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TOP SECRET Communists' electoral following, stiffen the purpose of non-Communist elements in the French labor movement, and lessen the possibility of the Communists' eventual return to the Government by legal means, the Communists are now openly committed to an antinational stand. Their actions will continue to be guided by Moscow as an integral part of the current Soviet offensive against the European recovery program. As French opposition to the Communists intensifies, the Communists may be expected to draw their forces together in a more closely knit unit, to intensify the training of Communist para-military formations, and to make a greater effort to conceal their activities short of going underground. Growing resistance to Commu- nist control of labor has already resulted in the secession from the CGT of non-Commu- nist leaders and the establishment of a new national labor organization, the Force Ouvrière. The trend of labor is away from the Communists, so that in the next few months, the number of workers represented by the Force Ouvrière, autonomous unions, and the CFTC (French Confederation of Christian Workers) may equal that of the CGT. The Communists, therefore, will probably not attempt within the foreseeable future to seize control of France by force. They will probably conserve their strength until the return of De Gaulle appears imminent when they can be expected to make an all-out effort to create disorder in an attempt to prevent his accession to power. The Schuman Cabinet, a centrist coalition government, by its success in breaking a wave of strikes that seriously threatened the nation's economy, has strengthened the Government's position and has indicated a capacity to cope successfully with Commu- nist attacks. For the time being at least, the Government appears to be secure against Communist attempts to bring about its downfall. In order further to promote French recovery and insure the continuance of his Government, Schuman, having initiated an economic program designed to balance the budget and control inflation, expects to devalue the franc in an effort to provide a realistic rate of exchange with foreign currencies which the Government hopes will be a stimulus to the volume of French exports. If the Government should fail to meet the exigencies of the current situation, how- ever, the return of De Gaulle would be practically assured, although he prefers not to take power until the present critical winter is over. A government headed by De Gaulle would be the last line of defense against Communist accession to power. Should De Gaulle fail to bring order and recovery, the pendulum might swing back sharply to the extreme left, thus bringing the Communists to power. 3. POLITICAL SITUATION. Domestic French politics are dominated by two factors: the existence of a multi- plicity of political parties, and the physical and psychological damage caused by war and German occupation. Because of the widely differing shades of political thought represented by the numerous and diverse political parties (at the present time, for example, the French Assembly is made up of representatives of 12 different parties), no one of them receives an absolute majority in elections. France, therefore, has usually been governed by coalitions. This has rendered very difficult the type of political compromise charac- 2 TOP SECRET

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Context sent to Scholar

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Page context
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nCommunists' electoral following, stiffen the purpose of non-Communist elements in the\nFrench labor movement, and lessen the possibility of the Communists' eventual return\nto the Government by legal means, the Communists are now openly committed to an\nantinational stand. Their actions will continue to be guided by Moscow as an integral\npart of the current Soviet offensive against the European recovery program.\nAs French opposition to the Communists intensifies, the Communists may be\nexpected to draw their forces together in a more closely knit unit, to intensify the\ntraining of Communist para-military formations, and to make a greater effort to\nconceal their activities short of going underground. Growing resistance to Commu-\nnist control of labor has already resulted in the secession from the CGT of non-Commu-\nnist leaders and the establishment of a new national labor organization, the Force\nOuvrière. The trend of labor is away from the Communists, so that in the next few\nmonths, the number of workers represented by the Force Ouvrière, autonomous unions,\nand the CFTC (French Confederation of Christian Workers) may equal that of the\nCGT. The Communists, therefore, will probably not attempt within the foreseeable\nfuture to seize control of France by force. They will probably conserve their strength\nuntil the return of De Gaulle appears imminent when they can be expected to make\nan all-out effort to create disorder in an attempt to prevent his accession to power.\nThe Schuman Cabinet, a centrist coalition government, by its success in breaking\na wave of strikes that seriously threatened the nation's economy, has strengthened the\nGovernment's position and has indicated a capacity to cope successfully with Commu-\nnist attacks. For the time being at least, the Government appears to be secure against\nCommunist attempts to bring about its downfall.\nIn order further to promote French recovery and insure the continuance of his\nGovernment, Schuman, having initiated an economic program designed to balance\nthe budget and control inflation, expects to devalue the franc in an effort to provide a\nrealistic rate of exchange with foreign currencies which the Government hopes will be\na stimulus to the volume of French exports.\nIf the Government should fail to meet the exigencies of the current situation, how-\never, the return of De Gaulle would be practically assured, although he prefers not to\ntake power until the present critical winter is over. A government headed by De Gaulle\nwould be the last line of defense against Communist accession to power. Should\nDe Gaulle fail to bring order and recovery, the pendulum might swing back sharply to\nthe extreme left, thus bringing the Communists to power.\n3.\nPOLITICAL SITUATION.\nDomestic French politics are dominated by two factors: the existence of a multi-\nplicity of political parties, and the physical and psychological damage caused by war\nand German occupation.\nBecause of the widely differing shades of political thought represented by the\nnumerous and diverse political parties (at the present time, for example, the French\nAssembly is made up of representatives of 12 different parties), no one of them receives\nan absolute majority in elections. France, therefore, has usually been governed by\ncoalitions. This has rendered very difficult the type of political compromise charac-\n2\nTOP SECRET"
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