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    "localId": "225248306",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 6-48, Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 6-48, Consequences of Communist Accession to Power in Italy by Legal Means",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 5,
            "logicalDate": "1948-03-05",
            "month": 3,
            "year": 1948
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nCONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST ACCESSION TO POWER IN ITALY\nBY LEGAL MEANS\nASSUMPTION\n1. For the purposes of this estimate it is assumed that a Communist-controlled gov-\nernment has actually taken office in Italy by legal means.\n2. Within the foreseeable future the assumed situation could occur only as a result\nof a People's Bloc victory in the election scheduled for 18 April 1948. At least a month\nmust pass between that election and the inauguration of a new government. Even if\nthe People's Bloc were to win at the polls a majority of the seats in the National Assem-\nbly, its actual accession to power might be prevented by falsification of the returns or\nby force. It is assumed, however, that a People's Bloc (Communist-controlled) govern-\nment has actually been installed in office.\nDIRECT CONSEQUENCES\n3.\nTHE POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL WAR.\nEven if there had been no resort to force to prevent the installation of a Communist-\ndominated government, there would be a strong possibility of an early attempt to\nprevent by force the consolidation of its power. Such an attempt would be handi-\ncapped by lack of cohesion and leadership among militantly anti-Communist elements\nin Italy and by Communist administrative control of the Armed Forces, Carabinieri,\nand police. However, an anti-Communist insurrection, if it occurred prior to an effec-\ntive purge of the Armed Forces and the Carabinieri, would be favored by the probable\npiecemeal adherence of such units of those forces as were in a position to do so. The\nVatican would probably give covert support to the movement, but would not take sides\nofficially against the government until, in the initial disorder, ecclesiastical persons and\nproperty had been subjected to mob attack (as in Spain in 1936). At the outset the\nconflict would be between the organized militants of the extreme Right and Left, the\nmass of the population being dismayed and bewildered. Eventually the masses could\nbe aroused to pillage and violence by whichever side held the local advantage.\n4.\nThe OUTCOME OF CIVIL WAR.\nIn the event of civil war in the circumstances envisaged above, the Communist-\ndominated Government could probably retain an effective general control of all Italy\nnorth of the Rome-Pescara line and of the Adriatic coast from Pescara to Bari, inclusive.\nIt might also hold the Taranto naval base, and Messina, Catania, Siracusa, and Agri-\ngento in Sicily. Either side might prevail in the initial struggle for the possession of\nRome. Elsewhere in Italian territory the anti-Communist forces would gain initial\ncontrol.\n3\nSECRE"
}