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{
    "localId": "225248268",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 62, The Implementation of Soviet Objectives in Korea",
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    "id": "225248268",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 62, The Implementation of Soviet Objectives in Korea",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248268",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 18,
            "logicalDate": "1947-11-18",
            "month": 11,
            "year": 1947
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    "seq": 3,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN KOREA\nSoviet tactics in Korea since V-J Day have consistently and clearly indicated a firm\nintention to accept no settlement which would not insure the acquisition of Korea as a\nloyal Soviet satellite in the Far East. Details of an alleged Soviet \"Master Plan for\nKorea\" were compromised in mid-1946, and subsequent events tend to confirm the fact\nthat the USSR has been following the essential outline of this \"Plan\" with minor diver-\ngencies necessitated by tactical considerations.\nOriginal plans apparently called for an extended breathing-space to be provided\nby the use of stalling tactics in the US-USSR Joint Commission. The purpose of this\nwas to make certain that no Korean settlement should be forthcoming until a powerful\nmilitary-political machine had been constructed in North Korea under Soviet aus-\npices. This was to be accomplished by the strengthening of the South Korean Com-\nmunist Party through an increase in the membership of the so-called Democratic Peo-\nples' Front. The Communist Party itself was to go underground and mask its real\nstrength by working through \"front\" organizations. It was also to concentrate on\ninfiltrating its members into key positions in the administrative and police organization\nof South Korea.\nThe USSR was signally successful in accomplishing the first of these purposes.\nWhen the Soviet forces entered North Korea in 1945, there were three main groups in\nthe population which were considered capable of offering any organized resistance to\nSovietization. These were: (1) the propertied classes-peasant proprietors and busi-\nnessmen; (2) nationalist youths, mainly students; and (3) religious groups with a\nWestern orientation. From the outset, the vaunted political, economic, and social\nreforms accomplished by the North Korean Peoples' Committee have been specifically\ndesigned to eliminate this potential core of resistance. The Land Reform Law and the\nBusiness Tax have resulted in the actual expropriation of the propertied classes and\nadded them to the stream of refugee dissidents swarming south over the 38th Parallel.\nThe efficient police net established under the Bureau of Internal Affairs has functioned\nso successfully that the leading North Korean youth group, the Northwest Korean\nYouth Association, has been forced to move into the US Zone and is now almost solely\nconfined in its activities to terroristic acts against Leftists south of the 38th Parallel.\nProtestant and Catholic religious groups in North Korea have either been effectively\nabsorbed into the Democratic Peoples' Front or have been declared illegal and their\nterror-paralyzed leadership placed under house arrest.\nAll available evidence indicates that the USSR has every reason to be confident in\nthe loyalty and survival-power of its North Korean Peoples' Committee. The subordi-\nnation of this regime to the dicta of Soviet policy is assured by the fact that it has been\ncarefully \"packed\" with Soviet-trained Koreans holding dual Soviet-Korean citizenship.\nMoreover, North Korean military forces have been carefully and soundly developed\nunder Soviet guidance to the point where they are capable of taking over all of Korea\nwithout serious delay after the initiation of active operations.\n2"
}