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{
    "localId": "225248323",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 7-48, Possible Developments in Palestine",
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    "id": "225248323",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 7-48, Possible Developments in Palestine",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1948-02-28",
            "month": 2,
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    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\ntine until after the termination of the mandate has prevented the progressive transfer\nof authority to the UN Commission. The Commission has also been compelled to recog-\nnize the deplorable security situation in Palestine and realizes that it cannot attempt\nto carry out the recommendations of the UNGA without an adequate international\npolice force.\nb. UK Activity.\nUK activity since the partition vote has been twofold. In Palestine the man-\ndatory administration, its police, and the UK forces have been attempting to maintain\ninternal security. They have been hampered by two main factors: (1) evacuation\nplans have considerably obstructed UK security measures; and (2) the UK desire not to\nantagonize the Arab states has prevented the implementation of full-scale security\nmeasures to repress Arab-Jewish hostilities. In spite of these reservations, UK forces\nhave been impartial in attempting to curb Arab-Jewish hostilities. The major aims\nseem to have been to prevent general anarchy and full-scale war-at least until the\nforces themselves have withdrawn.\nIn the UN, the UK delegates have taken pains to acquaint the UN Commission\nwith the difficulties of the Palestine situation. They have advised the UN Commission\non administrative matters, on the question of the projected Jerusalem Trusteeship, and\non the setting up of provisional governments. They have refused, however, to assume\njoint responsibility with the Commission for the establishment of the new states in\nPalestine or to permit any development which might be interpreted as UK support of\none side against the other. On this ground, the UK has refused to open a port on\n1 February to unlimited Jewish immigration, as recommended by the UNGA resolution.\nc. Arab Activity.\nArab reaction to the UNGA partition plan was prompt and violent. Strikes\nand demonstrations led to scattered riots within Palestine, and Arab League action was\ninstituted by the Arab states. The sporadic violence in Palestine had developed by the\nmiddle of January into more highly organized hostilities. By the beginning of Febru-\nary disciplined Arab bands were operating in different parts of the country, and the\nArab Higher Committee claimed to be directing their activities. The nature of Arab\nactivities indicated that until the British withdrawal Arab objectives were limited to:\n(1) avoiding, if possible, hostilities with the British forces; (2) purchasing and captur-\ning essential supplies such as food, weapons, ammunition, and clothing; (3) disrupting\nJewish commerce, transportation, and communications without launching full-scale\nattacks; (4) recruiting volunteer forces, within and without Palestine, and training\nthem in guerrilla tactics; (5) setting up a unified military command; (6) establishing\ncontact with Arab League channels of assistance. The entire emphasis has been on\npreparation for the British withdrawal, and the Arab leaders have apparently attempted\nto hold back their surging followers.\nDuring a series of meetings at Sofar, Aley, and Cairo, Arab League representa-\ntives, despite differences of opinion, eventually evolved a program of action. The\nprogram, which in several particulars merely approved activities already under way,\n5"
}