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{
    "localId": "225248286",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 64, The Current Situation in France",
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    "id": "225248286",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 64, The Current Situation in France",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225248286",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 31,
            "logicalDate": "1947-12-31",
            "month": 12,
            "year": 1947
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    "seq": 7,
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\noperational troops in Europe and North Africa organized into tactical groups is prob-\nably around 100,000, but all units suffer from inadequacies of equipment. Currently\nstationed in France are mobile groups equivalent to at least one armored and two\ninfantry divisions plus some thirty-odd territorial battalions fairly evenly distributed\nthroughout the country.\nThe Navy, including the Naval Air Force, composed of about 57,000 men scattered\nthroughout the French Union and metropolitan France, is almost totally void of Com-\nmunists or their sympathizers. Its loyalty to the present Government is unquestioned.\nThe Air Force currently has a strength of approximately 63,000 men. Because of\nCommunist direction of the Air Ministry immediately following the Liberation, this\nbranch of the armed forces, particularly the gorund crews, has the highest incidence\nof Communism. Current reports indicate that approximately 65% of the Air Force\nofficers are strongly anti-Communist, 30% politically \"neutral.\" and 5% fanatical\nCommunists. Although the prestige of Communists is not high, such individuals stra-\ntegically placed might very well render the Air Force ineffective in the initial phases of\nan operation.\nFor the most part, top Air Force leadership is composed of opportunists who would\nhave little hesitancy in supporting a Communist-dominated French government.\nGeneral Piollet, the Chief of Staff, is consistently rumored to be pro-Communist.\nIf\nFrance were attacked by the USSR, however, the top leadership would be likely to\nremain loyal to France.\nThe morale of the Army and Navy is good. The morale of the Air Force is poor\nbecause it lacks modern equipment with no prospect of obtaining any domestically for\nat least 3 years, and because the Air Force lacks real leadership at the top.\nThe armed forces would be reduced should French politics become more stabilized.\nEvery finance minister since the liberation has attempted reduction but all have been\nfrustrated by overseas military commitments (the cost, for example, of the French\neffort in Indo-China alone is estimated at $900,000 a day)\n6.\nFOREIGN POLICY.\nThe foreign policy of France is directed at two primary objectives: (1) security\nagainst possible future German aggression, and (2) restoration of French prestige in\nthe role of a major power.\nSecurity from German aggression has been and continues to be a cardinal point of\nFrench policy. Three times in seventy-five years, France has been invaded and ravaged\nby Germans. The French are determined that: Germany be kept permanently weak;\nsome form of international control be established over the Ruhr and the Rhineland or\ntheir industries; and the Saar be incorporated economically with France. Virtually\nall French moves in European politics are influenced to some degree by France's fear\nof a resurgent Germany.\nWith regard to national security in general, France has always supported the prin-\nciple of collective security and will continue to seek freedom from aggression through\ninternational agreements and the UN.\n5\nTOP SECRET"
}