor revolution. Five or ten\nyears hence Spain may be more explosive than now. If the USSR is at that time able\nto take advantage of Spanish unrest, the possibilities of installing a Communist regime\nin Spain will then have increased.\nThe reasons the Franco regime, despite its current stability, presents disadvantages\nto US interests may be summarized as: (1) The political and economic theories upon\nwhich the regime is based, and the attitudes of its leaders, conflict with US political\nideology. This points to the prospect that Spain, because of its different outlook, might\nin certain circumstances use its influence against the US or might insist upon remain-\ning in a \"middle\" or neutral position when a more positive alignment with the US\nwas desired by the US. (2) Its repressive measures and unpopularity with the Spanish\nmasses serve to drive these masses toward extremist programs, with the possibility that\nthey will be increasingly attracted toward Communism and the USSR, which has taken\npains to dramatize its opposition to the Franco regime. (3) The regime's dependence\nupon force to retain power delays preparation of the Spanish people for democratic\ndevelopment. (4) Its unpopularity with large numbers of people throughout the world\nembarrasses the US in all its dealings with Spain, postponing the time when the US\ncan restore normal relations with a country potentially valuable as a friend.\n5\nSECRET"
}